

BRINDAVANA PUBLICATIONS

Raghavendra

SHRI
RAGHAVENDRA,
HIS LIFE AND WORKS;

Vol. III

By :


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PARIMALA



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PREFACE

We have great pleasure in releasing the third volume of 'Shri Raghavendra His Life and Works' for publication. Both the volumes have been published on the same day by His Holiness Shri Shri Sujayeendra Teerth Shripadaugal of Shri Raghavendra Swami matha. The function was held under the very shadow of the Brindavan during the second session of the Sameera Samaya Samvardhinee Sabha on the 4th July 1972. The eager readers, we hope would appreciate our haste in bringing out the volumes II and III.

In the third volume we introduce the readers to the Magnum opus of Shri Raghavendra viz 'Parimala's gloss on Nyaya Sudha of Jayatheertha. So long only Pandits enjoyed the heavenly effervescence of fragrance emitted by the ever blooming flower Nyaya Sudha through Parimala, the gloss on it. But now we hope to offer only a small whiff of that heavy odour through our volumes for the enjoyment of our readers. They will realise the depth of thought, the subtlety of reasoning, the breadth of vision, the profound scholarship and generous chivalry shown to the opponents in the duel of dialectical debate. To

understand Parimala even in this diluted form, the readers shall have to leave behind the hub bub of the world. A calm mind and a quiet place will make the reading easy and pleasant.

The work Parimala being a gloss has no continuity as it only conforms to the needs of elucidation of knotty points here and there. So we availed ourselves of the thread of continuity of the original work, wreathing the gems of thought culled from Parimala into a garland. How far we have been successful is left to be judged by the readers. We are quite aware of our own limitations but we assure the readers that we have spared no pains in making the composition as easy and readable as possible. Of course such works expect some back ground of literary and cultural discipline from the readers. We hope to publish, God willing, the next two Volumes IV and V as early as possible.

MANTRALAYAM
4th July 1972

G. B. JOSHI

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PART II
(CONTINUED)

SHRI RAGHAVENDRA'S WORKS

PARIMALA

A GLOSS ON NYAYASUDHA OF JAYA TEERTHA

(Volume III)

A NOTE ON PARIMALA

Parimala is heavy fragrance invading the nose in profusion and leaving it in delightful pleasure. It is the organised effort of a flower to spit forth into air particles of sweet smell without any idea of serving some purpose. It only fulfills its natural urge to express itself. Raghavendra called his learned commentary on Jayateertha's Nyayasudha, 'Parimala'. Nyaya-sudha in its turn is a scholarly exposition of Madhva's Anuvyakhyana devoted to elucidate Badarayana's Brahmasutras. Ultimately all these works are devoted to the study of Brahma sutras directly or indirectly.

Thus Parimala, a gloss on Jayateertha's Nyayasudha is indirectly a study of Brahmasutras, a metaphysical treatise discussing the nature of ultimate truth or Reality of this universe. Pari-

mala does the work of a commentary; it defines terms, explains difficulties, clears doubts, corrects misunderstandings, fills up the gaps, elucidates at large, pithy statements, summarises lengthy elaborations, exposes involved truths, so on and so forth. More than this, Raghavendra has certain convictions—logical certainties, intuitive truths, religious experiences which loom large on his mental horizon and urge expression. As the flower emits fragrance, his fully bloomed heart sends forth these sweet truths on account of his native urge and not with the idea of edification. This unconscious art has risen to the eminence of original work and affords the pleasure of truth and beauty to all senses. It is beautiful to the eye, sweet to nose, palatable to the tongue musical to the ear and pleasant to the touch—all ending in essential bliss to the Soul. So the name Parimala to this gloss is more than justified. For it is fully significant.

Such commentary literature usually begins with verses whose apparent purpose is to invoke blessings from all those that are superior to the author—both human and Superhuman. These verses seem to have no spark of real poetry. They are mere versifications no doubt. Even in the midst of this dry dreary desert we sometimes

find poetic flashes. But we must remember that these writers have shown themselves capable of writing not only scholastic poetry, but lyrical poetry scintillating with devotional sparks.

These versifications are not without justification. Each word is packed to the full with significance and purpose which when brought to light rises to the height of poetry. The intellectual display, critical analysis, justification of each word by showing the fulfilment of purpose, the mass of meaning that bursts out from the compact words and phrases, all standing in a divine glow of a wonderful statement, more than compensate for the lack of poetical spark. It is poetry in the garb of prose. Throw it away as prosaic verbose and it explodes into a display of rich colours of meaning covered with the smoke of mystery. Hence the commentators always labour hard to expose the meaning and significance of each word.

CHAPTER 1

“A bow to the Lord of Shri, who has a form noble with perfect and innumerable attributes, who has holy fame and whose form has given the devotee his native bliss. A bow to Brahman (Paramatman) who has an eternally charming form noble with perfect and innumerable attributes, and whose fame is sung by (the four faced) Brahma, Garuda and others. I take resort to the third incarnation of Vayu under whose control is found always, the whole of the universe comprising Shankara and others. May the sage Jaya-teertha, like the sun, help me with the enlightenment of Reality, with his rays which are the friends of the lotuses in the form of the good and dispel the darkness of the universe. May Vyasa-teerth the best of the sages, contribute to the richness of my knowledge as he is an authority in Grammar, Meemansa, and Brahma Tarka and is the sun to dispel the darkness of bad systems of Philosophy. Let me elucidate the work of Nyayasudha, as much as I can, falling at the lotus like feet of my (direct) teacher or Guru.”

Now Raghavendra begins his glittering gloss to Nyayasudha which begins with a benedictory verse comprising salutations to the same supreme deity, supplying reasons for salutation. These

reasons are that the deity, has a unique speciality (विशिष्टत्व), is a favourite choice (इष्टत्व) and has the privilege of close association with the subject matter (अधिकृतत्व). In elucidation of the first verse of Madhva (Anuvyakhyana) Jayateerth at the beginning of his work, salutes the deity endowed with speciality, affection and privileged authority. In the original Shri. Madhva says that Narayana is Superior to Shri, Brahman and all in general. Here Jayateerth tells us in his benedictory verse that Narayana is particularly the Lord of Lakshmi or Shri, as thereby he gets another purpose served. At the beginning of a book it is essential that Lakshmi, being the presiding deity over speech and mind, must be honoured with a salutation. So here Narayana is said to be "the lord of Shri". But she does not deserve an independent treatment. She accepts worship only as the wife of Narayana. Hence she is mentioned not in a compound but in a dissolved phrase. Narayana has been qualified in the verse of salutation of Madhva by two adjectives 'having a body of merely innumerable and unlimited attributes' and 'free from blemishes'. In order to show that one is to be construed as the reason for the other, Jayateerth uses the adjective 'One who dispels the whole of the wretched darkness by means of

the lustre of jewels in the form of eternal and innumerable attributes'. It is said 'Being eternally endowed with unlimited attributes, He is immune from the taint of any and every kind of blemish'. Therefore you cannot dream of blemishes like dependence and ignorance in Narayana when he is endowed with attributes like 'perfectly independent, fully omniscient, omnipotent in all respects, and rich with unlimited wealth.' Thus showing fullness of attributes as the reason for absence of blemishes he explains the word 'Brahma' in the Sutra as not only 'one full of attributes' but also as 'devoid of blemishes'. This also suggests that the words 'Narayana and Brahma' are synonyms and there can be no objection that while in Brahmatantra Narayana is saluted inconsistently with the original (which salutes Brahma).

Raghavendra offers another interpretation. In daily experience we see the invariable concomitance of merits and defects. Therefore if Narayana possesses merits he must be also tainted with defects. But further investigation reveals to us that where there are limited number of merits, we find defects. Here we find unlimited number of merits and hence there is no scope for defects in Narayana. Just to suggest this explanation

it is said that there are 'innumerable attributes' in Narayana.

It is said that Narayana's body is made up of knowledge and bliss. If so, knowledge is produced and perishes; and Narayana's body accordingly is perishable. To remove this doubt it is said that His attributes are 'eternal'. This suggests that the word 'always' should be construed with निखिल also. The word 'blemish' in 'blemishlessness' in the original has the connotation of 'all blemishes'. Hence Jayateerth explains it in his verse 'all blemishes'. In the original Shri. Madhva says that Narayana is "One who causes creation and other operations to this". 'This' includes all that is known to us. But 'this' does not include God. To indicate this Jayateerth in his verse says that "Narayana's form has the nature of causing creation to the world".

Jayateerth uses the word स्थेमा in जगज्जन्मस्थेम-रचनाशीलवपुषे. Raghavendra explains it grammatically as its etymological derivation seems to be doubtful. स्थेमा means स्थैर्य or रक्षा or protection, or sustenance. There is usage also of स्थेमा which is derived from the word स्थिर with the termination इमनिच्-स्थिर is then changed to स्था which with इमनिच् is changed स्थेमा. Still in Vamanavritti, the words मृग्य, प्रोढ and स्थिर are not included in the group of

पृथु and others which alone will have इमनिच्. So the word with इमानिच् as suffix in this instance is wrongly used. In spite of this objection, we find स्थेमा used in the twelfth chapter of Naishadha and while elucidating it the word is derived from स्थिर and इमानिच् which is joined to व्यन् by the force of the coordinate conjunction 'and'. Now स्थिर is found mentioned with दृढ and others and hence इमनिच् is justified after स्थिर. This shows clearly how deep Raghavendra has studied Grammar and Literature. He also mentions alternative derivation of the word स्थेमा involving the application of other rules of Grammar. That 'He is the cause of creation and others' in the verse of Jayateertha requires explanation. 'Creation and others' means naturally the eight fold activity of God Vishnu in cosmic creation like sustenance, destruction, control, cognition, ignorance, bondage and deliverance. But as this activity of the creator refers to all except God, only three activities of creation, sustenance, and destruction are meant as is explained in Viyadadhikarana. Because others are not applicable to all. 'Control' also is implied in the three.

God is engaged in the activity of cosmic creation. Has He any motive in this creative activity? He cannot have fallen into this huge

undertaking without selfish motive. No sensible man engages himself in any activity without any interest in it. If on the other hand it is admitted that some unfulfilled purpose has actuated Him into this activity, then He cannot be characterised as perfect having innumerable and unlimited attributes. When thus cornered Jayateertha escapes by saying that it is the habit of God to create and habit requires no settled purpose for its indulgence. This is explained in greater detail in the chapter on "purposeless activity". Hence it is suggested that He constantly goes on creating and doing other things, by construing *सृजति* or constantly with creating and doing other things.

God possesses a body in the form of essential attributes proving its conformity with, not only attributes like knowledge and bliss, but its consistency with His activities like creating and destroying. Hence Jayateertha says that "God possesses a body habituated to create, to sustain and to destroy." If not we also are liable to be accused of irrelevancy as we accuse Pashupatas of the same for calling a bodiless Pashupati as the creator of the world. For God without body cannot bring himself as creator into relationship with the world as creation.

God is said to be the main purport of good books or sentences which comprise revealed vedas and written works following them. Hari is the constant object of his love. This Hari is specially liked by him as He is characterised by eternal and essential attributes and not tainted by defects (विशिष्टत्व). He is an authorised deity (अधिकृतत्व) as He is the purport of all revealed works. He is his favourite (इष्टत्व) because He is Hari, meaning that he wards off all evils.

Here Hari is shown to be one with Narayana. Hence when Vyasa is said to be the incarnation of Hari, he is also the incarnation of Narayana. To show that Veda is the only evidence to prove the justification of the three adjectives [(1) having the body of innumerable and unlimited essential attributes (2) blameless and (3) the best aim to be achieved] of Hari, Jayateertha mentions "The import of all revealed and written works" at the end. Raghavendra intersperses his commentary with interesting references to derivations, explanations, definitions and usages. Sometimes knotty problems in grammar are taken out and explained. There is a rule in forming a compound of many words. A word of a few syllables is used first (अल्पाक्षर) and then words of more syllables. But this rule is mostly used only in its breach. For we find

नासिका स्तनयोः ष्मा घटोः Here नासिका a word of more syllables is used first and then स्तन of less syllables is used after that in the compound. In its place another rule prevails and that is 'the important' is given preference to. Hence the word आम्नाय is used first in the compound अशेषाम्नायस्मृतिहृदयदीप्तः

This is the type of commentary we get in Parimala. Elucidation of one verse extends to many pages which open a vista of meaning both expressed and suggested and build a magnificent mansion of rich thoughts and noble feelings. Just to illustrate what was said in the introduction about Parimala we went in detail through the exposition of the first verse of Sudha, in Parimala. Now we select and abridge from Parimala in order to adjust ourselves to the limitations of our volume.

In due course Jayateertha prays Anandateerth to grant him his desired object, which is the discerning of reality. This discerning should be determinate in character, with tested validity and untouched by doubts and unsullied by perverted notions. Anandateerth is prayed to be the most valuable instrument of knowledge. But it is very difficult to conceive Anandateerth to be the instrument as he is not a direct instrument of knowledge like senses or mind. Yet he is the

main spring of knowledge, by galvanizing the mind which plays an important part in producing knowledge.

Anandateerth is said to be an unsullied instrument of knowledge or Shudha Pramana. He has got all the common qualities with the logical instrument of knowledge. An incontrovertible instrument of knowledge invariably brings about valid knowledge of reality. This invariable concomitance between these two is positive and negative. Here Tattvajnana is Sadhya, a thing to be proved while Pramana is Hetu or reason. This Hetu when it is invariably associated with Sadhya in its negative and positive form that is a Hetu is invariably found with Sadhya and the absence of Sadhya is associated with the absence of Hetu. Such a Hetu has five forms (1) Presence in the वक्ष्य or receptacle (2) Presence in similar instances (3) Absence in dissimilar instances, (4) the topic should not have been proved otherwise by another evidence (5) The contrary of Sadhya should not have been proved by another reason. These are the syllogistic prerequisites which the Hetu must have before giving us a good judgement. Now Anandateerth has all these qualities of a good Hetu in him not literally but figuratively through pun or play on the word. Raghavendra explains

in what meaning the attributes of a sadhetu are justified in Anandateerth.

He exists in his Paksha or fold of devotees. Paksha is a place in which Sadhya is to be proved to exist. The devotees labour under a doubt whether 'the knowledge that Vishnu is Supreme is valid, or identity is true, is valid knowledge; they enjoy the pleasure of valid knowledge that Vishnu is Supreme. Hence they desire to prove the existance of Sadhya and they are Paksha. Ananda Teerth immerses his whole fold in the greatness of his magnificent personality. So Sadhya is found in the whole of Paksha,

A reason that is positively and negatively concomitant with Sadhya in the whole of Paksha, that is found in all positive instances and is not found in negative instances and invariably concomitant with Sadhya or thing to be proved is a good reason. Similar instances are Hari in whom reality is proved beyond doubt; and Anandateerth has a limited knowledge of Hari. For Anandateertha's knowledge grasps all things accompanied with deliberate consideration except in the case of Hari. Anandateerth is not engaged in serving the unfit or uneligible people. So he refrains from advising the impious and devilish people. Anandateerth is free from attachment

to prohibited things. Or he is free from delusion. Anandateerth belongs to Ruju yogi class, who are well known for having valid knowledge which apprehends things as they are. There is none to dispute his sound arguments.

Madhva is as good as an infallible argument, satisfying all the pre-requisites of syllogistic reasoning, and leading us all to valid knowledge quite determinate in character as it apprehends Vishnu as the supreme reality.

The verse though made up of dry technical terms is made to yield a sense, super-sensible in nature, noble in conception, in expression alone it is stern and stiff. But it has raised a magnificent mansion of metaphysical meaning placing before us the mystical significance of Madhv's role.

Raghavendra often discusses the meaning of the words and then he refers to different authorities on word-meaning. Mainly they are Koshas and they are many in number. While discussing the meaning and derivation of चंचरीकृति he explains it as चंचरीकवत्प्रमरवत्प्रवाचरति and quotes Shabdaratnakara इतिदिशममरवत्पदचंचरीका : In this context he says इतिदिशममरवत्पदचंचरीकः is a rare reading of Amarakosha which is clearly an interpolation as it is not found

in many copies of Amarakosha and it is not explained in the commentaries of the same. 'My mind behaves like a bee in the lotus of Anuvyakhyana'. He then gives the simple meaning removing the metaphorical meaning "My mind is often eager to elucidate the meaning of Anuvyakhyana".

Jayateerth in a very serious tone denies any qualification in him to authorise him to write the commentary on such a profound work as Anuvyakhyana. It is only the gracious blessing of his Guru that might make him bold to bear such a heavy responsibility. Thus the only strength on which he stands is the unfailing favour of his Guru. Hence he is accepted by all. This suggests that the voluminous commentary that he has written is already involved in the original. This only shows Jayateertha's modesty. Really speaking, he has all the qualifications necessary as he has gained, access to the ocean of words, skill in interpreting the meaning of the vedas, and proficiency in logical reasoning through the grace of his master; These qualifications are many and hence the plural number is used.

Raghavendra construes the verse in a different manner. Access to the vocabulary and others are objects of negation. Blessed with the favour

of the master is the reason for being accepted as authority. The construction is 'We are an accepted authority'. So 'We' has no adjectives to qualify. Unqualified 'We' is not an accepted authority. Hence there is no negation of the qualified 'We'. Here the person is single and yet plural is used.

Raghavendra finds himself hemmed in by limitations though there is much to be said about these verses. For in Sudha every sentence, why! every word is packed with rich meaning. Still in order to achieve brevity we stop indulging in prolixity.

Jayateertha now gives an introduction to the composition of Brahma Sutras. They were composed to investigate the nature of the highest reality. Yet they remained incompetent in achieving their object as they were interpreted by commentaries which confounded the issues and created confusion rather than elucidated the Sutras. Hence their composition was futile as they were not able to clear doubts and delusion of the pious aspirants. So Madhva wrote a commentary to reveal the meaning of the Sutras in the spirit of the author of the Sutras.

Now Shri, Madhva before begining his work offers salutations to God Narayana, in the form

of a verse to acquaint the readers with his intention and not to ward off evils; for he is above them. Besides his prayers are running concurrently with his breathing. Shri, Madhva does this Mangala in the form of supplicatory salutations to direct his disciples in this course of discipline which is inferred as having been ordained in the Shruties from the tradition of Vyasa and Manu who are accepted as authorities in this matter.

Shri Madhva uses in the salutatory verse a verb (सनमामि) without a subject for it. In order to remove this defect one should not in haste suggest that the word मम being changed to the nominative case would supply अहं the subject. For a student of grammar knows the Sutra अस्मद्युत्तमः and when अस्मद् is expressly used or not first person is used in order to suggest that meaning. So first person is invariably associated with अस्मद् or I. Hence I is the subject for सनमामि.

The adjectives used in the verse have no other purpose than panegyric. And these laudatory adjectives would please the Lord to the highest extent.

Madhva uses the word एक in निखिलपूर्णगुणं कदेहं. Now एक is used in numerical meaning and qualifies गुण; In the compound it is used in the nominative

case and then it is placed first in the compound and thus एक conflicts with निखिल. This doubt is cleared by noting that एक is not used numerically but is used in the meaning of केवल, एकमुख्यान्यकेवला : Raghavendra quotes authoritative statements to prove its usage in that sense. Amara while mentioning the meanings of दीर्घसूत्री and पुरोभाषी uses the word दीर्घकद्क् in which एक is used in the sense of केवल. In the same manner in काव्यप्रकाश Mammata uses 'ह्लादेकमयी' also in the meaning of केवल. Thus you find एक has no पूर्वनिपात in this meaning. Only while showing number, according to the Sutra पूर्वकालैकेति, एक has पूर्वनिपात or it is used in the beginning of the compound. Then the whole compound निखिलपूर्णगुणकदेह means one having for his body only, innumerable and unlimited attributes; and not a physical body. We can have an idea how Raghavendra's gloss is not only elaborate but scholarly and deep !

Hari gives birth and death to the world. Birth, sustenance, death are moving in a circle and it is very difficult to settle which is first, just as it is difficult to fix where the whirlpool in the river begins, so in जन्माद्यष्टक why begin with जन्म or birth ? It is because only those that are born, sustain and die. Hence Birth or जन्म is mentioned first.

अष्टक is the group of eight which happen to the world. These are birth, sustenance, death and control; knowledge, ignorance bondage and release. All these are not found to happen to all things in the world. The Lord Hari brings about birth, sustenance, death and control of all things sentient and insentient. Only the sentient beings get knowledge, ignorance, bondage and release from God. Hence God is the doer of these eight. Moksha is given to the pious only and not to all. So God doles out these eight to all as applicable to each one of them.

Shri Madhva while saluting Narayan mentions as one of His attributes, (अस्य उद्भवादिदं) one who gives birth and other things to this (world). Here Raghavendra discusses a question of grammar. For he is a great grammarian. Here in 'अस्य to this word' the genative is used; while Panini enjoins the use of dative in the sense of (संप्रदाने अनुर्थी संप्रदाने) which means giving away in great respect, a certain thing willingly disclaiming his ownership in favour of others. (बहुमानपूर्वं स्वत्वव्यागेन परसत्तापादनं संप्रदानं) But in 'mere parting with' dative is not used. For instance रजकस्य वस्त्रं ददाति. He gives his clothes to a washerman. Here there is no question of disclaiming one's ownership. Hence the genative is used. So in अस्य उद्भवादिदं there is no

संप्रदान or disclaiming of one's ownership. Here genative is used by the Sutra विशेष्येष्टि, showing mere relationship without any specific implication of संप्रदान. We stop the discussion here fearing boredom though it is prolonged in the original.

While explaining अस्य उद्भवादिदं Jayateertha adds a qualification to अस्य and that is स्वव्यतिरिक्तस्य. God gives birth to all except to Himself. For God being eternal has neither birth nor death. So He is excluded. Now the objection is why exclude God alone. For there are certain eternal catagories like Primordial matter, soul, Time, Vedas, and others which are everlasting, being free from birth and death. So these also must be excluded from the clutches of birth and death.

Jayateerth replies this query. Creation or birth is different with different things. The eternal things that are mentioned above have a birth in the form of subjecting them to dependence, (पराधीन विशेषावाप्ति) which will apply to all except God. Now in-sentient Prikriti undergoes modification. Lakshmi who presides over Prikriti 'Cherishes desire to create' (सिद्ध्यन्ता), unchangeable Akasha (ether) gets contact with concrete things (मूर्तसंयोगित्वं) Souls like Matarishva and others get bodies (देहयोगः). Subtle senses get into collective concretion

(उपचयः). Creation comprises all these different kinds of changes. Now Sustenance or स्थिति is explained in the case of souls as by giving food while in the case of others, it is association with future time. In the same manner merging or लय is explained in the case of insentient productions as physical destruction, in the case of souls bodily destruction, and Lakshmi gets close vicinity and so on and so forth. All this is in Viyadadhikarna.

Even small words are held significant and they lend charm to the whole statement in which they are used. For instance the word अपि is a conjunctive indeclinable and joins together many words of similar grammatical status. There is another meaning of अपि which is 'in all respects or fully, comprehensively' (अभिव्याप्तौ) अपि अखिलैः सुवाक्यैः आप्यतमं 'excellently propounded by sentences of valid verity comprehensively'. Now अपि gives us the meaning that those sentences do not propound Narayana along with others; but treat Him exclusively in their best meaning, in all their meaning (यावदर्थक अपिपद). Some even go to the length of saying that अपि suggests that the sentences expound Him even by their words, letters and accents.

Moreover this अपि in the second sense of comprehensiveness averts the futility of its use.

For the Vedas no doubt do not expound **वर्म** in all their statements; yet besides Narayana they also treat Vayu or Prana in the whole of the Veda, as stated in the Bhashya of Aitareya Upanishad. Hence the exclusive privilege of being treated by the whole of the Vedas is also shared by Prana. Then **अपि** would have been futile. But fortunately Vayu is treated in all the vedas except in Vishnu Sukta, Purusha Sukta and Lakshmi Sukta. But Narayana has no such exceptions. Hence Narayana alone is exclusively propounded by all the Vedas, while others are propounded as subordinate to Him.

Raghavendra supplies sources for the statements made by Jayateerth proving their authenticity. Jayateertha states that it is very difficult to conceive whether God Narayana has any body. For with body He is subject to many sufferings; and without body He cannot claim knowledge.

For this statement is derived from the Sutras like **करणवच्चेन्नभोगादिभ्यः** in Patyu Adhikarana fully. The second alternative is treated in **अंतवत्त्वं असर्वज्ञतावा** while rebutting this dilemma Jayateertha says that God has a body of essential attributes like knowledge, bliss and others. This is based on the Sutras **विकरणत्वाच्चेति चेदुक्तं** and **आहूततन्मात्रं**.

At this stage an objection is raised that salutations to Narayana at the beginning of the commentary on Brahmasutras cannot be justified. For at the beginning of a book devoted to the treatment of Brahma, Brahma should be paid a homage and not Narayana. This objection is proved to be baseless for both Narayana and Brahma are not only the same in identity but the same in significance. For both mean, as they will be shown later on, the same thing viz. 'Full of essential and auspicious attributes'.

Raghavendra approaches Sudha of Jayateertha as an humble student and wherever he finds difficulty in construing, he elucidates it. For instance the use of a pronoun creates confusion when its noun cannot be easily traced. In Sudha Jayateertha uses the pronoun तदर्थं and the noun, in the place of which this pronoun (तत्) is used, is to be found in the previous sentence. So Raghavendra explains it as नारायणशब्दार्थं and अनेन as इल्लोकेन which does not at all occur in the previous sentences.

Raghavendra is an adept in the art of teaching also; and he has inherited that art from his pontifical ancestors. It is through creating curiosity that one should conduct lessons of instruction. A new subject to be taught success-

fully must be introduced first in brief outline which will create curiosity for greater details. That is why Madhva salutes first Narayana. For 'Narayana' introduces the whole of Shastra or holy discipline in brief, in the salutation—verse. Thus knowing the subject matter in outline in the first verse, the reader is curious to know the whole of the Shastra in detail which is further developed attracting the attention of the student. प्रपञ्च जिज्ञासुः and not प्रपञ्चस्य जिज्ञासुः means 'desirous to know the detailed propagation of the subject.

Jayateerth in Sudha nicely expounds how the whole of the Shastra is introduced in a nutshell in the salutation—verse. The adjectives that qualify Narayana bring with them the pith of Shastra. Narayana is said to be 'fit for salutation (सदावर्च) always'. This is the meaning of the first Sutra. For जिज्ञासा or meditation is the inclination of the mind to admire or to worship or वन्दन. Not the soul but the supreme spirit or Brahma is to be worshipped. That is expatiated upon in "one having the body of innumerable and unlimited attributes" which is the meaning of Brahma as shown in the second sutra. The third sutra adduces Shastra as evidence in this matter viz, Brahma is full of attributes on the strength of its being the creator, sustainer and destroyer of

this world. For this, in the second sutra, we get the definition of Brahma. Thus we see that the third sutra is put between the first and the second. For thus the construction becomes easy. But in Sannyaya Ratnavali and Nayachandrika a different interpretation is given of the four adjectives qualifying Narayana. These four adjectives epitomise in order the four Adhyayas of Brahma sutras.

The remaining of the Adhyaya is an illustration of this truth. All this is summarised in the adjective आद्यतमं. 'Who is predominantly propounded by all the Shastras'. The doubts that arise in the statements made in the first Adhyaya are cleared in the second Adhyaya. That we find succinctly expressed by निर्दोष 'one having no defects'. In order to show that even this defectlessness is warranted by Shastras the meaning of the third Sutra is introduced before the meaning of the second Sutra.

Now how to get immediate intuitive vision of that Brahma ? We must get acquainted with the Shastras in an attitude of detachment and devotion; This is the subject matter of the third Adhyaya and this is implied by प्रियतमं and आद्यतमं (most dear and chiefly propounded). Raghavendra explains why Jayateerth puts these two together.

For one who is most dear is prominently propounded; or one who is most dear means one who is chiefly propounded; or 'one who is predominantly propounded' is to be reread with 'One who is most dear'. If the alternative of re-reading (अनुवृत्ति) is to be accepted, then the relationship between the two is the causal. Because it is most dear it is chiefly to be known. For predominantly propounded thing becomes dear to us and we entertain a desire to acquire it. Mental acquisition is nothing but knowing a thing. No doubt the object which is most dear to us evokes a feeling of devotion and hence प्रियतम touches the topic of अन्ति or devotion. But it is beyond our imagination to think that अशेषविशेषतोपि प्रियतमं. आप्यतमं suggests renunciation or वैराग्य. For it only means 'dear and fit to be acquired from all points of view'. Raghavendre explains this construction grammatically. अशेषविशेषतः has a termination तस् of the ablative case. After this ablative a gerund (ल्यप्) is understood. We must supply that gerund and change the case of Ablative to accusative (कर्म). So the construction is "It must be acquired or known, leaving or setting aside all pleasures of life" which amounts to renouncing all pleasures of life. This is वैराग्य which is the topic of the third Adhyaya. (अशेषान् विषयविरोधान् विहाय बन्धं आप्यतमं).

This cannot be a special privilege of Shri Madhva, as all qualified aspirants are eligible to get god-vision. Then why should Madhva arrogate to himself alone this attribute? (मम-वृत्ति and अप्य) Raghavendra makes this clear on the strength of a Sutra in III Adhyaya 'इयदामननात्' in which it is made clear that among those who meditate Mukhya Prana is one who has reached the highest Standard. Now Shi Madhva, being the incarnation of Mukhya Prana, has the highest eligibility for meditation.

In the fourth we know what boon God grants to those with whom he is pleased. That is also suggested by the attribute (आप्यतम) fit to be obtained.

In poetry expression is tinged with imagination and emotion, rich in suggestion, deep and solemn in thought and inspiring the souls and transporting them to the joys of heaven, hence more affective than cognitive. But in philosophy the aim is different. It is clearness and perspicuity in thought unaffected by sentiments and hence perspicuity is the quality we seek in expression used in philosophy. So usage is deliberate and carefully considered.

Hence Shri Madhva makes a statement that 'I begin my commentary'. Really his commentary

begins from *सोतस्ववाची* which is one of the coming verses. Hence he ought to have said (I shall begin my commentary)'and not 'I begin my commentary' as done now.

Besides the present tense is used to show time that is present before it ends. Hence it cannot show future tense. To this objection the reply is that the present tense is used to show the time that is very near the present. Or another reason is adduced for the use of the present. Briefly the commentary has already begun so that knowing the subject matter in outline the reader would be able to understand its exposition at large.

Shri. Madhva now salutes the same god Narayana in the form of Vyasa, as his Guru. He explains how Narayana is his Guru. Vyasa has interpreted to Madhva all composed and revealed works (*अपौरुषेय*). Narayana is Guru directly and not through Brahma and others as in the case of common people in the world.

But in the world often we do not see the same man saluted differently for different purposes. A father is not saluted by the son twice, once as father and once as master.

The objection is explained away by an instance in the ritual of the sacrifice. So in Narayana two

causes like godhood and teacherhood are merged in one, for separate salutations. Yet salutation for His greater satisfaction should be done separately in order to show His greatness. Then it would have been better had the second salutation been done independently in the mind. Even this objection is set aside by stating that the second salutation is done openly in the book itself to guide the disciples in such matters, even in future time. The disciples have their divinity and preceptorhood different and not merged in one as in the case of Madhva. Hence they must be guided in salutation.

It is one of the main functions to be done by the gloss that wherever the flourish of the language hides the syllogistic reasoning, the premises and conclusions are presented in strict logical form casting away other encumbrances to make the argument lucid for refutation or propogation.

Raghavendra in this context puts the argument in the form of Indian syllogism of five limbs. The Brahma Sutras beginning with अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा is not fit to be commented upon.

For "that aphorism is not composed with the intention of imparting some meaning.

Like the combination of क, ख, ग, घ, ङ, without any meaning.

That which is fit for comment is always intended to convey some meaning.

You cannot say that aphorisms are intended to convey some meaning. For we infer that,—

the book under discussion is not intended to convey meaning."

For there are no evidences to prove the intention. If it is disputed that 'No evidence' cannot be proved then it is analysed into three alternatives; (1) evidence of composition (2) of meaningful composition (3) of valid and meaningful composition.

Evidence of mere composition does not prove its intention to convey meaning. It must be meaningful composition. Even then there are some mystic and symbolic incantations meant to neutralise the evil effect of serpent poison. They need not be commented upon.

They must be meaningful and hence accepted by the wise as useful. Then only they are fit for interpretation and explanation. Even then there must be sound reason for its elucidation leaving other valid and meaningful compositions.

All these objections are set aside by one statement that the Brahma Sūtras are called 'Paravidya' in the Upanishads. It is said that there are two means of knowledge. One is lower and

that consists of the four Vedas and its dependent sciences which help their interpretation like Shiksha, Kalpa and others. Then the second means or Vidya is higher or Para, which is Bramha Shastra. Hence Shri. Madhva chose it for his commentation, as these aphorisms are composed by no less an authority than Vedavyasa himself. Hence Brahma sutras are called Para or the best and most authorised source of Brahmajnana. Hence it is called Brahmatantra as it gives a correct conception of Brahma or the highest reality.

Casually Jayateerth states that other interpretations of Para Vidya and Aparā Vidya are not warranted by recognised evidences. An objection is raised against the interpretation of Paravidya as the best Shastra. For Vidya from its derivation means a source of knowledge of the Vedas through the attempt of the disciple. But Shastra from its derivation means an aid used by the preceptor in his attempt to teach the Vedas. Thus we see that one is the aid to the attempt of the disciple while the other is the aid to the attempt of the preceptor. So one cannot be the interpretation of the other.

But the reply is that Shri Madhva interpreted Vidya as Shastra dis-regarding the difference due

to the attempts of the disciple and preceptor, and taking only the common factor of "the aid to the teaching of the Vedas".

But this interpretation that Paravidya, or Brahmatantra clashes against the commentary on Atharvana Upanishad in which Vedas like Ric and others are called Paravidya and not the Brahma Sutras; while here they are called Aparavidya.

This conflict is reconciled by allowing the Vedas also the name of Paravidya when they connote by derivation the meaning of Vishnu. When they do not do so they are Aparavidya. The reconciliation is restricted to those portions of the Vedas which are called Mantras and Brahmanas. For primarily they denote sacrificial acts and deities, while by derivation they connote Vishnu. But Upanishads primarily and derivatively mean Vishnu alone. When they mean Vishnu there need be no such distinction. For Brahma Sutras depend on the whole of the Vedas to arrive at correct conception of Brahma.

Now look to the unquestionable reliability of the Brahma Sutras and their sound validity as the guarantors of knowledge of Brahma. Vedavyasa is a well-disposed and competent teacher to the earnest hearers Brahma, Rudra and others

discoursing on a congenial occasion, with the intention of benefitting the hearers with the nature of Brahman. Hence it has got all the good qualities of an authoritative work.

Besides Vedavyasa is said to be the master of the world teachers like Brahma and Rudra. So his deep knowledge of Vedanta can be inferred. And he being the author of the Magnum Opus in Vedanta (Brahma Sutras) his omniscience and sound condition of senses can be accepted. In the same manner Brahma, Rudra and others are fit disciples being posted as the teachers of the world. And their very names convey to us that they are dearest favourites of Lord Hari.

In the Shastras composed by Budha who is said to be Hari himself and in many others these reasons for undisputed reliability might be found singly; but collectively they are not found. Hence they are not accepted as authoritative works.

But the works of Budha are endowed with all these reasons collectively and yet they are not considered as authoritative works for an aspirant; For, as described in the 32nd Chapter of Mahabharat Tatparya Nirnaya though the works of Budha are even addressed to the gods like Brahma and Rudra, yet they are not taught there with

the intention of paving the path to Mukti or Salvation. But what is written in those works by itself stands reliable. If that is contested and Budha's works are considered as unreliable documents of philosophy, it is because they are not composed by Vyasa the author of all Shastras.

In this inference of the authoritative reliability of the Brahma Sutras, the instance quoted is Mahabharat. There is no dispute about its reliability; for it is a work meant to guide us to Mukti as it is taught to the teacher of the teachers. He is said to be the author of Shastras and hence the fact that it is composed by Badarayana is accepted by all great men. Thus Bharat is fit to be an instance of accepted authority by all.

Or the inference giving us the required conclusion can be put syllogistically in another form. The form of the inference already laid down is "The disputed Shashtra or Brahmasutra is a reliable source of valid knowledge; For it is composed by Vyasa with the intention of facilitating the Moksha of Brahma, Rudra and others.

The accepted instance is Bharat which is composed by Vyasa for facilitating the Moksha of Brahma and Rudra.

Now an inference formally different from the present one is presented. "The disputed work can be accepted as reliable; for the composition is from the hand of an accepted author (Apta). The other reasons cited before will all go to prove that Vyasa is an accepted author. The acceptability of a work as a reliable source of valid knowledge depends upon three factors. The work should be from the pen of an authority. It must be rigorously faithful to Shruties and it must be consistent in its logical argumentation. Now another may be added to these three requisites, and that is, it must have been composed specially for facilitating Moksha to Brahma Rudra and others. If a work on Moksha Shastra satisfies all these four conditions its authority is par excellence.

Here a doubt arises. Authority par excellence does not require four conditions. For, of these four we have two similar conditions which treat of the same subject as Brahma Sutras and yet prove the authoritativeness of these Sutras. 'Faithful to Shruties', 'Consistently logical in arguments' have the same subject matter and hence they both form one group; 'composed with the intention of yielding Moksha' and 'composed from the pen of an authority' - these two do not treat the same subject yet they support the

authoritativeness of the Brahmasutras. These two dissimilar conditions form the second group. Thus there are only two conditions and not three.

All these doubts are cleared by a different interpretational adjustment. The disputed authority of Brahma sutras is not directly proved but in-directly. First they are the statements made by authoritative persons like Vedavyasa. This is proved by the fact that a well disposed master, with the pious intention of doing good to the disciples, has given a discourse to earnest hearers. Then such Brahma Sutras are authoritative because they are the statements made by reliable persons.

Now who is this reliable person ? Reliability consists in real knowledge of the subject matter, absence of desire to deceive, eagerness to treat the Subject and senses in sound condition. One who has got this reliability is a reliable person.

But this definition of a reliable person is defective; for 'One who or he who' is not a common form to be found in all the reliable persons. For a definition should be found to cover all cases that come under the category of a defined object. But as there is no universal of oneness and whoness we shall have to take individuals that come

under that category; then definition is restricted only to one individual. Hence a definition commonly found covering all defined objects cannot be found.

But Jayateertha is not bewildered by such bluffs. For he belongs to a School which does not recognise a universal, single, and consistently found common in all individuals of a particular class. There is not one 'Horseness' to be found in all horses. Still horseness in one horse is similar to the horseness in another; hence we say that a horse is a horse. So the definition of a reliable person will cover all such persons who are reliable though there is no one reliability to be found in all reliable persons, on the strength of similar reliabilities. Hence lack of universality is not a defect in universals; For similarity will do its work.

An author may be reliable and still his statement or composition may not be a source of valid knowledge. For there are poets and novelists like Bhavabhuti and Kalidas who write dramas like *Malati Mhadava* and *Megha Sandesh* which have never happened. This cannot be an objection to the definition of a reliable person who is defined to be reliable only in respect of compositions based on real happenings. Raghavendra adds that Bhavabhuti is not considered a reliable person in

that respect; and hence his dramas are not a source of valid knowledge.

Another objection is that a sound reliable person babbles unintelligible sentences which cannot be a source of valid knowledge; or he uses sentences which are liable to be wrongly interpreted.

This is not a sound objection. For a person suffering from the lack of good instrument of speech or endowed with wrong knowledge have no reliability at all; For the constituents of reliability being absent, it is seriously affected. Hence they are not reliable sources of valid knowledge.

Now all this attempt is calculated to prove the sound reliability of the Brahmasutras to produce valid knowledge by inference. But it is the accepted principle of Badarayana that validity of knowledge is self evident. This means that we come to know that Shastra generates valid knowledge by the same instrument by which we know that it produces knowledge. This is the self evident nature of an instrument like Shastra. Badarayana has admitted this principle and hence the futility of the inference to prove that Shastra produces valid knowledge. Because the instrument of both is the same. Now the inference through the reason of 'a statement by a reliable

person' proves that it is the instrument of valid knowledge; it must also prove that it is the instrument of knowledge. For both the instruments are one and the same. But suppose they are different yet you can infer that Shastra produces knowledge, being the composition by a reliable person. From this inference alone you can also know that Shastra produces valid knowledge. It may be objected that first the inference proves that Shastra produces knowledge and then it proves that it produces valid knowledge, in succession. But 'knowledge is valid' is simultaneously born with knowledge. Unlike this we do not know that the instrument that produces knowledge also produces valid knowledge.

Suppose we infer that this Shastra which produces knowledge, also produces valid knowledge for the reason of being the composition by a reliable person. Then in the next statement Shastra is going to be proved that it produces valid knowledge; because it is based on both Shruti and inference; and these objections and answers are based on the future statement. Hence it is coherent with the statement that 'without any corroboratory evidences the Shastras are known to be the source of valid knowledge, or the validity of Brahma Sutras means the validity of the

knowledge produced by the Sutras. "These are the statements made by reliable persons' means 'the knowledge produced by the statements of reliable persons'. And the validity of the knowledge produced by the Sutras is cognised by Saskhi the internal instrument and not by inference. Hence it is wrong to propose an inference to prove that the Sutras produce valid knowledge on the strength of their being a composition by a reliable person. Badarayana also in his Sutras states that knowledge produced is said to be known to be valid by itself (self evident).

Or this Shashtra is an instrument of valid knowledge; because it produces knowledge other than indefinite or perverted as in the case of an accepted sentence. And these three reasons (of आप्ति, श्रुति and दृष्टि for समाख्य) adduced are helpful to prove that Shastras have indisputably these three reasons. That is how the objection and reply are to be interpreted.

But really speaking the objection means that, as soon as we hear a statement made, we apprehend its meaning, and we infer its knowledge-producing capacity which is the cause, from the effect, namely apprehension of the meaning; from the same reason, valid knowledge producing capacity also is inferred. This is self evidence in an

instrument of knowledge. This is the contention of the objector.

Raghavendra spares no pains in elucidating and enlarging the statements which give a little scope to doubt or double meaning. He tolerates no equivocation either in the objector or in the proposer. For a clarity in expression is a prerequisite to arrive at a fair judgement. The objector is not slightly treated but his side is fairly presented by Raghavendra who is not afraid of making him as strong as possible. Then he comes to grips with his opponent, whose fall is then complete and irrecoverable. Here we see his dialectical skill and fairness of judgement.

Jayateerthahas quoted two sutras to corroborate his statement, but he had not explained them fully. Now Raghavendra explains them and shows how they corroborate the statement made by Jayateertha. One sutra is (नविलक्षणत्वात् तस्य तथात्वं च शब्दात्) that Veda and other shastras are peculiar in the respect that they do not require any corroborative evidences to prove that they are sources of valid knowledge, as they are self evident. Jaimini also in one of his Sutras says that Badarayana accepts the principle of self evidence in respect of Vedas and other Shastras. For a word is naturally connected with its meaning

and Vedas hence connote a meaning which is not wrong and not doubtful. So this amounts to mean that the Vedas convey some meaning which is not wrong and not doubtful. Hence when they teach something not warranted by other means of knowledge they do not need any other evidences. Jaimini quotes this as the opinion of Badarayana.

Still sometimes we utilize other evidences like inference to eschew invalidating blemishes of unripe thinking.

Raghavendra is also very critical about readings. In Geeta Bhashya we read in the VII Adhyaya श्रीसौ तावन्मो ज्ञेयो जीवेश्वरसंज्ञितो. This has a different reading जीवश्चपरमस्तथा which Raghavendra, in his grim humour says that it is the fruit of the Scribe's brain (लेखकायत्तः) A long discussion is instituted on the advisability of commenting a work which has not saluted God in the form of Mangala. For it is an accepted practice upheld by tradition that an author desirous of finishing his work without obstacles begins his work with a solemn salutation praying for the uninterrupted achievement. Brahmasutras have no such salutations. Hence it has insulted the age long practice amounting to heterodox heresy. Hence Shri. Madhya a staunch follower of tradition ought not to have commented upon Brahma Sutras, a heretical work.

But Mangala is not proved to be the cause of unhindered finishing of the work. For in actual life we see that many works are completed without Mangalacharana; while works done with Mangala have remained unfinished. But if such a destructive argument is pushed to its worst consequence then we shall have to give up performing even Karere yaga which is performed to revive half dried crops. Because such a breach of the causal law is found in that context also when once the rule is established by the authority of Veda that for a particular purpose a particular sacrifice should be performed if the fruit is not coming forth in spite of the performance, it does not nullify the rule; but it only pleads for inefficient performance or some such cause for the failure of the object.

On the other hand even without the means prescribed by the Vedas a man may get the same fruit mentioned in the Vedas. Here an instance is given. There is one ritual called Darsha consisting of Agneya yaga, Dadhi yaga and Payoyaga which are to be performed on Amavasya (new moonday). Similarly Purnamasa consists of Agneya upanshu and Agnishomiya to be performed on the full moon day. If these two are performed one gets heaven. In the same manner if a Shudra

serves the upper three castes along with pilgrimage and dip in the holy rivers and charity he gets the same heaven. So also rains and revival of the half dried crops are possible by some other means.

Insufficiency in cause attended with failure of producing effect does not prove that the cause is not a cause. Hence the objection that Mangala must be performed and has not been performed is sound and must be replied.

But this objection is honoured with acceptance. Mangala must be performed and has been performed and has been inserted in the beginning of the work. Mangala is performed with the insertion of ओम् at the beginning of the Sutras. (ॐ अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा). Now Omkara is a word referring to the subject of discussion. Yet here it is explained as auspicious Mangala. For the word signifying the subject is Brahma and hence Omkara need not do the same function of supplying the subject.

Now Omkara and the first Atha are both auspicious in nature and suggestion. But auspiciousness is [not their word meaning. Having different meanings both the words imply with suggestion auspiciousness. Just as a woman with her husband alive carrying a pot full of water on

her head, though for different purpose yet for the man who meets her, suggests, as a good omen, auspiciousness.

Hence all objections, raised that auspiciousness connoted by this word cannot be syntactically connected with the statement 'Brahma should be investigated' have no meaning. For auspiciousness is not the connoted meaning of this word; but it is only the suggested meaning which is neither primary nor secondary meaning of this word Omkara.

Though both the words suggest auspiciousness yet syntactically their position is not the same in the first Sutra. For Omkara though read with the Sutra does not form an organic part of the sentence as Atha (अथ) does. Atha is vitally connected with the purport of the sentence while Omkara though invariably recited at the beginning of Vedic hymns does not participate in enriching the meaning of the statement. Hence it is argued that the Omkara at the beginning of the Sutra, though pronounced regularly, does not form a syntactical part of the Sutra as it is not pronounced closely with the Sutra without any grammatical reasons for it, like the Omkara pronounced at the beginning of the study of Veda by the students of Veda. Had it been an organic part

of the Sutra it would have been closely connected with it like the word अथ. Sometimes when words in a sentence are pronounced dissociated with other parts (as in हरी इहोपवक्षतः) there is grammatical reason for it. Here हरी is a dual ending in long ई and hence by the rule ईद्वेद्विवचनं प्रग्रहं it stands without coalescing with the following vowel. Here Omkara does not coalesce with अथ for any grammatical rule. Hence it does not form part of the syntactical construction.

Now the instance given in Omkara recited at the beginning of Vedic recitation. This does not form an organic part of the Veda recited. Because it is used at different places in Veda wherever it is chosen for recitation like a chanted interjection (स्तोत्र) in Samaveda (Such as hum, ho). At the most Omkara can claim a place of necessary requisite in the recitation of Veda just as facing the east, sitting in a holy place and others are pre-requisites of Vedic recitation. But it can never form a part of Sutra. Its only purpose is to serve solemn auspiciousness as a sign of unhindered completion of the work begun when pronounced at the beginning of the Sutra. This practice is not blind but it follows a warning given in Smṛiti. "If Omkara is not used in the beginning the study of Veda proves abortive as the pouring of water

in an unbaked earthen pot. If again it is not completed with Omkara ;it is frustrated in its object.” Hence all the Sutras both at the beginning and at the end must be recited with Omkara, which must be supposed to be existing at both the poles of the Sutras. But this goes against what is stated in Sudha that the Omkara and Atha are both placed at the beginning of the Sutra. For what is already used cannot be supposed to be existing. If that is true then Atha also must be supposed to be existing though it is really existing.

The reply is that Sudhakara means that both are there in the beginning of the Sutra. It might be that Atha is actually placed and Omkara also, though not placed is said to be so. Or because Sutrakara supposes that Omkara to be at the beginning and hence it is as good as placed with Atha. All that Sutrakara has said is that अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा; but by the strength of the Shruti Vakya Omkara is to be pronounced at the beginning and at the end. Therefore Omkara and Atha are jointly said to be at the beginning, and not that Omkara and Atha are on the level when their position in the Sutra is considered. Hence in the Bhashya there is elucidation of the Sutra beginning with Atha. Hence also it is said that all Sutras

begin with Atha and Atah; they only are used in the beginning.

Or as explained in Chandrika Omkara is said to be of the same status as that of Atha. Therefore they stand at the beginning, on the strength of Smriti. It is not the one referred to in the Shruti quoted before. But that Shruti also might be taken as implied in the statement.

Some others still contend that Sutrakara has expressively used Omkara at the beginning of the Sutra. 'Supposed to exist' only that it is based on the Shruti "Sutra or Veda without Omkara becomes futile". Really speaking though pronounced at the beginning it is not organised into the Sutra like the word अथ.

To all this objection Sudhakara gives a stunning reply. We do admit that it is supposed to exist on the strength of the Shruti statement. A word supposed to exist on the strength of some implication cannot but be a part of the sentence. If not, anything, supposed to exist in a Mantra, will not form a part of that Mantra. Then if Omkara is the part of the Sutra what about the evidences which contend its dissociation from the Sutra ? They must be interpreted so as to conform to this fact that Omkara is a part of the Sutra. If it is to be repeated at the beginning and end

of every Sutra, it is a tedious process. Hence it is repeated only at the beginning of the first Sutra and that too uncoalesced so that it should not be supposed that it is only the part of the first Sutra. On the other hand it should be repeated with every Sutra after the first. Therefore it is separately recited.

Now the Omkara at the end of the first Sutra is not a part of the Sutra; it is repeated for some (अदृष्टफल) fruit. Hence though it is not separated there is no such doubt as about the first Omkara. But here 'part' does not mean organic syntactical part; it is only a conglomeratory part, (अवयवशब्दः उपकारमात्रपरः) used for same beneficitation.

With this much of introduction the real elucidatory commentary begins. In the first Sutra the first word is अथ. Vachaspati contended that अथ did not mean auspiciousness. Hence it is not a syntactical part of the sentence अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा Vivaranakara, admits that the word अथ has the meaning of auspiciousness but it is construed in the sentence either keeping it in the same case with other words or in a different case from that of the word. To both these contentions the reply is that अथ does not connotationally mean auspiciousness. अथ only means 'afterwards' and indirectly suggests auspiciousness.

Thus it is proved that Sutras are the valid instruments of knowledge of Brahma and auspicious salutations are performed at the beginning and hence 'Brahma Sutras' is fit to be commented upon. And hence the commentary of Madhva begins from the verse.

Intelligent people will be inclined to read a book when they know the subject matter of the book and other allied things about the book. They must have a clear idea about the purpose the book serves. Then they know for whom the book is written. In this context the Brahma Sutras treat of Brahma which is its subject matter. Through the knowledge of Brahma one is authorized to get Moksha which is the purpose the book serves.

After a full knowledge of these factors one will be tempted to read the Brahma Sutras. Are these prerequisites of reading activity mentioned in the Brahma Sutra or are they mentioned somewhere else? If these are mentioned somewhere else they need not be dilated upon here. If these are mentioned in the first Sutra itself then how one is to be tempted to read the first Sutra itself? For first Sutra has no allotted separate purpose mentioned somewhere else.

For in order that you should know the purpose of the knowledge of Brahma to be generated by the Sutra जन्माद्यस्ययतः the second Sutra of Brahma Sutras for its motivation you should have the first Sutra अथातोब्रह्मजिज्ञासा, then for the motivation of the first Sutra you do want another Sutra proving the purpose of the knowledge of Brahma to be generated by the first Sutra, and that for that Sutra another Sutra and so on and so forth. To avoid this infinite regression if you admit that one is tempted to read the first Sutra without the mention of its motivation, then one will be equally tempted to read the Second sutra without any motivation for it as mentioned in the first Sutra.

To get out of this jumble, Jayateertha clears the meaning of प्रवृत्ति or inclination or will to activity. The tendency of the mind is of three kinds- Experience or knowledge, will or desire and activity. Then desire is of two kinds one is desire to know the means and the other is to know the end. Now Pravritti is desire and will in respect of the means; and neither experience nor knowledge, nor the desire for the end is Pravritti. Raghavendra clears the notion of experience or knowledge. It is the knowledge of the means to the end chosen by man. This is not Pravritti and hence you need not attempt to know their moti-

vation. If Pravritti meant valid knowledge of the means as the means only and the desire of the end, then you are justified in asking for the motivation of Pravritti, so that certainty of the means to the end or desire for the end itself would have been necessary.

We shall never cease to know an object which is fit to be rejected; nor do we grudge to desire happiness because it has no other end. Now Swarga or heaven is not coveted by one who is after Mukti. Even then that aspirant of Mukti knows that Swarga is obtainable by sacrifices. For even though this aspirant has an aversion for heaven (wishing for some thing higher) he will surely understand the meaning of the statement 'one after heaven should perform the sacrifice Jyotistoma' when he reads it, if he knows how to interpret it.

Thus when we know from the first Sutra that the present Shastra is meant to facilitate the end desired by man we need not know that it is the means to that end. Similarly why should not desire and effort also function without the knowledge of their being the means to the end? Desire and effort do not function of their own accord. For no body desires for food or tries for it without the knowledge that food satisfies hunger.

Hence the purpose and other things propounded by the first Sutra are quite essential if one is to be induced to enter into it, for its perusal.

Even when the first Sutra affords proper motivation still how should the reader rely upon its assurance ? some satisfy this doubt by saying that a good intentioned writer writes the book and that hence it must have proper motivation. To this the objection is that a reader is not satisfied that the present work has some purpose to serve. But he must be assured that the work serves his purpose. Then only he would devote his time for the reading of the work. Besides even when we do not know him to be a good intentioned writer we can accept the enterprise of reading the book just as a farmer undertakes cultivation even when his crop is not assured by good rains. So there is no justification for the motivation given by the first Sutra. It cannot also be said that the first Sutra helps the reader to specify the doubt of the particular alternatives (Namely whether they help to get Moksha or not.) For the reader expects to know the motivation from the source by which he is induced to undertake reading the work. Besides the reader is not satisfied with the mere supply of motivation but he wants to be assured that this motivation is the only one when

judged by logical rules of interpretation of the Vedas. So the first Sutra supplies the ground for the logical conclusion of the motivation supplied by the Vedas. In this connection the knowledge of the author being good intentioned is an aid to reach the logical conclusions.

There is then no scope for infinite regress. For just as the statement which ordains the study of the Vedas ordains also its own study, the first Sutra in justifying the composition of the whole of the Sutras justifies its own composition also.

Now the work Brahma Sutra justifies its existence only on the ground that the जिज्ञासा or discussion of Brahma is justified. Hence we must know what is Jijnasa in its etymological meaning. It is a desiderative form from ज्ञा to know with the termination सन् meaning desire. So the word जिज्ञासा means 'Desire to know' It is said by Jayateertha that Jijnasa is not desire to know but it means 'hearing, thinking and meditating' Then Raghavendra makes a reference to the gloss, Chandrika of Vyasateertha which makes the meaning of this more clear. Jijnasa is not a desiderative form of ज्ञा to know but it is a common noun accepted by usage to mean 'a course of thinking'. So it should not be etymologically

derived to mean 'desire to know'. This course of thinking depends upon syllogistic reasoning. When the course of thinking is proved to be begun, you cannot stop syllogistic reasoning which forms a vital part of thinking process. Now the syllogistic reasoning is the means of the thinking process. Syllogistic reasoning is the provision of subject matter, purpose or intention, the qualified reader and their mutual relationship or in short motivation. Without this motivation we cannot get the interpreted meaning of the Shruti that Jijnasa or thinking should be begun.

Now when we feel doubtful about a certain thing we begin logical reasoning. Thinking process is applied to cases fit to be begun and unfit to be begun. We have no grounds like motivation to settle either way. Hence there is doubt whether thinking or Jijnasa should be begun or not. Jayateerth in a long discourse proves to the hilt that nothing can be the subject matter of thinking process taking into review the whole mass of philosophical literature and human experience. That which is shrouded in doubt becomes fit to be subject matter. Thus as nothing is clear and every-thing about Brahma is doubtful the beginning of Shastra is justified and it takes a long course to prove the subject matter, the eligible

reader, the purpose and their mutual connectedness- all which form the motivation. Now the Sutrakara gives us this motivation, in the first Sutra ॐ अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा. First he says that the subject matter is provided by the words Om and Brahma.

In the Shruti these two words (ओमित्येतदक्षरमुद्गीतमुपासीत and others) are found to connote the thing fit to be thought over. This is Brahma who is distinctly different from the soul and the insensate world. But there is the objection (as said before) that mere words cannot etymologically prove the existence of super natural things like God. Even such objects as heaven, Apurva, and deity which are beyond the ken of senses are not proved to exist by merely words, but by statements whose meaning will not be consistent without the existence of these super natural things. Hence the words Om and Brahma cannot prove the existence of Brahma or Iswara.

In this context Shri Madhava states that when Om and Brahma are derived etymologically, they form sentences and they do not remain words. And then statements prove that Brahma, the abode of innumerable and unlimited (in connotation) auspicious qualities is proved to exist as

distinctly different from the sensate and insensate world.

So Shri. Jayateerth takes recourse to Grammar and semantics for the derivation of these words. Raghavendra finds this very occasion suitable to pour his wealth of erudition in grammar to bear upon the subject.

Om is derived from the root अच् which among many other meanings has the meaning of 'moving'. This root according to a Vritti in unadi, has a suffix of मन् and then there is the loss of ङि, which means the last vowel. This loss of ङि refers only to the Vowel in मन् and not to the root Vowel. This is known by relying on the use of ङि here. If on the other hand the ङि were to refer to the Vowel of the root and that were to be dropped ङि need not be used. It is enough if you say लोपः which means the root is to be dropped. But when dropping is ordained it refers only to the last letter according to the technical procedure अलोत्यस्य. This means the dropping of च् from अच्. Hence ङि is used. To this objection it is replied that अलोत्य is applied only in the case when the अच् or letter is mentioned in the genitive case. Here अवतेः in the oblique case is used while stating the suffix of मन्. Hence अलोत्य is not applied here. Even if we admit अलोत्य and drop only च् from अच् then अ is

dropped by the Sutra अतोऽलोपः. Hence टि in टिलोपः would have been used in vain as लोप alone would do the work of dropping अच्. An objection is raised that अतोऽलोपः drops only a word or syllable having अ at the end. Here अच् has अ at the beginning. To this the reply is that, what is at the beginning might be considered as at the end. Hence mere लोप will do the work of dropping अच्. So टि suggests the coming of the suffix मन् before operation of dropping begins.

Some others defend टिलोप taking recourse to some other method. They say if टिलोप is prescribed then by the sutra डिच्च, the suffix मन् is assigned; and by डिच्च alone the whole of अच् can be dropped. So लोप alone is sufficient. To avoid this and to show that the operation of dropping takes place with the termination and not the root टिलोप is mentioned. Hence टिलोप is justified.

Now Raghavendra passing through this labyrinthine mechanism of Sanskrit grammar derives Om, from अच् and suffix मन्. After टिलोप we have the residue अवम् and by ज्वरेत्वरत्निव्यविमवामुप-श्वायादव both अ and व are changed to ऊङ् and then one long ऊ in the place of both. Thus अ+ऊ together form ओ a guna which with the म् at the end of अवम् becomes ओम्. Raghavendra enters still

more into the wilderness of grammatical technicalities. Fearing that dry details would tire out the reader, we stop here. This has been given here as a specimen of his proficiency in grammar.

After this derivation and on its strength the meaning of ओम् is settled. This means the agent or कर्ता of गति or the object or कर्म of गति which is the meaning of the root अच्. Now if this form is to be derived in passive voice, the object and in active voice the subject is not mentioned. ओम् means ओतत्वं or पूर्णत्वं which means filled with. With which is he filled ? By context of other Shruties or syntactical propriety it means filled with auspicious qualities like bliss, consciousness and others which are innumerable and unlimited in connotation. Raghavendra quotes liberally to prove that this is the meaning wanted by all sources.

Now the word ब्रह्म also means the same thing in its root-meaning. Hence the object of investigation is one with innumerable auspicious qualities and this characterization disqualifies the soul and the matter to be the objects of such investigation.

ब्रह्म or the object of investigation goes by the name of नारायण which also means the same thing. This ओम् is elucidated by the Vyahrities which again are explained by the Gayatree Mantra. Now

this Mantra is elucidated at length by Purush Sukta, to expatiate the meaning of which all Vedas proceed. So if the meaning of ओम् is ब्रह्म then ब्रह्म is the subject matter of all the Vedas.

Shruti openly declares that Brahma is the purport of all the Vedas. (सर्वेवेदायह्यदमामनन्ति); yet this lengthy attempt is under-taken to prove this very fact by syllogistic reasoning. A sorites or chain syllogism of the following type is used:- A cat is a quadruped; A quadruped is an animal; An animal is a substance; and hence a cat is a substance. The Lord Brahma is the purport of all the Vedas. Because he is the purport of Purushasukta which is elucidated by all the Vedas. He who is the purport of the original, is the purport of the elucidation also. Then again Lord Brahma is the import of Purusha Sukta because he is the import of Gayatree which is explained by Purusha Sukta. Again Brahma is the import of Gayatree; for he is the import of Vyahrities which are expatiated upon by Gayatree. In the same manner the Brahma is the meaning of Vyahrities; for he is the meaning of Om which is dilated upon by Vyahrities. In all these syllogisms, the reason given is not unproved for Shruti proclaims that they bear the relationship of commentary and original. If still one disagrees to accept

the conclusion one is reduced to the absurd position of denying that relationship warranted by the Shruties.

Let this be for what it is worth. But why go in for a long sorites when a single syllogism can prove that the Lord Brahma is the exclusive import of all Vedas. Brahma or God is the sole import of the Vedas. Because it is the meaning of Om which is commented upon by all the Vedas. This is also corroborated by Shruti. Or all Vedas have Brahma for their import; Because they are elucidation of Om whose meaning is Brahma. Thus directly you can infer that Brahma is the sole import of all Vedas.

But this indirect method of inference is adopted because it is not directly known that all the Vedas are the elucidations of Om; but only indirectly as already noted. Hence this sorites is adopted.

Let the Vedas have the sole import of Brahma. But the Brahma Sutras deal with the syllogistic reasonings which are the means to prove that the Vedas propound mainly Brahma or God. How these Sutras have Brahma as subject-matter? The answer is that the syllogisms are a sort of aid to understand that the Vedas propound Brahma. So these syllogisms as aid to the Vedas have the

same subject as the Vedas. And through these syllogisms the Sūtras also have the same subject.

But syllogistic reasoning also states that this is fit to convey the particular import or this is made known to us from this source. And hence the reasoning deals with fitness or propriety which naturally becomes its subject matter and not Brahma. In this context Jayateertha thrashes out the whole question of activity and its object. Two sorts of objects are there. The axe specialised with activity of rising and falling resulting in separation and conjunction of the upper and lower regions i. e. the axe rising from the ground to the higher region and coming again to lower level, becomes the object of activity of the agent, directly. Some other (the tree) becomes the object through the medium of the instrument's activity. The tree is the object of cutting, indirectly through the cutting activity of the axe. The tree is the object of the activity of the agent through the activity of the means, the axe. So also the reasoning through its activity of proving the propriety or fitness of the means of knowledge (to produce knowledge), has for its object the knowledge of Brahma.

All this fuss might be justified only when reasoning, the aid to the interpretation of Vedas,

is found necessary. But even without the aid of reasoning by the ordinary help of knowledge of word and its meaning and its recollection we will easily determine the import of the Vedas as in the case of other compositions. Even when the interpretation is clogged by doubts of meaning and the import, and fallacious reasoning, good knowledge of these things should lead us to the correct interpretation and not other foreign aids like syllogistic reasoning. For then we shall have to forgo our accepted criterion of self-illumination of validity of knowledge. Hence reasoning is not a positive aid to interpretation; but it removes the difficulties coming in the way of interpretation. We do accept the same position for reasoning. Still because it helps to remove the difficulties in the way of interpretation it is formally accepted as aid to judgement or import. Hence the reasoning or Meemansa has for its object God or Brahma. There are different opinions and conceptions about God and his nature and function. These hinder the Vedas, though they are guarantors of knowledge, from giving right knowledge. Reasoning or Meemansa or Jijnasa removes all such hindrances, becoming an aid to the interpretation of the Vedas.

When Jijnasa is settled we must try to understand the meaning of the first Sutra. But first

let us know what is ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा. This is a compound word and unless the compound is dissolved the meaning is not clear. In धर्मजिज्ञासा in the Sutra अथातो धर्मजिज्ञासा of Jaimini the compound is dissolved as धर्मय जिज्ञासा. But Jayateertha wants us not to follow the instance of Jaimini's commentators. He wants us to dissolve it as ब्रह्मणः जिज्ञासा in the way of a Shasthi Tatpurusha and not like Jaimini's commentators, in the Chaturthi Tatpurush. Now it is explained why it is not so. In the meaning of तदर्थे 'for that purpose this one' if two words are used Chaturthi is prescribed only when, of those two words one is material and the other is its product. The instance is वृक्षाय दाह "wood for the post of sacrifice" wood is the material of which the post is prepared. Hence there is Chaturthi. When there is no such relationship as material cause and its effect then there is Shasthi; Chaturthi is prohibited where there is no such relationship and in its place Shasthi is prescribed. Accordingly we do not find even in ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा the relationship of material cause and its effect. Hence there cannot be Chaturthi compound here.

Some say that the Shasthi or genative is one showing relationship in general; and not one showing any particular function of a case. But

really this is genitive showing (either agent or) object on account of the कृत् termination used at the end of जिज्ञासा. Hence it is said अयं जिज्ञास्यः. For जिज्ञास्य means the object of जिज्ञासा.

This gives room for another drawback in Brahma. In राजपुरुष(राज्ञाःपुरुषः) a genitive Tatpuruṣa compound the word राजन् is unimportant. For a Tatpuruṣa compound is one having the latter member as important. Similarly in ब्रह्मणः जिज्ञासा also Brahma becomes unimportant and subordinate to जिज्ञासा. By mentioning that Brahma is the object of जिज्ञासा this doubt of subordination is cleared.

Or in such injunctions as स्वर्गकामो यजेत (one desirous of Swarga must perform Yaga), Yaga is ordained for the purpose of Swarga, Swarga is important and Yaga is unimportant. Here also for the purpose of Moksha, ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा is ordained and hence ब्रह्म जिज्ञासा is unimportant, and hence the object of जिज्ञासा is unimportant. To avoid this difficulty it is said 'जिज्ञास्योऽयं विधीयते' and Brahman is the chief object of जिज्ञासा. Hence subordination cannot be doubted in the case of Brahma.

But this does not clear the doubt of subordination of Brahma in the injunction of जिज्ञासा for the purpose of Moksha. To this the reply is given that the meaning of the Sutra is not 'inves-

tigation of Brahma should be made' nor is it 'The knowledge of Brahma should be acquired ; But it is "For the sake of knowledge of Brahma, all Vedas should be investigated". Hence Brahma is included under motivation (for the purpose of) and hence claims superiority of being treated chiefly in the injunction, "Investigation should be made". This is exactly what is implied in जिज्ञास्येयं विधीयते in which ब्रह्म is mentioned as the end of investigation.

Now the discussion about the motivation of Jijnasa begins with the interpretation of अतः in the first Sutra. Raghavendra now recapitulates what has been said so far in order to supply the reader with a connecting link to the whole trend of thought. In the Sutra the word Brahma and OM supply the subject of investigation and the feeding evidence, the subject not being proved by any other instrument of knowledge. And the word अतः is explained in the Bhashya both in brief and in detail. Hence Shri Madhva does not feel its necessity to be explained here. Besides it is going to be commented upon in brief at the beginning of Upasanapada.

Now the word अतः is explained by Madhva as supplying five reasons to prove the necessity of investigation of Brahma. {Brahma must be inves-

tigated because: (1) there is the purpose of Moksha through the gates of knowledge or god-vision; (2) because the bondage we are suffering from is real; (3) because veda has for its subject a being (and not becoming); (4) because Vedas are the guarantor of knowledge which is self evident; (5) and because Vedas yield their meaning after being syntactically connected.

The real purpose for the investigation or Jijnasa is that the investigation alone can generate the sound knowledge of Brahma. This knowledge thus generated alone (and no other thing) can secure for us the gracious favour of Brahma. This sort of favour alone ensures us Moksha. Hence this investigation has an exclusive purpose and is worth our attempt.

Here a doubt arises. The favour has its seat in God while the knowledge which is the cause of that favour is to be found in the aspirant for Moksha. So the favour, to operate for Moksha should get connected with the aspirant, so that he being favoured with the grace of the Lord will be blessed with Moksha. Thus the sentence that follows "There is no other path to Moksha" has no meaning. Because no other cause is at issue, other than the grace of the Lord to

assure Moksha and hence its negation is unwarranted. But this doubt is easily warded off. For this negation or exclusion refers to the exclusion of other means in the aspirant than knowledge, in generating the gracious favour of the Lord. For Karma or action also is credited with capacity to secure Moksha. So it is clear that the aspirant has no other way to win the favour of the Lord besides His knowledge (god-vision). No doubt the aspirant with devoted deeds can win the favour of the Lord but work-won-favour secures him the second rate Moksha and not the first rate Moksha. Thus it is for this reason clear that the investigation of Brahma is reasonably enjoined.

This Prasada or grace of the Lord can be won by devotion alone. For Prasada is nothing but a special turn in the will of God, which is easily secured by single-minded devotion.

Now again if this grace is generated by devotion how it is that it was declared that the grace was to be obtained by knowledge? The reply is that knowledge is a component part of Devotion and hence mention of knowledge as the cause of grace is a partial explanation. Hence Jayateertha gives an all comprehensive classical

definition of Bhakti which has won universal recognition.

It is an incessant flow of Love towards the Lord which is caused by the knowledge of the Lord as having auspicious attributes, untarnished with blemish, boundless, eternal, and innumerable, surpassing many times the empirical love for self, and things belonging to the self, and which is not hindered even by thousands of odds.

Raghevendra corroborates the truth of this meaning of Bhakti which is a happy combination of knowledge and Love of God Hari by quoting Madhva from his Tatparya Nirnaya:—

“Bhakti is Love of the Lord, caused by the knowledge of the wonderful greatness (of the Lord) firm and steady and excelling all love (and lures of the world). This is the cause of Mukti which is not made available by any other means.”

In order that one should not doubt the possibility of such spiritual love, Jayateerth quotes Shruties. In Chandogya in the seventh Adhyaya it is said about Bhuma “when one is saturated with such unparalleled love, one does not see any thing else, does not hear anything else and is not aware of any thing else”. Such all consuming love is also instanced in Geeta “the meditating Muni

is aware of the supremacy of the Lord about which the others are in the dark and the Muni is in the dark (is not aware) about those things of which the common men are fully in the knowing."

Now let us come to the point at issue. Let Mukti be made available to the grace of the Lord which is caused by singleminded, all absorbing, devotion; but what about Jijnasa that is now on hand for consideration? Jayateerth after a full fledged argument comes to the conclusion that Jijnasa is the cause of Mukti not directly but through constant meditation which wins the grace of the Lord. This common grace secures for the devotee, god-vision, which results in all-consuming love, brining in its wake the uncommon grace of the lord which finally releases soul from its extraneous limitations. Thus from Jijnasa to Moksha it is a long way.

At this juncture the representative of Nyaya School on the strength of a Nyayasutra of Jaimini objects to this interpretation of ३३. He admits that Jijnasa or constant meditation causes god-vision which removes ignorance, the root cause of our bondage and secures us Moksha or release. Where is the scope for the theory of grace? When light is brought darkness is dispelled without any body's favour. So the insertion of Prasada

in between knowledge and Moksha is unwarranted and ill advised.

Jayateerth for a moment agrees with the follower of Nyaya and admits that knowledge or god-vision is the cause of Moksha. Yet grace is essential and inevitable. For it is not ignorance alone that binds us to this mundane existence; it is the determined will of God Hari that causes bondage. Hence that will alone can withdraw this bondage and grace is nothing but will favourably inclined to release us.

A great metaphysical objection is raised against this will of God being the cause of a beginning-less bondage. A beginning-less thing does not admit of any modificational addition and hence no cause can add to it by its causal operation. So this mundane existence which is beginningless cannot have been caused by the will of God.

This metaphysical objection is set aside by categorically denying the privilege of beginningless things claiming immunity from the operation of will of God. For the objector himself (Naiyyaika) had admitted in his metaphysical technique that beginningless attributes (गुण) depend upon attributed things (वस्तु). In the same manner even the School of Advaita admits the distinction between

the soul and Brahma as beginningless and yet depending upon Nescience. Hence even beginningless samsara can depend upon the will of God.

Now Jayateerth propounds his own theory of beginningless bondage. It is admitted on all hands, that Soul is essentially constituted with bliss and knowledge. And every one knows by his own experience that he is now not so constituted. This leads us to the inference that his essential nature is successfully covered by some extraneous hindrance, from our experience. This cover naturally should be beginningless and it must be other than desire or Kama, which is caused and requires a cause again. This beginningless cause of samsara is called Prikrati or Maya in different source-books. As this Prikriti is accepted as destroyed there is no complete withdrawal of the cover. Only at the will of the Lord the whole of the screen is withdrawn. Hence Apanda is fully opened for enjoyment as another act of the will of God Hari. Hence it is considered a separate gift.

Now the sutra is explained and Jayateerth criticises the interpretations by others. we need not question how a self luminous soul is hidden under this Maya or prikriti.

An insentient Maya cannot alone hide this self-luminous soul, at its own initiation. It is but proper and reasonable to believe that God Hari with Maya or prakriti that is subordinate to Him, with his mysterious and miraculous power, has contributed to obscure the essence of the self-luminous soul and has thrown it in bondage. And hence release also comes to us as His gift through His grace. When we assert that the cause of release is knowledge we mean that it is through his grace. For God is the general cause, as nothing can be done, without his will or desire.

The crux of the problem is how a beginningless bondage at last, whatever the cause might be, terminates. Jayatertha critically reviews the explanations and solutions offered by other schools of thought. Then he finds them not satisfactory and gives his own solution.

Many shruties and smrities are quoted to prove that there is the strong cause for the destruction of the bondage. There are two screens one covering the attributes of the soul; and the other covering the supreme spirit immanent in man. First God Hari removes the screen that covers the soul and then the one that covers the supreme spirit is removed. Thus the soul standing in its native lustre enjoys its essential bliss.

Now the beginning less, if it is to be destroyed it should follow one of the two courses of destruction prescribed, namely 1) the parts of a thing are destroyed 2) or the connection of the parts is destroyed. What is the type of destruction which pertains to the destruction of bondage? Jayateerth says the two types that are mentioned above characterise only things that begin or that are born. Unborn things have a third type of destruction which is its own type. We admit that the unborn bondage is completely annihilated. The real fact is God Hari pleased with the aspirant destroys the bondage. In this, god-vision is not the cause of his grace. It is the deep intensity of devotion that is the cause of the divine grace. This intensity being mental can only be inferred and cannot be perceived. The contention that the Karma that is now being enjoyed, being not exhausted serves as a hindrance to the origination of divine grace, is very poor. For insentient Karma cannot rally such strength as to challenge the supreme will of the sovereign Power. While the will of the Lord adjusts itself to the contingency of Karma and operates in its absence so that its sovereignty is not infringed. Besides in the third Adhyaya in one of the sutras it is stated that the god-visioned devotee through the grace

of the Lord has his Karma tempered in its intensity and virility which is impossible if Karma stands an obstacle to the grace. The talk that the unexhausted Karma causes the postponement of liberation or release is only a layman's parley. The real thing is that complete grace is not yet originated and the release is the gift of god Hari Himself.

It does not seem to be reasonable to say that Lord grants Moksha and Ananda; for moksha is the removal of the screen that hides the essence of the soul from being enjoyed. If the screen is removed automatically the soul enjoys the essential delight; and hence it need not be a separate gift different from Moksha.

This objection does not arise when we know that the cause of the cover is really the will of Hari while Ajnana is only the nominal cause. So when Ajnana is destroyed there is no complete withdrawal of the cover. Only at the will of the Lord the whole of the screen is withdrawn. Hence Ananda is fully opened for enjoyment at another act of the will of the God Hari. Hence it is considered a separate gift.

Now the sutra is explained and Jayateerth criticises the interpretations offered by others. This is done not inspite of others, but with a

sense of precaution that the interpretation of others superficially enamouring should not distract the readers while they are following his interpretation or it was stated that the god-vision or jnana, the result of the process of hearing, thinking, meditating, was the cause of divine grace which yielded Moksha in its turn. The word ऋतः was interpreted as showing the reason for jijnasa as yielding Moksha through grace. Now this is objected to on the ground that the bondage being illusory its sublation is possible only through real knowledge of the thing that was erroneously misunderstood and not through the grace of god. Therefore to justify and prove the theory of grace the interpretations of others are critically reviewed.

He takes up for review first the most prominent school of Adwaitawada in which bondage is considered to consist of agency and enjoyment, attachment and hatred, good and bad actions, and the fruit of those actions. This is imposed upon Brahma where it does not exist and hence it is illusory. The Adwaitis describe this theory of illusion in their Bhashya of Brahma Sutra. Their contention is that Bondage is considered unreal or illusory so that the investigation will have a topic and purpose. For the purport of the first sutra is that for the sake of the knowledge of Bhrahma

the interpretation of the statements of vedanta should be tried. Now if the bondage is to be destroyed by knowledge it can be done so only when the bondage is illusory in nature and not real. Without the implication of the illusory nature of our bondage, we cannot get rid of it through knowledge. Hence the illusory nature of bondage, though not expressed in the sutra, is implied in it. For knowledge came to destroy only ignorance and its effect; it has no power to destroy real things. Hence to make the statement that knowledge removes bondage, consistant, bondage shall have to be accepted as illusory. Hence the sutra by implication means that bondage is illusory. To be rich in implied meaning adds to the merit of the sutra.

Besides, this propogation of illusory nature of bondage is not only the implied meaning of the sutra but it is a necessary introduction to the whole of the shastras.

Thus for supplying the purpose for the investigation of Brahma we must accept the illusory nature of the bondage. Then for supplying subject matter for investigation also we must accept the illusory nature of bondage. And lastly shastra itself will not proceed without the introduction which treats of the illusory nature of bondage.

These three referential justifications for the beginning of Adhyasavada at the commencement of Shankara's Bhashya on Brahma Sutra, are not genuine justifications.

Take first, the first justification based on the incongruity of the purpose without taking for granted the illusory nature of bondage. The law of suggestien holds that, that is taken to be suggested by a certain fact, without which the fact remains unexplained. That the fact Devadatta does not have his meals by day, suggests his night meals. For Devadatta's fatness remains unexplained without taking for granted his night meals; hence his fatness without day meals suggests night meals. Here also, if the purpose of investigation namely Mukti is made available by knowledge of Brahma then bondage must be unreal or illusory. Now Jayateerth proves that Mukti is available through knowledge, without its being illusory. For the master when seen and pleased will release the captive from his bondage. But there is special quotation to prove that knowledge directly grants Moksha; and hence it is proved that otherwise also (and not otherwise only) Moksha is explained. "He gives Moksha to one who has been graced with godvision." does not brook any other alternative than through the grace of Lord Hari.

So "one who knows Atma, gets over grief" means "One who has the grace of the Lord through knowledge" will attain Mukti.

But it is objected that a man in dream knowing himself to be a captive is automatically released when he wakes up from the dream. Hence a false bondage is got rid of, only by knowledge or waking up without any grace in the middle. Therefore it cannot be pleaded that only a real bondage is removed by the knowledge through the grace of God.

The objection is refuted by saying that removal of bondage by knowledge is a general statement while "Moksha is said to be a gift of God" is a particular statement which restricts the general statement to its own requirements. Then again if it is objected that god vision and Moksha do not tolerate anything to intervene between them and hence grace cannot operate between them, it is replied that in 'After seeing only one is released'. 'Only' has a sense of exclusiveness. It does not exclude 'grace' of any kind, but it excludes only grace generated by disciplined and devoted deeds. Hence God seen, grants us grace which makes us eligible for Moksha.

Let us admit that knowledge is the cause of the Mukti directly. Even then bondage cannot

be illusory. You are not going to settle knowledge to be the cause of the removal of bondage by finding out their invariable concomitance; but by consulting Agama (one having the knowledge of Brahma will get over grief or bondage) you come to know that knowledge causes the reduction of bondage. When thus the relationship of cause and effect is settled in Agama why should you wait for the justification of this casual relationship.

A bit of Meemansa is to be considered, before settling the previous question. दशपूर्ण मासाभ्यां यजेत one wishing for Heaven should sacrifice with Darsha and Purnamasha. Darsha and Purnamasha are now performed and then they become extinct; Swarga or Heaven is coming into existence in future. How one is the cause of the other? Meemansaka tells us that the two Yagas produce one Apurva which will bring about residence in Swarga. So अपूर्व is connoted by the termination of Lakara and is known to be caused by these two yagas by the injunction itself. Still the explanatory justification is necessary, where the casual relationship is ambiguous even though enjoined in the Vedas. Jayateertha has given an explanation. There are enjoined three darshas to be performed on the new moon day. And three

more on the full moonday. All these six together create one Apurva capable of procuring Swarga. This Apurva is called the Pradhana or chief Apurva. Now these six yagas being done successively are not able to produce this chief Apurva. Hence these six yagas are supposed to produce intermediary Apurva as they come into existence. These six will produce the chief Apurva which secures Swarga. Even when the causal connection is warranted by the Shruti yet to connect the distant Pradhana Apurva with the six yagas, intermediary six subordinate Apurvas are supposed to come into existence. This is the Seven-Apurva-theory of Prabhakaras. But Bhattas suppose that three Apurvas of the new moonday produce one Apurva while the three Apurvas of the full moon day produce one; and that these two produce the Pradhana Apurva.

One more simple example is cited. The Bhattas suppose that योनिर्वाण this day performed secures Swarga after many more years. Though this is enjoined in the Vedas, still to supply a reasonable explanation of this causal relationship one Apurva is supposed to be produced by the yaga. For, to be a cause this is required to remain in time in the moment previous to the production of Swarga. And Advaiti comes forward to say that in supply

-ing such an explanation he says that bondage is supposed to be illusory.

This is not fair. As for the instance of Apurva it was right because what are distant in time if temporally not connected cannot be causally related. In order to connect the temporally distant yaga with Swarga, the supposition of Apurva was justified. Here there is no such rule, as knowledge is the destroyer of Nescience only. But knowledge is never found to reduce things that are real.

Mere seeing two things together will not settle a causal relationship between the two; but one should be invariably concomitant with the other and one should be found existing invariably before the other. And you cannot even conceive one thing causally connected with the other without one being regularly prior to the other.

Just as bondage need not be considered illusory because it meets with no contradiction even if we suppose that a real thing is destroyed by knowledge; so also nothing is lost if yaga or sacrifice be the cause of Swarga that comes in future. Hence in the intervening stage no Apurva need be supposed to arise to bring about their temporal conjunction. But such a doubt does not arise as the very concept of a cause as priorly

existing to the effect, goes against this supposition.

But there is some trouble if knowledge is supposed to destroy something real. For then Atma which is real shall have to be destroyed by knowledge. To avoid this spiritual crisis if Ajnan (or bondage) is accepted as not real then Anjana or (cosmic) ignorance shall have to forgo its beginninglessness. And if beginningless Ajnana is to be reduced by knowledge why not Atma? Besides it is very difficult to establish causal relationship between illusory nature and its reduction by knowledge.

Adwaiti may object to the real, being reduced to, by knowledge. For knowledge in order to remove, will remove something in the subject of knowledge or the seat of knowledge; or both. Now in the first alternative, tell us whether knowledge will remove something of that subject only or will it remove something that inheres in the subject of knowledge? Or that which inheres in the subject will remove something of the subject which is contrary to it. Now in the first alternative, in verigated or multicoloured object, the knowledge of a thing with blueness does not destroy its subject blueness or its inherent quality, in the flavour and others or the contrary qualities like

yellow and others. In the second alternative also, the knowledge of a pot will not remove qualities like Dharma residing in Atma. In the third also, Atma knowing the body, will not destroy the contact of body and Atma.

Now this objection can be easily refuted. For if knowledge, should destroy the things in its seat then it shall have to destroy Dharma and others which reside in the seat, Atma, with knowledge. This assumed hypothesis has no invariable concomitance to base it upon. If the contrary supposition is accepted there is nothing to lose. Moreover we find a decisive dissimilarity between the two cases. Now knowledge of pot and others does not contradict Dharma and others; hence they need not be destroyed. But the real knowledge of Atma contradicts bondage and hence destroys it. The assumption of this hypothesis is based on the Nyaya theory of Moksha. In his system the real knowledge of Atma through the precise and discriminatory knowledge of the sixteen fundamental categories will lead to the destruction of Dharma and Adharma and then to Mukti or if we want to base it on Shri Madhva's system, we must take Atma to mean paramatma. For it is the exact knowledge of paramatma which leads to the

destruction of all Karmas in the soul in which this knowledge is originated.

Other allegations also are not sound. It was alleged that the knowledge of a pot with blue colour, when the pot is multi-coloured does not destroy its own subject, nor any quality inhering in that subject like flavour, nor its contrary quality yellow. This allegation is not sound; because the knowledge of a blue pot in the case of a variegated pot is wrong knowledge and hence it does not come in the way of the right knowledge removing real bondage. Even in the case of yellow colour the knowledge is erroneous. For according to the Naiyayikas the pot that is begun with various colours results in one colour namely variegated. Hence the knowledge of one colour whether blue or yellow is sure to be wrong knowledge. If different colours even in production retain their individuality the colour or Rupa will not be one but many and hence will occupy partially the substance like samyoga or conjunction.

Conceding the last concession, we admit that knowledge should destroy or dispel ignorance only. Let there also be a logical concomitance to that effect. Even then Mukti or salvation does not necessitate the falsity of bondage or Bandhana. Then Shankara ought to have told us only

Ajnana produced bondage or it was itself bondage. There was no necessity of the theory of false imposition, being established. But Ajnana is not unreal or illusory and when the theory of false imposition or Adhyasa itself has no place in Brahma sutra, then the falsity of Ajnana based on Adhyasa is a still greater improbability.

Raghavendra here explains an expression कपोणि गुडायितम् involving a beautiful imagery and the use of practical knowledge. First following his analytical method grammatically derives the expression, कपोणि. He quotes Amara and assigns meaning to it. Kaponi is the outer part of the joint between the fore arm and the upper arm. It is the elbow. The reading कपोणि with ण is correct and not क. Raghavendra takes great care and mentions that the second letter of Pavarga is wrong. He quotes for authority the commentary of Amara which derives this word from the root पुणाति as कं कर्मप्रसरणादिकं पुणाति करोति that which helps such actions as stretching and others. Then he explains the whole phrase as "Just as it is not possible to touch jaggedness attached to the end of the outer part of the middle joint or elbow, so also the idea of falsity or erroneous nature cannot be ascribed to Ajnana.

Jayateerth also shows that the generalisation

of negation by knowledge and falsity is found broken in the instance of snake poison being real yet removed by (knowledge) the meditation of of Garuda. But the poison, being a component part of the world the whole of which is false or Mithya, is false and not real. Then the Advaitin cannot accuse the assumptions made by us regarding the pot of variegated colour, as the blue substance also is unreal or Mithya.

Advaiti agrees, for the sake of argument, that the snake poison is real yet it is not negated by knowledge; For Meditation is not of the nature of knowledge. Meditation is some mental activity and not knowledge. Raghavendra analyses this statement and exhausts it in two alternatives 1) This mental activity is some vibration or activity (other than mental) yet happening in the mind. 2) or it is the modification of the mind itself. In the first alternative if it is some super sensible vibration stationed in super sensible mind, it is but natural that it is beyond the reach of the senses. And if imperceptible things are accepted to be perceived by the internal eye or sakshi, then too the vibrations being formless cannot be perceived as having the form of Garuda in our mind. In the second alternative of its being mental modification we

agree with this alternative. Because through seeing and hearing mental impressions are produced. And mental image built with this mental stuff, seen by the mind is Meditation. The perceptibility of a thing made of imperceptible stuff can be explained in the manner of a Tryanuka being perceptible though made of imperceptible Dwyannikas.

Then if Dhyana or meditation is accepted to be of the nature of knowledge; then it would be wrong to pass an injunction that one should meditate. But this objection is easily waved and Raghavendra beautifully presents how that is done so. When we read 'one should meditate' the imperative tells that meditation is the means to achieve the aim of our life. Then one desires to meditate and does make an attempt in the direction of the means. The mental impressions of hearing and seeing lying in heap are awakened and formed into a mental image which is seen by the mind. This is meditation, though knowledgei would not be incongruous in an injunction. For Dhyana does not become the object of desire or effort.

Many more examples are given to show that knowledge negates real (bondage) and not unreal (bondage). The knowledge of Brahma negates

the bondage of man. Therefore the word conveying the meaning of purpose in the sutra does not expect the falsity of the bondage. In the sutra if it is the investigation of Jeeva that is laid down and if the knowledge of the jeeva negates the ignorance of the jeeva and if this is the meaning of purpose in the sutra, then it might expect the bondage to have been some how unreal. For the false imposition of silver on the shell is not negated or disproved by the knowledge of a pot. Thus the falsity of the bondage expected by the purpose of the investigation of Brahma is proved baseless. Now the falsity of the bondage that is expected by the word conveying subject matter is denied. Here also if jeeva had been the subject for enquiry then some how, in order to make that subject doubtful the bondage consisting of agency or doership and enjoyership would have been false or unreal. But the subject matter is Brahma only. Hence that one thing is doubtful and another thing is to be investigated is not proper.

Thus proving that the words in the sutra meaning purpose and subject matter do not logically expect the falsity of bondage for their coherent purport in the sentence and that the sentence will be meaningful even when we do not accept the falsity of bondage, he brings home

to our mind that there is no need of believing in the unreality of bondage. For it is not, really speaking, false or mithya.

Jayateertha discusses the prerequisites of the presumption or Arthapatti. That on which the presumption is based must be known by evidences. आक्षेपक must be प्रमाण प्रमित. Fatness with the absence of meals by day should first be ascertained by evidences. And this fatness without meals by day time, is found impossible अनुप पद्यमानत्व without nightmeals. That which is presumed आक्षेप्य रात्रिभोजन or night-eating should be leading to the meaning of the sentence, and should not go against facts. Therefore presumption has the following usual defects:— 1) आक्षेपक unwarranted by evidences. 2) not impossible without that presumption 3) Adjustment of meaning even without presumption 4) Adjustment of meaning without it only 5) presuming some thing which runs contrary to evidences. Hence we argue that presumption or Arthapatti does not function where there is evidence to the contrary. Here this presumption cannot presume the falsity of bondage because that goes against the experience of man. Bondage consisting of doership and enjoyership, pleasure and pain, when accepted false belies the experience of man which perceives pleasure and pain by

the internal organ of sakshi. Not only the presumption goes against perception but it runs counter to other evidences also. Atma is known to be a doer for the reason of his चेष्टा which is defined by Raghavendra as some activity calculated to avoid evil and to get good and for the reason of an Agama which says "He is the soul who is known as 'I'.

The objector says that the evidence of presumption is contradicted mainly by perception. But perception is not a guarantor of right knowledge. For the nature of Atma is proclaimed in Shruti, Smriti, Itihasa and Puranas to be one only without second, indifferent to all, having for its essence, chaitanya (consciousness) Ananda (Bliss) Ananta (infinite) not particularised by any limiting adjuncts. Invoking the aid of the canons of interpretation this is settled to be the connotational meaning of the statements in the Vedas. When so settled and when they directly express this meaning, you can by no means make those statements to have a formal meaning. Now how does your pratyaksha or perception remain free from calamity though exhibiting Atma or Soul, contrary to the vedic statement, to be localised and immersed in mundane life of misery and others. Really speaking the perception does not reveal to us the

real nature of 'I'. For 'I' is a production of the material of spirit. Now this 'I' which is in essence Brahma screened by beginningless and indescribable-Avidya which is a causal back ground for the manifestation of generated knowledge (वृत्तिज्ञान), good and evildeeds, memory, and mental impressions, and which presents him (Atma) as soul. Therefore all the attributes of Atma that are now perceived in him are all false as the red colour of a crystal which is imposed upon it by the contact of a red flower. Therefore the results of perception that the sould is doer and enjoyer are contradicted and refuted by the statements of Shruti and hence the unreal nature of bondage propounded by Shruti stands true and undisputed.

What is said looks very nice to the laymen. But to those who are well versed in the science, the statements from Shruti cannot be accepted in their apparent meaning. To ascertain the meaning of statement you must read it in its context and the meaning should not be in-consistent with the enunciation at the beginning or conclusion at the end. Other canons of interpretation also should be consulted before arriving at the interpretation of the statement in Shruti. Consistency is the criterion of right interpretation,

But there is the fear of great inconsistency if the Shruti proves the unreal nature of all things other than Atma. For the statement of Shruti proving all things other than Atma false, denies its own reality. For Shruti stands in the same category of 'other than Atma'. If it does not prove its own falsity or invalidity, Shruti not having capacity to prove its own invalidity cannot prove the unreality of other things. If it denies its own reality then its very existence is at stake and like the words of the child of the barren mother, cannot prove any other things.

Jayateertha concedes in all fairness of argument that Madhva also says that bondage is of the nature of error (भ्रम). Yet he shows the difference of view-point in both the systems. According to Panini the agent or doer is said to be free, (in his activity). Free will or agency in an activity or cognition is one not contingent upon any other agent than the soul, of course subject to the common authority of the Supreme Will. (Everything or action within the cosmic frame work is subject to the Supreme Will or dispensation) The Tarkikas define the agency of the soul as 'inhering of knowledge, desire of doing and activity in the soul' This agency is an inherent quality of the soul and not a borrowed one or

through its contact with the conditioning appendage as in Adwaitwada. The same thing is declared by the Author of Brahma sutra in the aphorism कर्तृशास्त्रार्थवत्त्वान्. The soul is the agent in order that the shastra in the form of injunction, and prohibition should have motivation.

If the soul is the agent then he will be subject to such modifications as indifference and error and then he will be affected with birth which entails transitoriness on the soul. But this objection is fully thrashed in the samayapada of the second Adhyaya.

As for Adhyasa which is at the basis of the illusory nature of bondage it is not refuted in toto. For Madhva also accepts (Adhyasa) super imposition of some kind. For the soul labours under the super imposition, arrogations of complete independence to himself. Madhva does not accept only complete identity of body and soul. For he illustrates it mentioning that in common parlour we say 'it is my body' and not 'I am the body' Even discarding identity we can explain such references as 'I am black' 'I am lean' only on the principle of supposition (उपचार). This has been more clearly explained in Nyayamrita.

The Adwaitin supposes that the doership that really belongs to ज्ञतःकरण (a mode of mind) shines

in contact with the soul because the soul is tinged by it. This is not reasonable. Because the notion of 'I' really belongs to the soul. If it is so, the Advaitin objects, the soul should make its own reference with 'I'. For the soul then shines in its native lustre. Then Avidya or Nescience is not at all functioning; if so we must have the experience of it. Madhva rejoins that even in sleep there is no objection for 'I' to shine. For he remembers afterwards that he had then slept soundly. But it is objected that the 'I' in this cognition is not Atma. For in chandogya Atma is referred as same thing distinctly different from 'I'. This objection is not sound. For Atma and 'I' (Ahamkara) are both, the forms of Narayana. If not how can 'I' be described 'as found in all places'. But in some other places as in Geeta Ahamkara is mentioned as different from Atma, it is one of the twenty four principles and that is not the referent in sentences like 'I slept soundly'. Even Brahma refers to himself as 'I' when He is in the atomic form and is immanent in Jeeva or soul while the same is Atma in the all pervasive form. Jayateertha makes a grammatical distinction between अहं an indclinable ending in ण् which means the effect of matter or Prakriti; and which is not used to refer to Atma and अहं

which is the nomanative of असद् the pronoun, is not used to refer to the effect of Maya.

Hence' Perception is not a conveyer of erroneous knowledge. For the Shruti which tries to prove the illusory nature of all things proves its own illusory nature and invalidates all knowledge it conveys. Therefore the Shruti which tells about the illusory nature of knowledge incapacitates itself and proves nothing, Ultimately Perception is proved to be not a conveyer of erroneous knowledge.

Now the Adwaitin might contend that Perception is known to be a guarantor of knowledge. Shruties and inference in-form us that Perception being different from Brahman comes under the catagory of illusory things. You should not ask why or how an illusory or erroneous perception is a conveyer of knowledge. For looking at a piece of Sandal wood we get a combined cognition that sandal wood is fragrant, only with the eye that is aided with the mental impression born of smell of fragrance of the sandal piece. So also we get a combined cognition that perception which is illusory is conveyer of Knowledge. Or perception with the eye and with touch both

combined to comprehend a pot, would be a combined cognition that the pot has form and touch. In the same manner two means of cognition, one proving the illusory nature of means the other proving the capacity of the means to convey knowledge, combine into a single psychosis of which is both illusory and conveyer of knowledge.

Jayateerth now refutes this plausible argument. Just as Adwaitin proves by a statement that is illusory in nature, so also a means that is illusory is made to convey knowledge is proved by an illusory means of knowledge or by a sound means of knowledge.

If it is a real and sound means of knowledge that proves the illusory nature of the means that conveys knowledge then easily the Adwaitin is committed to the system of Dwaita. For two real things are accepted. If it is unreal and illusory means that the Adwaitin accepts, then it is not acceptable to Dwaitins.

Among the many facts like dream and others which Adwaitin has marshalled, it is found that what is illusory is not able to convey any knowledge and what conveys knowledge is not illusory. For dream is a real phenomenon and conveys knowledge. Even line is a symbol of a letter just as a word is a symbol of its

meaning. Hence they being real things indicate the things symbolized.

Shruti says 'Here there is no manifold thing (Mundane line)' which proves the illusory nature of all things other than Brahma. But this Shruti means 'Only there is no distinction involved in the organic constitution of Brahman'. The Advaitin objects that in this Shruti only manifold mundane life is negated; and the existence of difference is not denied. For the word used is नाना different thing and not नानात्वं difference.

To this Jayateerth replies that no doubt it is the concrete thing that is important; yet difference between the parts, between attributes activities and others is denied which amounts to the negation of difference in Brahma. When an attributed substance is posited or negated it ends in the affirmation or denial of the adjective only. If asked why not the negation or affirmation of the attributed whole or the substantive that is qualified, the reply for the first is that it is a lengthy process and to the second, the attributive adjective comes first.

If this is not so नाना would not have been mentioned and denied. 'Nothing' was there would negate all things. "One entering the

house-holder's life (स्नातक) should not wear old and dirty clothes." In this statement only the state of oldness and dirtiness in clothes are prohibited and not the clothes themselves. Hence it is said that a statement having spent its force on an adjective would not reach the substantive. In some places the whole of the qualified thing is denied as in 'Here is no man holding a stick' which denies the existence of 'a man holding the stick' and not merely the stick. Such an interpretation is only an exceptional case where no other interpretation is allowed.

If it is objected that the negation of a qualified substantive refers to the negation (not of an adjective as shown before) of the substantive; Hence नाना cannot be denied with reference to Brahman which has no attributes (according to Adwaitin), it is contended that Brahman would be proved to have adjectives to qualify it. So in the Shruti 'Here there is not any difference' (नेहनानास्ति किञ्चन) 'any' cannot be denied and only 'difference' is denied. This is expatiated upon in greater detail in Nyayamrita.

Jayateerth reminds Adwaitin that he also has accepted a real instrument of knowledge while proving the existence of positive Nescience which is stated by Adwaitin to be the cause of

this cosmic phantasmagoria. For Adwaitin accepts that it is the Sakshi (the internal organ of self or Chetana) which proves the existence of positive ignorance or nescience in such perceptions as 'I am ignorant'. Therefore Adwaitin cannot contend that he has accepted only unreal instruments of knowledge. For Sakshi is real.

Jayateertha admits that he also has admitted the real Sakshi to be the conveyer of the knowledge of pain and pleasure. Pleasure and pain are directly experienced by the self or Sakshi.

But the Adwaitin contends that the Sakshi which experiences 'Nescience or ignorance' in such experiences as 'I am ignorant', is not pure self or Chetan which is real. But this instrument of ignorance is covered Nescience when experiencing it. Hence this Sakshi also is an unreal instrument. Therefore Adwaitin need not budge from his contention that an unreal instrument is the conveyer of knowledge.

But this is only a futile contention. For this contention cannot avoid the logical falacy of mutual dependence. For there is no other existence of Neacience in his theory than the cognition of it by Sakshi. Hence Sakshi is the

instrument only after the existence of Nescience. And after Sakshi is there available as the instrument of knowledge, Nescience will be proved to exist.

Hence Adwaitin will be reduced to an absurd position of being disqualified to enter the lists of the tournament of dialectic discussion. For accepting the unreality of every thing except Brahma; Adwaitin shall have to concede the falsity of Shruties like नेहानानास्ति किञ्चन. Hence those Shruties are incapacitated to convey any knowledge. Thus being reduced to this absurd position, Adwaitin shall have to walk out of the lists being completely disarmed.

But the Adwaitin is proved of being a distinguished knighterrant to enter the lists and he is not ready to forgo his eligibility to fight. Hence he shall have to admit the reality of the instruments he cannot parry the blows of the opponent; nor can he shower blows upon him.

All communication depends upon real communicative instruments. Adwaitin is not eligible for communication; for he has no real instruments of knowledge. But to prove this converse viz. ineligibility of communication,

inacceptability of a real instrument is not the reason. The real reason is the inability of words to convey the meaning though apparently defectiveness. For the concomitance of ineligibility of communication and inacceptability of a real instrument is violated. Discourses of the followers of one system, though they have accepted real instrument of knowledge are discarded by the followers of other systems as unfit to prove anything. Therefore it is contended by the Advaitin, that the real reason for ineligibility for communicative discussion is the inability of words with apparent defectlessness, to convey meaning.

Now Jayateerth argues that when there are no valid instruments of knowledge how will then be started any communicative discussion at all? How to expose fallacies? For assertions and negations entirely depend upon the valid instruments.

The Advaitin contends that the discussion should be started without any reference to the reality or otherwise of the instruments that are used. For suppose a discussion is started to decide the eternality or otherwise of 'word' or shabda. Of the two debators one has accepted the reality of instrument and the other its unreality. Now setting aside the discussion of

the eternality of the word if you try to corner your opponent that if he does not accept the reality of instrument he is ineligible for the debate, you start a different discussion which amounts to a stale mate in dialectical discussion. For it leads to an endless regress. Therefore it is not necessary that one should accept the reality of the instruments before entering the arena for discussion.

To all this the reply Jayateertha gives is that they only reduce the Adwaitin to an absurd position—if he were to accept no real instruments of knowledge, and those instruments would not yield any knowledge; For an unreal thing is known to produce nothing. When they are unproductive they cannot help the cognitional business which entirely depends upon real instruments of knowledge. Hence it eternally follows as day follows night on that account that Adwaitin cannot participate in the dialectical discussion. But he is a participant in dialectics and hence the instruments must be accepted by him as real. With the threat of ineligibility to participation the Adwaitin is forced to accept the reality of instruments.

To the contention that one can enter into discussion being neutral in respect of reality of

instruments, the same may be the reply. For in order that a discussion should bear fruit, when its nature and condition are settled certain rules are accepted willingly by both the parties which automatically include the reality of instruments. So the Adwaitin was not aware of his own position as a debator; and Jayateerth has awakened him to his commitments.

Even if it is contended that an inferior type of reality of instruments is accepted and hence no refutation on the ground of unreality of instruments can be forced against Adwaitin. Jayateerth smilingly brushes aside this contention as worthless. For this empirical reality is only a technical reality. If it is reality then Adwaitin is forced to give up his theory of a reality; if on the other hand this phenomenal reality is stark unreality why all this fuss? He is in the mud again.

Now the Adwaitin is cornered and he divides reality into three kinds. There is the unsublated reality of Brahman. This is the principle reality. Now subordinate reality is of two kinds. One is subordinated to Maya and the other is subordinated to Avidya. Maya is that evil influence which affects the vision of Brahma. Avidya affects the knowledge of its own substratum. The resort of Maya is

God or Isha while Jeeva or soul is the support of Avidya or Nescience. Now the knowledge of the sky and other things is of the first kind. For this knowledge of the sky is not proved false by any other knowledge than the knowledge of Brahma and therefore fit to be accepted as real in ordinary daily life of give and take. And therefore this reality is called emperical or pragmatic reality. The second kind of reality is apparent reality or false reality. This is found existing as long as it is appearing, like rope-snake or shell-silver. It is not fit for the business of give and take.

This arrangement of three degrees of truth or reality will not take the Adwaitin a long way. For whatever degree of truth or reality he may adopt for the instruments of knowledge he cannot be free from the absurd position in which he has been landed. Then in a frantic frenzy Adwaitin adopts again a supertechnical reality known as 'Sadasadvilakshana' and if the whole world has this kind of reality then by what evidences, real or unreal? Thus he is stranded in the same shallow water as before. This has been dealt with in detail in Nyayamrita in the chapter dedicated to the refutation of three grades of reality.

Besides a thing different from sat is Asat and hence an evidence which is Asat cannot be an instrument. And if that evidence is different from being unreal or Asat it is sat only and hence a real thing cannot be Mithya or unreal. If on the other hand the Adwaitin agrees that a thing different from being unreal or Asat only is fit for the business of giving and taking then a thing which is apparently real or Pratibhasika of the type of shell-silver or Rope-Serpant which is not nonexisting (for it appears existing) might be fit for giving and taking. But this is absurd as no one can have a silver-bracelet out of illusory silver in the Conch-shell.

The Adwaitin objects that the emperical world and the illusory shell-silver though equally different from nonexisting thing like hair's horns yet they are different from each other. For illusory things are the objects of erroneous knowledge while the world is made up of the stuff of Nescience. But this difference is technical and not real. And hence the absurd position to which the Adwaitin is reduced is confirmed.

Even giving up this discussion about Sadasadvilakshana for a moment let us go to the original proposition about the Shruti 'नेहानास्ति किंचन' This is not an evidence to prove the emperical

world to be indescribable or Anirvachaneeya in nature. For this shruti does not posit that the world is always Anirvachaneeya, of the nature of being different from existence and non-existence (real or unreal)

The Advaitin contends that the real evidence in respect of the nature of the world is an inference, "world under dispute is different from both real and unreal for it is sublated by knowledge as shell-silver. Then this Anumana or inference exerts its influence on the interpretation of Shruti, which is then easily cajoled to accept the illusory nature of the world.

But this inference is fallacious. Jayateerth first takes up the statement that the world is *sadasadvilakshana* for scrutiny. First what is this *Sadasadvilakshana*? What does *sad* and *Asad* mean? Do they mean positive and Negative? Or Do they mean existing and non-existing? Now in the first alternative the positive world (*Bhava*) is naturally different from the negative even in *Dwaita* System. For *Madhva* also admits the difference between the two *Bhava* and *Abhava*. In the same way the negative world is different from the positive. So if you admit the world to be of such a nature it would not be disagreeable to *Madhva*. Besides even if you

prove sadasadvilakshana to be the attribute of the world yet you will not find the world Mithya or illusory.

Thus Jayateérth exhausts all alternatives and shows how Adwaitin is foiled in his attempt of proving the world to be Anirvachaneeya or Mithya.

In the mean while some one raised an objection against the use of the short form of ते at the beginning of the pada, as it is prohibited by the rules of Grammar. Hence instead of तेनानिष्ठं कथं भवेत् it ought to be त्व अनिष्ठं so that the longer form त्व should be used in the place of ते. To this Raghavendra replies that अनुदात्तं सर्वं अपदादौ is a Sutra from which is repeated अपदादौ and joined to तेमयावेकवचनस्य which ultimately means that the pronouns यूष्मद् and अस्मद् will have short forms of ते and मे not at the beginning of a Pada. Then there is a general rule that what is ordained by a negative is not to be held universally true. Hence even at the beginning of a pada the prohibited short form ते (as the prohibition is not universal) can be used and justified.

Thus refuting the first statement that the disputed world is different from sat and Asat

Madhva shows the hollowness of the reason adduced to prove that statement. The reason adduced is 'being sublated by knowledge'. But this sublation by knowledge accepted by the Adwaitin is different from that admitted by Madhva or Sidhantin. For Madhva also sublation of the type of अन्यथा विज्ञातस्य सम्यग्विज्ञातत्वं (When a thing wrongly understood becomes rightly understood there is Badha or Sublation.) is acceptable. Or 'destruction brought about by the knowledge of God also' is said to be Badha. Now the reason adduced by Adwaitin ज्ञानबाध्यत्वं or Sublation by knowledge is different from these two types.

Now there are different schools among the Adwaitins who hold different conceptions of Badha or Sublation of the phenomenal world. Vivarana Kara maintains that Sublation is disappearance of Ajnana or cosmic nescience with its productions existing or already merged, by knowledge. For he has admitted the illusory nature of the world to be 'Negation of an object in a place where it is expected to be'. But Sureswara thinks that Sublation arises by knowledge born of such statements in Upanishad as तत्त्वमसि or अहं ब्रह्मास्मि. After the rise of this knowledge we come to know that the cosmic ne-science with its productions had never existed before nor

is existing now nor will it exist in future. Here the reason adduced either belongs to the first or second school of Advaitin.

But both these are not acceptable to Shri Madhva. To this Advaitin objects that Madhva also concedes that the phenomenal world is removed by the knowledge of God. True, yet, it is categorically different from the conception of Advaitin. For Advaitin explains that the knowledge of Brahma, disillusions the illusion of the cosmic phenomena. While Madhva contends that when God's knowledge, desire, and effort become active and alive to the situation the so long existing world is physically destroyed as an earthen pot is smashed by a club.

The Advaitin for the sake of argument may even agree to this conception of destruction. But Madhva shows that certain eternal things like Prakriti and Kala have the immunity from physical destruction. In the case of such categories the creation and destruction are not physical but metaphysical.

Thus showing that the concepts of bondage and release are not warranted by evidences Madhva goes on to show the inference to be logically unsound.

In the course of discourse on illusion and Sublation Madhva refutes the school which admits no illusion and propagates his own concept of illusion and sublation.

First Madhva introduces us to the School of Prabhakaras, who are a part of Meemamsakas. They pose themselves as the propagators of a Khyati. They contend that all knowledge is valid, as the object of all knowledge is true. He does not agree with the school that propounds the theory of Parinamavada that shell is changed into silver. For the origination of silver cannot be explained in the erroneous knowledge of silver seeing a piece of shell. Then Prabhakara explains his own theory of illusory knowledge. His theory is more psychological than metaphysical. Now shell has been cognized as silver. The form of cognition is 'This is Silver'. In this illusory perception there are two elements. There is the presentation of shell as 'this'. There is the memory representation as 'Silver'. Each of these elements taken by itself is true. It is only the difference between these two elements that is the cause of this illusion. The form of memory is 'this is that Silver'. Its presentation is immediate apprehension. It is difficult to understand how these two so different are confused. But the

Meemamsakas explain - this difficulty in the following manner. Owing to some defect in the sense-organs the real nature of the thing apprehended ('this') is not apprehended, but affords some similarity to Silver. This excites and revives the memory of Silver seen before. Again the 'that ness' in the representation of silver owing to some further fault is not brought to consciousness. And the silver is cognised as presented. The difference between the two is not recognised. This non-discrimination gives scope to the illusion or false perception which at the first appears to us as real as any perception that is valid. And we have the cognition 'this is Silver'. And one is tempted to activity to have it.

Again silver in this illusion is due to memory and cannot be disputed. For it is not perceptual cognition; there being no contact of the eye with Silver. It is not also inference. Because we have no middle term or Hetu to make the inference possible.

Thus there are two psychoses one is presentation and the other is representation. Presentation of 'this' and the representation of silver though different in kind and in their objects, yet with the difference blurred and with similarity

awakened one psychosis as 'this is silver' rise up in identification and used in apposition.

This cognitional phenomenon cannot be explained in any other way. Cognition of 'silver' as said above is Representation or Recollection. It is not proper to object that it is not Recollection because it has no element of 'that' in it. For recollection does not bring the whole of the experience to mind. There is the element of presentation in the cognition 'this is silver'. But the function of the senses ceases when it apprehends the similar qualities in the object that is before us and awakes the impresses, in the mind, of silver experienced before:

Raghavendra beautifully summaries all this in one sentence. This is the view-point of Akhyatavada of Meemamsa. (इदं रजतमिति ज्ञानादयं ग्रहणस्मरणात्मकं दोषवशात् अग्रहीत शक्ति विशेषं प्रमृषित तत्ता हं इत्यत्र अन्यथा न पपत्ति परिक्षेपो प्रमाणीकृत्य अत्र पुनः अविवादे दमंशज्ञानं हित्वा रजतज्ञान स्मरण इत्यंशो मानं च प्रमाणयति). This is the silver in the combination of two psychoses. One is presentation and another is representation. Due to some defect silver is not cognised and the 'that ness' (in representation) blurred out. This is borne out by the Reductio absurdum theory and the principle of eliminations Giving up the 'this ness' as out of consideration for it is agreed on all

hands; consideration is continued only in respect of the cognition of silver to be memory or representation and evidences are presented in that respect.

Now the Meemamsaka tries to prove that the disputed illusory knowledge that 'this is silver' is valid, because the cognition of the object before us is indeterminate cognition. There is also the memory of Silver aroused by the similarity of the object before us (Shell). Then rises the determinate cognition that 'This is' and born of this is the cognition of silver whose being different and not different is under dispute.

The Meemamsaka contends that deleting the disputed difference and non difference if we keep only 'This is Silver' retaining their apposition on the strength of which there is reference to it, no body can object to it.

But we must clear that 'Silver' here is memory element. Similar explanations apply to the stock examples of dream consciousness, yellow couch sell and others.

Hence the contention of the Meemamsaka is that all cognitions are valid, because they are cognitions. Here it is not the Shell that

appears like silver. For shell is not of the nature of Silver. We cannot cognise the identity of Silver for it does not exist. Therefore the theory that there is no illusory knowledge or Akhyati Paksha alone is rationally superior.

Here begins a stiff tussel of dialectical discussion, Madhva opposes this school because he poses himself to be Neo-Anyatha Khyativadi. So he analyses critically theory of Akhyatavada.

He admits the reputation of Anyatha Khyati Vada which is done by the Meemamsakas. For Madhwa's Anyatha Khyati vada to us different and it means that one thing is known as another. For he says that he calls it Brahma when non-existent this is known as existing thing. Here a pertinent query is made by the opponent whether in the apprehension of one thing as another, the nature of being another is real or unreal and the reply is that the nature of being another is unreal, and it is admitted that an unreal thing also is apprehended. Even Silver in the false apprehension is unreal.

Now Madhwa calls himself Abhinava Anyatha Khyatiwadin. In the case of illusion the question of object and sense arises. A rule is necessary to fix up this relationship, which Jayateertha defines. The knowledge of a certain thing

arises when that thing gets contacted with a certain sense. Then that thing is the object of that sense, while settling the causal relation we must take into consideration the contact with the sense which must be incorporated into the body of the Cause. But all contacts cannot generate the effect. For the contact of the eye with other cannot be the cause of Perception of form of Ghata. But we mean only those contacts when are inevitable or unavoidable. Then the contact of Smoke or Hetu with the support of Fire viz. mountain will give rise to the knowledge of Lingi. That means Parvata also would be object of inference.

The simple meaning of this Apadana is that the inference born of the cause or smoke which is in contact with the Paksha or mountain, shall also include the mountain as its object.

But this Apadana is not undesirable. For an inference includes among its objects minor premise and its supporter Paksha or mountain. To this an objection is raised that Paksha is not an object of inference only minor premise or Sadhya is the object to be inferred. Because 'that can be the object of that knowledge which is generated when the sense is contacted with that object' this definition is applicable only to Sadhya alone

and not to Paksha. For contact with Ling is nothing but invariable concomitance of it with Sadhya. This Vyptic is not to be found in Paksha and it is found only in Sadhya.

But Paksha is not to be found invariably with hetu or major premise. Still in the inference which recognises five or minor premise also cognizes Paksha in its form. 'There is fire on the Mountain'. When we take this as our contact Parvata or Paksha also is the object of inference. But mere objectification does not give a place in the form of inference. If mere objectification is the cause of apprehence, then there should be no apprehension of Silver in the false knowledge 'this is silver'. For Silver is not objectified in the required sense.

It is ultimately settled that if a thing should be the object of cognition, it should be contacted with the instrument which causes the cognition. But in the erroneous knowledge 'this is Silver' Silver is the object of knowledge though it is not contacted with the sense of sight (Because Silver is not at all existing). This is true. But in this illusory apprehension of Silver, Silver is the object of cognition though it is the shell that is contacted with the sense of sight. But this

supposition will not lead to an anarchy and confusion. For such an anarchy prevails only when some blemish or defect is the cause of cognition and not in the case of normal cognitions.

Even if we stick to the rule that, that is the object of knowledge which when contacted with the sense appears in the apprehension, still this does not go against our experience. For if shell is contacted and shell is apprehended yet Silver is the object of knowledge then there is really gain-saying of our experience. We never admit that shell is apprehended in the illusory cognition 'this is Silver'. Because we state that after the illusion, apprehension of shell immediately negates the cognition of Silver. And experience is not contradicted by admitting that 'this' is contacted and apprehended in the knowledge 'this is Silver'. Hence there is no objection if 'this' is contacted and apprehended.

So far 'Silver is seen' is an optic illusion. Admitting this and conceding any objectivity to so shell-Silver in the illusion one definition was given. Now Paksha and shell-Silver are both admitted as objects of knowledge. And a definition which is applicable to both generated and ungenerated knowledge will be given.

The cognition of a thing as its object is the cause of the expression of that thing as the object of that cognition. But it is not that every cognition produces an expression. The cause has merely the potentiality of producing the expression. The cause has merely the potentiality of producing the expression and not the actuality of producing always the effect of expression of that thing as the object of cognition,

There is reason for accepting wrong knowledge which apprehends a thing wrongly. The chief reason is the senses. Though for right knowledge also the same senses are the reason yet the senses that are affected with defects produce wrong knowledge. This rule is applicable not only in epistemology but also in other fields. But as in other fields the defects merely hinder the natural capacity to produce the effect, and they do not contribute for the production of the effect. This is not true; other wise true knowledge which is the cause of valid expression, would not have been the cause of even invalid expression.

Again there is further investigation of illusory cognition and of its causes. The defects and auxiliary causes have their own part to play in creating optic illusion.

A series of syllogistic inferences are used to show the cognition 'this is Silver' is a wrong cognition, sublated later on by a true cognition 'this is shell and not Silver'. The inferences adduced by the Parvapakshin to prove that 'this is Silver' is a valid knowledge are fully proved to be fallacious and hence they are rejected and its invalidity is accepted.

Some others like Ramanuja contend that there is no illusory cognition at all. Ramanuja forms a sub variety of Akhyati Paksha.

Ramanuja propounds his theory of Satkhyativada thus: All appearances, in illusory knowledge form objects of knowledge; these objects have real existence and are valid entities. These apprehensions even in false perception like 'this is Silver' even at the sight of shell are valid and have objective reality. Ramanuja explains his extreme reality depending upon his metaphysical theory of Panchikarana or Trivritkarana. Panchikarana is a theory in which all the cosmic manifolds are mixed substances. They contain all the five Bhutas or the five gross elements. The Trivritkarana implies that the cosmic world is made tripartite and this tripartite constitution is apprehended in all valid perceptions. In Chandogya it is said that every entity of earth or

fire or water is made tripartite. Then he corroborates this truth with quotations from Purana and Brahma sutra. By tripartite he means each thing is made up of all elements. Or each thing is made up of three elements, earth, fire and water.

Now he gives the evidence of pre supposition or Arthapatti. In Jyotistoma one should pour somajuce in fire, while in Darsha purna Masa corn substances are to be thrown. Therefore Soma and others alone are accepted. In the absence of these the sacrificers choose Putika as the representative of Soma and others for sacrificial objects. This choice is justified only on the pre supposition that every object is constituted with all elements. Though all the elements of Soma are not to be found in Putika yet a few have justified the choice of Putika.

Ramanuja also adduces the evidence of perception. The similarity of one thing to another is nothing but the constitution of one thing with the same elements of the other thing. As there are elements of Silver in the oyester shell the perception of Silver is valid cognition. The arrangement of denotation and utility is settled by the understanding of majority of elements. When we cognize an object with meajority of elements,

then the cognition of a thing with minority of elements is set aside. On this very basis, proceeding towards Silver and receding from Silver; and sublation after illusion are explained. In the same manner all so called wrong perceptions like yellow shell, dream objects, Redness of the crystal, mirage and others, are to be considered as valid perceptions.

But this theory is not sound; For the Upanishadic and Puranic quotations only prove the mixture of earth fire and not the mixture of shell and Silver. Now you cannot even infer the effect of the mixture of causes like earth fire and water, every where. For the existence of cause does not certainly warrant the existence of the effect in the form of elements of all things in every place. If it is a fact then just as Silver appears in the shell every thing ought to have appeared there.

Besides the Presupposition based upon Shruti is most unreasonable. For let us know how many elements of Soma plant are to be found in Putika. Are they in majority or in equality or in minority. In the first alternative if some elements are in majority it is Soma plant and not Putika Anukalpa. An Anukalpa in Meemawsa is a subordinate thing to repre-

sent a predominant thing. It is argued that Soma is fully Soma when Soma is available. But when Soma is in majority in a thing taken in its place then because soma is not fully available in it, it is the Anukalpa of Soma. This does not hold good. For even Soma is not fully Soma but only has majority of elements of Soma. In the second alternative when both the elements are equal both shell and Silver should appear. And in the third alternative in which Soma is in minority of elements how can that do the work of Soma ? If it still does then even shell should do the work of Silver.

Then there is a long discussion over the nature of Similarity according to the theory of tripartite constitution of things. Exposing its artificiality and far-fetchedness Shri Madhva stops from refuting still further the ridiculous theory.

Jayateertha after the refutation of the real nature of objects of Sense-deception directs us to deal with other illustrations of objects of wrong knowledge. It is a heavy list of things of different nature requiring different methods of refutation. Now Raghvendra comes to our help and shows how unreasonable it is to concede uncontested reality to objects of valid cognition

on the principle of tripartite constitution of this heavy list. Dream stands first.

1) Dream is the creation of God as told in the Upanished and hence all things seen in the dream are real being created by God and their cognition is valid. But this contention is untenable because after the wake up we say 'So long it was only dream and not wake ful state' This refutation comes in the way of accepting dream things as true.

2) As for the redness of the crystal, there is the contact of red flower with the crystal and hence the real red rays are contacted with the eye. Hence the cognition of redness is not erroneous. If it is so another thing near the red flower also should look red.

3) As for the contention that in the illusion of Mirage the eye comes in contact with the watery particles is refuted by refutation of the example of shell Silver.

4) In case of the fire brand circle (अलातचक्र) its perception is explained that when the fire brand is swung round very rapidly it touches all points on the circle and thus creates a notion of a fiery wheel. Hence it is no illusion. But it is an optic illusion to common people.

5) The visual rays emitted towards the mirror are reversed by the mirror and these rays in the reverse order apprehend man's face on his neck. Therefore the apprehension of the face is real. This is refuted later on.

6) In the case of direction being mistaken as when we take north for south, the object of perception is true because even in the north there are the elements of the South. Hence this is no erroneous knowledge. Now this is proved wrong by the instance of Shell-Silver.

7) Now the case of double moon perception is similar. Through the pressure of the finger upon the eye, the visual rays go out divided. Some rays go straight while others travel oblique. The straight going rays touch the Moon in her place, while the rays going obliquely catch the Moon from a distance. Thus there is the double Moon perception which is valid. But this method is adopted only when the perception is proved valid; and that is never proved valid.

Here comes another belonging to a group of the Naiyayikas, who say that erroneous cognition is only determinate perception born of two psychoses, their difference being not cognised. Because the residual impression of Silver along with the sense affected with defect becomes co-

ntacted with the shell not knowing or knowing the difference between the two, produces one determinate cognition, with the object of the 'this' and the piece of shell which is contacted by the sense. Two things appearing in the cognition, the difference being not apprehended form the expression which amounts to a false knowledge. Showing its falsity the apprehension of difference is called the sublating knowledge. But one does not appear as another as said by others.

Jayateertha exposes this school to ridicule. For the Meemawsaka in accepting the view of Akhyati Vada has some motive. Because on the basis of this Vada he builds the validity of the Vedas. But this junior school of Naiyayikas disregarding the tenets of their ancestors that one thing appears as another, has nothing to gain by accepting Akhyati Vada.

Now Jayateerth critically reviews the theory of the ancient Naiyayikas who contend that the Silver that is superimposed is, real. That a thing is what it appears to be, is a general rule. An exception is accepted only when there is great objection to it. In the cognition 'this is Silver' three things appear viz 'This' 'Silver' and 'their identity. Here Silver and Silverness and the thing called 'this' are not sublating in

later knowledge and hence they are not unreal. Only their identity is negated and hence it is unreal. The presentation of Silver is explained thus: the Silver that is apprehended is not existing here but is existing in a distant place.

But all this is proved false by every body's experience which is obtained in later sublation. Its form is clear 'So long it is only unreal Silver that appeared to us'. Some of ancient Naiyayikas accept this story of unreal Silver appearing in the false cognition 'this is Silver'. Among the Baudhas there are Vijnanvadis who argue that the Silver in 'this is Silver' is real, no doubt. But there is no extra mental reality. Hence it is mental or internal reality. For it is neither objectively real or unreal; it is of the nature of consciousness. He also uses the following syllogistic reasoning; This Silver appearing in shell is of mental nature because it is perceived without sensual contact. The only erroneous nature of it is that the internal appears as external. And the sublation or negation is justified by proving that it is not objectively external as it is only subjectively internal. This theory is not reasonable. For if that Silver is objectively real it is belied by our experience that an unreal piece of Silver appeared. And

the theory of illusion is found coherent with an unreal piece of Silver. The Baudha need not run to apply the principle of elimination as done before. If, on the other hand it is objectively unreal it cannot even be seen as objectively real. It is not that objective reality alone is negated by the unreality of the perceived. For its subjectivity or internality is not warranted by evidences.

For refuting the syllogistic reasoning Jaya-teerth asks if the apparent Silver appears without sensual contact or without sensual contact alone. In the first alternative, perception without sensual contact concomitant with internality is violated in the externality. The reason adduced that there is no sensual contact is disproved because the perception of Silver comes after sensual contact with the shell. The direct perceptive nature of the cognition is accepted because there is the sensual contact with shell.

This theory of internality of Silver leads to ridiculous absurdity. For suppose burning is superimposed on Gunja punja; then this burning is some thing internal and it may cause the burning of the stomach. If it is not so even the internal is unreal and the object of illusion is fully unreal. Thus the Baudha shall have to surrender

his theory of Atma or consciousness being the object of wrong cognition.

Now some among the Baudhas contend that the fully unreal is the object of wrong cognition. This super imposed Silver is not real. For it is negated by later knowledge. Nor is it both real and unreal. For the idea of reality and unreality of one and the same thing, at the same time, in the same place, amounts to self contradiction. Reality and unreality, if conceded in different places and at different times then the super imposed Silver is no less than an ordinary pot of empirical truth. The cognition of pot also would amount to illusion.

Now we must scrutinize here, what constitutes the theory of unreality of an illusory object. If it means that the real piece of shell being cognized as silver which is not existing at all times and in all places, then we shall accept your theory with all submissiveness. If on the other hand what is perceived in the erroneous knowledge 'this is Silver' is all unreal, then we honourably differ from you as the 'this' referring to shell is real, before and after the sublation. Therefore this theory is not sound.

Mayavadi appears on the scene. His contention is that the super imposed silver is Anirva-

chaneeya or indescribable. This is not reasonable as it is not held up by evidences, then they run like this. This shell silver is indescribable as the cognition is born of some epistemological defect like identity warranted by erroneous cognition.

First Jayateerth critically analyses the concept of Anirwachaneeyatwa or indescribability. Adwaitin explains it as 'It is neither real nor unreal nor both'. This is considered as Anirwachaneeya. But Jayateertha says that he has not accepted the reality or the reality and unreality; hence 'it is neither real nor both' is also acceptable to him. Hence his attempt to prove it is carrying coals to Newcastle. If on the other hand his intention is only to prove the negation of unreality, then the experience that it was unreal to the core, gainsays the conclusion he has arrived at.

Besides the reason that it is a cognition born out of some defects is a futile reason or non-existent reason. For the cognition of 'this' is only a modification of Antah karana or mind through the contact of sense; This is one cognition while another is that of Silver. In respect of this super-imposed Silver without sense-contact it is production of Aanjna or nescience. The first cognition being true and valid is not born

of defects. Though illusory knowledge is born of defects, yet being the effect of Ajnana or nescience it is not of the nature of knowledge. As for Sakshi being eternal and unborn it is not produced at all. Hence the reason is futile and non-existent. For the fact that an object of cognition born of defects is not to be found in Shell-Silver. Hence the reason is futile.

This theory of Anirvachneeya too is fully reviewed and its loop-holes are fully exposed in Nyayamrita. But here let us scratch it a little more. More over Advitis should explain a little more about 'this is Silver'. Is this eternal or temporary? If it is eternal its cognition should be co extensive with it and hence eternal. If it be temporary it must be born and its cause should be provided.

Avidya cannot be the cause of its origination. For in Adwaita Avidya will have nothing to cover. This will be explained later on. Avidya seeks its substratum in Atma and then it would shine only inside, and not outside. Its effect naturally the Silver also would shine inside only. But Atma is all-pervading; hence Avidya seeks Atma which is limited by shell and produces Silver which appears contacted with

shell only. If it is said so then Silver should appear always.

Let us try to know more about this shell Silver as supposed by Adwaitin in order to show inexplicability of the appearance of Silver. We must know if this Silver appears due to sense contact or through residue impressions as of past things. Or is Silver apprehended by Sakshi or internal soul as pleasure and pain are done. The first alternative is not accepted because Adwaiti accepts that due to contacts with affected senses, Ajnana or nescience sheltering with soul limited by shell changes into Silver and cognition of Silver. Thus Silver and its cognition come into existence at one and the same time. The second alternative is not reasonable. Because it is not warranted by experience.

The third alternative also is not acceptable. Raghavendra now explains the form and method of perception through senses in order to understand the significance of the apprehension by Sakshi or internal organ. Just as water running from a lake through canal enters into the field and assumes the square form of the field, so also Antahkarana which is fiery by nature and made up of its particles comes out of the eyes and others and transforming itself into a long

piece of light covers the whole of the object and assumes its form. This is vritti or empirical knowledge (common knowledge). In the same manner the soul residing in the shell and limited by the cognition of shell identifies itself with the soul or Jeeva limited by Antahkarana, both being limited by the same adjunct.

Sakshi is no other than Jeeva or soul identified with the soul limited by the adjunct of the substratum of the illusion. It is by this Sakshi that the Silver as contacted with shell is made to shine or appear.

Hence the appearance of Silver entirely depends upon the sense contacting the object shell. So Sakshi does not apprehend Silver directly without the medium of senses.

Besides if the Silver is Anirvachaneeya or indescribable then how do we feel at the time of appearance that it is real and at the time of sublation that it is unreal? Why do we not cognise it to be Anirvachaneeya? Silver no doubt is Asat or unreal not completely but only in a limited sense. Sat is pragmatic utility, and Asat is denied that pragmatic utility. If this is the contention of Adwaitin then pragmatic utility is not the point at issue to him. If utility is the point at issue then the Adwaitin would

be committed to the theory of Anyatha khyati-vada (First Silver was thought to be useful then it was found that it was useless).

Now suppose the argument is put forth that shell Silver is unreal as it is not perceived. To this Jayteerth replies that the contrary might be proved. Shell Silver is unreal as it is perceived.

Adwaiti's argument that if shell-Silver is Asat it cannot be perceived is hollow. For he would have been able to prove Silver's absence of unreality on the ground of its perception, only when there is concomitance between unreality and imperceptibility. This concomitance suffers violation at the hands of Adwaitin because he has to admit perceptibility of an unreal thing. For he admits the cognition of a thing different from pot he must cognise the pot. For the knowledge of difference entirely depends upon the knowledge of the counter-entities concerned. So if you want to attribute distinction of Asat to shell-Silver you must know the Asat which is its counter entity.

Enough of this prolixity. Let us first restrict ourselves to the notion that Asat has no cognition. When we deny cognition to Asat we must have cognized Asat. For if one denies

whiteness to a pot he must have cognised the pot. Hence Asat is cognisable.

To this there is an objection from the Adwati. He does not deny cognition of Asat in general. But he says Asat is not directly perceived as a real thing.

Really speaking super-imposition is imposing some thing on another thing where it does not exist. But this will not lead to Anyathakhyati. Adhisthana or substratum or shell as associated with Silver is Anirvachaneeya or mithya while essential (shell) is real. That which is super imposed viz Silver is both associatively and essentially unreal. This is the theory of Adwaitin.

But the Anyatha Khyati-wadies think both shell and Silver as associated are unreal but essentially are real. The relationship between the two is identity, which when it shines becomes the cause of attempt to get it. The Silver referring to 'this' of shell and 'this' referring to Silver are both imposed; and imposed form is false and yet it is perceived as real. Hence the concomitance of Asat not being perceived is violated in illusory knowledge. So you cannot conclude the shell Silver being perceived cannot be Asat.

The shell-Silver is not sat or real; For then in sound knowledge also shell should have appeared as Silver, so it is not sat or real.

Thus "Asat does not appear as sat in a perception" This rule is violated else where. For the reality that appeared in shell-Silver was unreal no doubt. Still it appeared as real in the perception of shell-Silver

Even Anirwachaneeyatwa attributed to shell-Silver must be accepted as appearing sat in the perception. For our experience at the time of illusion corroborates this and we feel at that time the urge to get it. Therefore the world of illusion cannot be explained the world being Anirvachaneeya.

So long it was argued that bondage cannot be superimposed and illusory and while discussing the desirability of the investigation of Brahma it was out of context. And the Adwaitin had in this context tried to prove that bondage is the product of cosmic nescience which is illusory or Mithya. In order to prove that their contention is unreasonable, Madhva says that Nescience is not possible and its functional necessity cannot be explained.

This cosmic nescience or Ajnana is some positive substance and not the negation of

Ajnana or knowledge, Now the Ajnana cannot stand on its own legs. It must have substratum. What is its support must be scrutinized. Jeeva or soul or Brahma the supreme soul or the insentient Jada— one of these three entities must have supported Ajnana. But it cannot choose the soul for its support. This is explained later on. Insentient Jada is not accepted as the support of Ajnana. Besides there is mutual dependence. For when Ajnana is proved then the insentient its product is proved. And when Jada is proved then with it as its support Ajnana will be proved. Ajnana without a support to hold it cannot come into existence. When Ajnana takes recourse to Brahma; and covers Brahma in such a manner that Brahma will not know Brahma Himself.

Madhva says that Ajnana cannot cover or hide Brahma who is attributeless and who is self luminous, from him self. A thing is shining and is hidden is contradiction in terms. Avarana or hiding has only one purpose to serve and that is to hide the light that is ever burning. When Brahman is self-luminous, it goes without proving that Brahman does not require the help of another light; Therefore Ajnana cannot even put out the light of Brahman.

Now the attributes like 'not having second' in Brahma are accepted not as different from Brahman, and hence how can they be Mithya or illusory ? To this the reply of Adwaiti is that 'not having second' is real essentially; yet as an attribute of Brahma it is unreal. So it is said "Though they (attribates) are one with Brahman, they appear to be different."

Attributes even as attributes cannot be Mithya or illusory. For again it takes us in to logical pits of fallacy called Mutual Dependence. For all things except Ajnana are considered to be Mithya. And all other things are required to be Mithya to be objects of Ajanana for its covering. Hence the Mutual dependence.

When all the causes are there and the effect is not coming forth then we are justified in supposing that there is some hindrance working as cover. Jada or insentient can neither cognise itself nor others because it is not of the nature of consciousness. So Adwaiti thinks that there is no point in considering Jada to be the support of Ajnana.

Besides if Ajnana were to seek shelter with Jada then Ajnana will not be cognised at all. A thing is cognised in its own light or sheltering

with some light. Ajnana has no light of its own; nor Jada has it, being the support of Ajnana.

Hence Ajnana cannot be explained by Adwaitin. In the absence of Ajnana it cannot be the material cause of Bandha which then cannot be Mithya. This will lead to the futility of all Shastras.

Here Jayateerth uses व्यर्थमविद्यति which is a chwee form, in grammar, व्यर्थमविद्यति becomes futile would have done the work. But the first one the chwee (चिह्न) has a special meaning. अभूत तद्भावे-
कृत्वस्ति यो गेसंपद्यकर्तरि चिह्नः is the sutra of Panini. Chwee is used in the sense of 'that which was not before'. Here the word व्यर्थ is used together with the root भू. Then व्यर्थ becomes व्यर्थी. Thus it becomes व्यर्थीमविद्यति. The Shashtra will become futile. This futility was not before and it is happening now. That this futility of the Shastras is not a desirable thing is the meaning carried by chwee.

For in order to provide motivation to Shastras (to provide Subject matter and purpose) imposition of false bondage on Atma is described at length. Hence this bondage is made up of the stuff of Ajnana or nescience. This Ajnana is again Supposed to be Mithya or false. Then it is superimposed on Atma. For all false things (Mithya things) are thus characterised as superimposed on Atma. But

one Ajnana is the material cause of another and that is of the third and so on. Hence it leads to Infinite Regress.

“This positive and inexplicable character of Ajnana is apprehended through perception, inference and some other logical proofs, that Ajnana becomes directly cognizable to internal perception is patent enough from such judgements as ‘I do not know’ ‘I do not know myself or others’. In fact such a judgement presents itself directly to the mind. It must not be regarded as a case of antecedent nonexistence of knowledge which is presented to the mind not immediately, but mediately through the Anupalabdhi, an indirect proof. Even if it be admitted that negation is immediate in its perception, the position does not improve. For the experience under discussion presupposes that there is always a cognitive element in the self which recognises the negative character of the judgement. The consciousness of the non-existence of the knowledge is some kind of knowledge and as such cannot be explained away as mere negation. For it leads to an apparent self contradiction.”

If Ajnana were to be the material cause of Ajnana there would be an endless regress. Upon

this the Adwaitin contends that no such fallacy would accrue to our Theory of Ajnana. For Ajnana is the production of itself as the material cause.

To this the reply is that self dependence is the fallacy. Here is a scope for mis-interpretation. अथवा should be taken as one word or it should be taken as two words. Jayateertha shows that it is one Nipata and not two as अथ and वा. Raghavendra makes the point clear. The whole of अथवा represents one alternative and not two, one by अथ and the other by वा.

Ajnana cannot be said to be eternal; For it must be either Swabhavika (not produced by any thing) or it must be the effect of something. In both the cases it is not free from logical fallacy. Besides this Avidya or Ajnana may be granted for argument's sake to be one and eternal. Even then it must be settled whether it is essentially real or it has only apparent reality (which means that its existance is only appearance and there is no further reality). If Chaitanya or soul were to remain detached and free from any sort of blemish Ajnana must appear and take up work of cosmic delusion. If this Ajnana is one you may avoid the regress infinite of Ajnana; but you cannot avoid the infinite regress of the appearance of

Ajnana. One appearance leading to another and so on. For if Ajnana were to appear before Chetana it must have the help of another and so on.

Instead of using Anavastha (endless regress) the word Anavasthitih is used just to show that it has sanctity of the vedas. This is the statement made by Jayateertha. Modern critics feel that it is ridiculous to lend Vaidic sanctity to regulate usages. So, Raghavendra quotes instance of this type from classical literature. Kalidasa in his famous work Kumara Sambhava says 'saw Triambaka the ascetic'; the usage of Triambaka is defended by Mallinatha as having the sanctity of Vaidic usage though it is secular Kavya. This shows Raghavendra's acquaintance with classical literature and its commentary literature. But there Vaidic sanctity is Mithya everything being empirical; here Vaidic sanctity is real as we recognise all things to be real.

Now Adwaiti rises to the occasion. He presents his side clearly and boldly. He admits Ajnana to be eternal and positive and to be sublated by knowledge. In this connection he marshalls all evidences to prove this statement: Perception, inferential reasoning, Vedic word, and presupposition. As perception he

cites instances of experiences like 'I am ignorant' 'I do not know myself and others'. No one should doubt that such experiences are explained by the experiences of 'absence of knowledge and not by some positive entity. For the experience is warranted by internal eye or Sakshi as happiness in such direct experience as 'I am happy. So it is not a negative entity. Had it been a negative entity it must have been apprehended by the sixth evidence of Anupalabdhi. Even those who say that an Abhava or negation is apprehended by Pratyaksha or perception cannot explain Ajnana in the Atma as the negation of knowledge. For the cognition of a negative entity first the cognition of its locus and counter entity is essential. Hence in both alternatives that there is such cognition and that there is no such cognition you cannot prove the negative nature of Ajnana. 'There is no knowledge in me'. This cognition presupposes apprehension of the locus Atma and the counter entity of 'I' in Atma. There is negation and hence its negation cannot be apprehended. If on the other hand the locus and counter entity are unknown you cannot have the apprehension of their negation.

You should not object how the object of Ajnana which distinguishes it from other subjects becomes cognized by Sakshi the internal eye. For all objects become known to Sakshi either as known or as unknown. If they are to be cognised by Sakshi as known they seek the help of the senses. Otherwise when they are to be known as unknown to Sakshi they are directly apprehended by Sakshi thus it is proved by perception that Ajnana that is in Atma is positive in form.

The recollection of some experience at the time of sleep is 'I did not know any thing at that time' This experience does not cognise Ajnana in the negative. For negative cognition needs the cognition of locus and its counter entity. But here there is no recognition of any thing. Hence this Ajnana is not negative but positive.

This is no inference which is now made after the experience we had in sleep. For inference we do need a Linga or invariable sign of it invariably associated with it. But there is no such Linga.

Thus there is perception to prove the positive nature of Ajnana. In this connection the Adwaitin

adduces Anumana or syllogistic reasoning to prove the positive nature of Ajnana.

The knowledge (under dispute) established by one of the different means of proof (प्रमाण ज्ञान) which lights up or intellectually illuminates the objects of knowledge which were not known before, annihilates ignorance having four characteristics 1) that ignorance is different from pre-existing negation of itself 2) that ignorance had so long been screening the objects which are afterwards intellectually illuminated by (प्रमाण ज्ञान) or knowledge established by valid means of proof 3) that this ignorance is capable of being annihilated by the act of intellectual illumination and 4) that the ignorance was located in the locality of the said illumination, just as the first rays of the lamp which light up and illuminate objects not already illuminated annihilate darkness which is not the pre-existing negation of illumination but has a positive existence a concrete content that the darkness has been screening the objects which are afterwards illuminated by the rays of the light and that the darkness was located in the locality now occupied by the rays.

Now Raghavendra brings the treatment of this very subject in Nyayamrita and Vadavali to bear upon the present inference, the four adjectives

mentioned to qualify 'the other positive object' (वस्तुवन्तर पूर्वकं) in the sadhya, have the purpose of warding off the possibility of proving the sadhya without proving the existence of Ajnana—proving only the existence of the pre-existing negation of knowledge, to be got from the Pramana or by the existence of Adrista which would obstruct it or by proving another quality of hiding or being unknown proved by it. In the illustration it is already found that the darkness which is the other thing in the rays of the light is existing. The reason 'which lights up intellectually the objects which were not known before' in the illustration, proves another object. Now we must know the nature of that. And that is the positive Ajnana which has the same locus and object as those of Jnana or knowledge.

Then Adwitin adduces many more inferences to prove the positive nature of Ajnana.

Now a doubt is raised. It is said that Ajnana is annihilated by Jnana or knowledge. Yet how do you explain such expressions as 'I do not know' though you know the object. So Adwaiti clears the doubt. He accepts that the positive Ajnana is cognised by internal knower or Sakshi and not by any senses. So before the senses apprehend the object there is Ajnana

which is comprehended by sakshi and hence such expressions as 'I donot know' are justified.

Now the Adwaitin places his cards on the table, and explains the whole theory of Ajnana in detail. The 'I' is superimposed on the pure Brahma and Silver is superimposed on the shell. Now this superimposition which is unreal which consists of object and knowledge must have for its material cause something unreal. If a real thing is accepted as cause, then according to the law of causality the superimposition also shall have to be real.

Again if this unreal thing that becomes the cause is again a thing to be produced then that requires another unreal and so on and so forth endlessly. So the supposition is not found possible without an unreal and eternal Ajnana as its cause, proves this fact.

Besides it is told in Shruti that bondage is removed through knowledge. If this is to be possible then there is the presupposition that the bondage has for its cause some thing unreal or Mithya.

This Ajnana cannot have for its substrata an insentient thing. There is neither evidence to prove it nor any purpose to induce it. Therefore depending upon the principle of elimination

Atma alone should be accepted as locus for Ajnana.

Now the whole structure of superimposition is critically analysed. Adwaitin had aduced perception as evidence to prove the existence of the positive Ajnana. Let us see to what absurd position we are reduced if Ajnana is accepted as negative. You should not put forward the excuse that had it been negative Anupalabdhi would have cognised it and not perception or Pratyaksha. For even Pratyaksha would apprehend negation or Abhava.

If not the Adwaitin would never be able to explain the cognition of Abhava or negation. Then the negation of knowledge would not be cognised. So he cannot even deny the negation of cognition.

Under these circumstances when any one cognises the absence of anything at the sudden opening of the eyes, it is but proper to say that Abhav is apprehended by perception or, knowledge being directly preceived, the negation of knowledge also is directly perceived.

If inference concludes that Perception will cognise the absence of knowledge at the time of sleep, what harm is there? Thus Jayateerth con-

tends that negation of knowledge will explain every thing about the theory of Ajnana.

For there is no reason at all to believe that Adhyasa cannot be explained without its cause. Adhyasa or super imposition is of the nature of knowledge. The material cause is mind or anta-karana. If that material cause is real then the effect Ajnana also will be real. Adhyasa being real is a desirable thing. Silver seen in Adhyasa is unreal and hence is sublated. But Adhyasa itself is knowledge and is not sublated. But it cannot be forced that Adhyasa should be Valid. For though Adhyasa is essentially Valid yet the object being false or unreal becomes invalid. It is not a rule that a real knowledge should have a real subject. Hence all the reasons adduced will not prove Ajnana to be positive.

Now Madhwa explains his position with regard to positive Ajnana. He is not against positive Nescience. All that he contended was to prove that Adwaitin cannot substantiate the theory of positive Nescience.

Now Madhwa maintains his position with regard to his theory of Positive Nescience which he calls by the name of Swabhava Ajnana Vada. Jayateerth explains this theory in five different ways. 1) The theory that Ajnana is the screen

hiding the soul and resorting the soul. This theory is free from defects mentioned before. Therefore futility of Shastras cannot arise from this theory. 2) The theory that it exists by its own merit means it is not imposed by Ajnana. So Jeeva or soul is not imposed by Ajnana, it is really existing. In such a soul Ajnana is residing therefore there is no mutual dependence. 3) The theory that Brahma is independently existing, is Swabhava. Soul is labouring under ignorance of Para Brahma. In the same manner Swabhava means the qualities of the soul itself like dependence. The soul is ignorant of its dependence and others. In this theory the soul is not screened in respect of its self illumination. 4) This ignorance is the nature of Jeeva and it is not in this theory, unreal or illusive. Hence there is no reducing to absurd position. 5) In the same manner the theory that Ajnana is assigned to the soul by the independent God is the Swabhava Ajnana Vada.

Then Jayateerth shows that in these theories of Ajnana there is no objection at all. For Ajnana screens Jeeva or soul; or is supported by Jeeva. The nescience covers Jeeva. Though Jeeva is self luminous yet by the inflexible will of God, the soul gets covered by Ajnana and

remains ignorant of God and many of his attributes.

All the attributes of Jeeva are not different from its self-luminous nature; still as Madhva admits, there is in Jeeva a self sufficient differentiating agency in a context where there is strict identity. So the attributes of the soul identical with it are abstracted from it to be the objects of Ajnana. Now this Ajnana is real and not imaginary. And yet there are ways and means to get rid of it. Jeeva intrinsically is endowed with consciousness which has the capacity to cognise Brahma and its own attributes; yet coming under the influence of Avidya whose capacity of screening is augmented by the miraculous and inconceivable power of Paramatman the soul does not shine with native luminosity,

But just look to Avidya. It is there; but it is very difficult to form a concept of it. Adwaitin takes pride that Avidya is difficult to be conceived and to be cognised by the means of knowledge. If its nature and contents are tried to be ascertained Avidya loses its characteristic marks. Some searching questions are asked regarding Avidya. Has Avidya both conceivability and inconceivability ? or has it only the quality of inconceivability ? The first alternative is not rea-

sonable. For in that part in which it is conceivable, Avidya loses its characteristic nature. If Avidya is of inconceivable nature then it cannot have a substratum and a witness. If Avidya has these things then Avidya would lose its nature. So when there is no substratum and witness it will lead to Nihilism.

Therefore the theory of Ajnana cannot be maintained in Adwaitavada; and when there is no Ajnana then there is no subject. For an unknown thing can be the subject of investigation. Such an ignorant man would be an eligible aspirant to study shastra.

Annihilation of Avidya is the coveted end. But when Ajnana itself is a square peg in a round hole in the system of Maya Vada, all the four pre-requisites of subject, eligible reader and a high end and the close relation ship of these being wanting, this Maya Vada is infested with dangerous fallacies and hence is a condemned system to be kept at a distance by the pious aspirants.

We started the critical review of this system stating that Shankar cannot make the identity of the soul and Brahma as the topic of his Sharirika Meemansa. And hence to adjust with that identity it is not necessary to accept and propound the falsity of Bandha or bondage.

This same contention is further explained by exposing many more defects in the reasoning of the Advaita Vadi. Now he is accosted with this question. He made identity the topic of Brahmasutra. If so it must also be the subject matter of Vedas. For Vedas are the instruments of the knowledge of Brahma. But interpreters of Vedas are Brahmasutras. The instruments and interpreters must have a common topic to deal with. But the Vedas in the form of Samhita, Brahmana and Upanishads are the propagators of difference and not identity.

Advaitin objects that Upanishads are the staunch advocates of identity, though he concedes that Mantra and Brahmana being devoted to Karmakanda hence resorted to by the ignorant might propound Bheda; in Upanishads there are such statements as तत्त्वमसि and others which out and out declare the identity of the Soul with Brahman. Hence Brahmasutras also treat the same identity.

This is not coherent reasoning. For तत्त्वमसि cannot teach identity. Because perceptual experience contradicts it. For perception cognises directly the miseries of the soul, and conflicts with the idea of identity of the soul and Brahma as they stand. For we experience misery while Brahma is free from it.

It is objected that perceptual experience cannot go against Shruti. For it is an instrument of higher capacity than Pratyaksha and it makes Pratyaksha to adjust itself to the meaning of the Vedas.

Madhva quotes an instance where Shruti adjusts itself to the needs of Pratyaksha and thus avoids conflict with it.

‘यजमानः प्रस्तरः’ is a quotation from Veda. The simple meaning of this statement is ‘the master is the handful of grass.’ Here this Shruti does not tell us the identity of these two. But only tells us that Prastara does the work of the master.

Now we must know this interpretation of the quotation will help us in the present context. Identity is not the topic of Brahma Meemamsa; because Veda, which is benefitted by Brahma-Sutra, does not treat this topic. That which is not the subject of the original cannot be the subject of its benefactor in interpretation; any accepted instance will serve the example.

In the same manner when Pratyaksha is contradicting it तत्त्वमसि cannot teach identity. So it must compromise its meaning to suit the necessity of Pratyaksha. For Pratyaksha is Upajeevyā and Veda is Upajeevaka. And Upajeevyā

is a stronger instrument of knowledge than Upajeevaka. Hence the Veda shall have to take cognisance of the conflict of Pratyaksha.

In the same manner certain Shrutis declare the omniscience of Brahma. Such are the Upajeevy Shruties. तत्त्वमसि depends upon these Shruties. Hence it is Upajeevaka; so तत्त्वमसि cannot go against Upajeevaka Shruties.

If on the other hand Adwaiti pleads that this rule of the strength of Upajeevy is not universal; it has also exceptions.

Having seen a rope one erroneously thinks that he saw a snake. This Pratyaksha is Upajeevy; still cannot go against the Upajeevaka truth that this is not the snake. Because it carries truth with it, it contradicts the Upajeevy Pratyaksha 'it is a snake'. Hence the Pratyaksha that cognises the difference between Jeeva and God though Upajeeva is not carrying truth with it.

Now the question to be settled is which is truth. Is that settled by the apparent meaning or on the strength of other reasons like 'not treated any where else' Hence the instrument that carries extra ordinary meaning not treated any where else will have a preference in settling the import of the passage. Now such canons of interpretation should be stated and not truth.

Those instruments that are stronger contradict those that are weaker. Hence if one Shruti is to carry the meaning against another Shruti the first one should be proved to be stronger than the second. Now we must show that shruties stating difference are stronger than shruties stating identity.

Jayateertha offers his rejoinder based on Madhva's Anuvyakhyana. In Shruti identity is used but in its secondary meaning. Leaving the primary meaning the secondary meaning is resorted to with some definite purpose, which must be found in the respective Shruties. Identity when contradicted results in secondary meanings like these: "Identity when contradicted will easily glide into one of these secondary meanings as would suit the context; Freedom, Superiority, unity of place, unity of opinion and similarity.

Raghavendra tells us that these are very well illustrated in Sannyaya Ratnavali by Padmanabha Teerth. In common parlance in the case of a man who has the whole village under his control, we say 'He is the village'. Identity is not literal but figurative, meaning that he has great liberty and control over the village. Referring to a Brahmin who is very learned it is said

'This is the only Brahmin in the vallaḡe'. meaning that he is known for his erudite learning. 'All cows become one in the evening in the cow-pen'. Here identity means 'oneness or sameness of place'. 'The Brahmins formerly were at daggers drawn and now they are one? Here identity means consensus of opinion. 'Manavak is fire itself;' this identity shows similarity between the two. (Manavak is like fire.)

Of these meanings of identity one is to be chosen to suit the context. How to apply this rule about the meaning of identity in the case of different contexts. In प्रथमुद्देशाधिकारण while elucidating the Guna sutra तद्गुणसारत्वात् he quotes verses which tell us that in तत्त्वमसि similarity is meant between Brahman and the soul. In परेऽप्ययं सर्वं एको भवति identity means sameness of place. As for the mode of expression or वृत्ति employed in each case it is discussed there only. Raghavendra makes the reference clear. While expressing similarity the mode or vritti is called Gaunee; while expressing sameness of place it is implication and while expressing consensus of opinion it is implied implication.

Hence the Shruties conveying difference are strongly grounded and are pinned down to this meaning; while Shruties conveying identity are

weakly grounded and are capable of yielding many meanings. Hence the former contradicts the latter and switches it off to another meaning that would suit the context.

Now the whole of the argument is wound up. Therefore, Madhva says that there is no necessity of supposing Bhandha to be false. Analysing it threadbare and exposing its vulnerable points Madhva showed the hollowness of the theory of Mithyatwa and now explains the first Sutra. The purpose of this long argumentation is clear. It is to show that Adhyasa Bhashya at the begining of the Sutra Bhashya is irrelevant, out of context, and unwanted.

But if Adhyasa Bhashya is unwanted for the explanation of Sutra, equally and even more unwanted is the refutation of Adhyasa Bhashya at the beginning of elucidation of the Sutras. Thus it might be very well said that Madhva is a Seeker after others defects 'Seeking the mote in the eyes of others he does not see a beam in his own eyes'.

So Madhva in order to be free from this charge shows he was forced to take note of the wrong elucidation of Shankar and was forced to refute it in order that his disciple should not be attracted by the apparent glamour of the

Adhyasa wada. Hence for the real under standing of the elucidation of Sutras the refutation of Adhyas proved in inevitable. Formerly the word अतः was interpreted as 'one gets release through the grace obtained by knowledge born of hearing thinking and meditating.' Now the present one is the second interpretation of अतः, 'Because bondage is real hence'. In fine that without which can be justified, is briefly implied in the meaning of अतः; If not all other reasons impied in अतः not being expressed. Jijnasa will not be fully justified though the word अतः is used. For without the reality of bondage being proved, Jijnasa cannot yield the desired fruit (Moksha; of Prasada through knowledge. That is first proved. In order that Moksha is conveniently obtained through the grace which is the result of God-vision or knowledge acquired by the three stages of hearing thinking and meditating, the bondage is accepted as real and this is implied by the word of अतः in the Sutra. Hence all this justification and vindication of the reality of Bondage is neither out of context nor unwanted. This is an organic part of the elucidation of the aphoristic अतः is a part of Madhva's Bhashya.

Jaya Teerth uses the word कृपात् and a grammatical objection is raised against the

application of the suffix आलुच् to कृपा. For this suffix is not provided after कृपा in rules of grammar, in the case of the root कृप् to be able. Then a circuitous way is chosen to justify the form कृपाल्. It is not the suffix आलुच् but it is the termination लुक् (in which क् is meaningless) that is applied to the root कृप् and after many modifications कृपाल् is formed. In that case by कृपोरोलः लत्व is not added and hence it would not mean दयालु or compassionate or kind. To this objection Raghavendra finds a new way of solution. The word कृपालु is not derived from the root कृप् and the termination आलुच् but it is a compound word of two substantives कृपा and आलु and Amara is quoted as an authority in which आलु means a pot (कर्कशालुर्गलतिक, Amara). Or Raghavendra suggests another derivation from कृपा and the root ला (कृपालाति) and quotes Amara स्याद्दयालुः कारुणिकः कृपालुः सूरतः समाः and commentary on this, grammatically justifies this form by deriving it as कृपालाति.

Bhagavan is one who is endowed with six distinguishing qualities like the whole of wealth, valour, glory, splendour knowledge and special knowledge. This Bhagavan being endowed with these qualities is credited with the extra-ordinary power of accomplishing the impossible task. Thus the second meaning of अतः is now wound up.

So far अतः is interpreted as supplying purpose or motivation to the investigation of Brahma. Raghavendra drags back the long chain of argument to the starting point and makes a brief and pithy statement containing all the relevant points spread over many pages of elucidation. By the very phrase ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा, we know that our investigation is that of an uncommon object, Brahma, full of auspicious attributes and hence it is different from the common soul or Jeeva, and that the purpose of investigation is Moksha through the grace of God born of God vision. Yet this Moksha and its means like grace and god-vision are individually considered to be the products of Karma. And hence it is thought the investigation of Brahma is futile.

Now there are three doubts to be cleared. 1) One is Karma does the work of God-vision and grace 2) According to the Naiyayikas there is a chain of causes and effects of which the root cause is false knowledge which when it disappears removes the activity which when stopped cancels the birth and death which in its turn takes away misery from us. Hence no investigation is necessary. 3) Unreal bondage is destroyed by knowledge and hence no grace is necessary. By removing these three doubts and proving that God vision is possi-

ble only through knowledge and grace is achieved only through God-vision and Moksha is attained only through the divine grace, and also by proving the reality of Bandha, Madhva explains the implications of अः in two ways.

This is what has been done so far; अः has been interpreted so as to supply motivation to the investigation. Now it is interpreted so as to supply reasoning which infers a 'being' to be the meaning of a word (and not 'becoming') which will supply the object of investigation. Justification of an object is maintained in two ways. One is by removing doubt of a wrong form imposed on Brahma, the object of investigation, by denying objectness to Brahma on the ground that it is one with the inner soul (Jeeva) which is self luminous. Or another is disproving the doubt of the wrong form imposed on the source of Brahma.

The second one is again employed in three ways. First by removing the doubt that when genus, a word, has no connotating link with the meaning and is not entitled to valid instrumentality, how can a species of it, Veda, arrogate to itself such a claim. Or by disproving the ineligibility of Veda for being valid instrument on the ground of the absence of means of connotation and of import of a sentence. Or still admi-

tting validity to Veda, it cannot be valid in respect of connotating or importing a 'being' to be its meaning.

Of these four ways the first one was employed to vindicate the object of investigation, when Omkara was said to indicate the full possession of perfect attributes which proved conclusively that Brahma was different from Jeewa. The second was employed when अतः was interpreted to mean that there is valid instrument of knowledge in verbal testimony like Vedas and others (The Vedas are self valid, self proved, like perception). The third will be employed afterwards when we prove that a word has capacity to connote its meaning only after it has established syntactical relationship with other words of a sentence. Now the fourth one is to interpret अतः as a reason proving that Vedas connote a full fledged Being like Brahma and not a becoming like sacrifice. This will begin with कार्यताच्च न कश्चित्स्यात्.

The so called followers of Jaimini say that Veda consists of injunctions, explanatory passages and hymns- The import of these is Karya which technically in Meemansa means a Parama Apurva or the last Apurva (which connects the pleasure of Swarga with sacrificial act.). Now a sentence consists of many words and when we hear it we know

only the meanings of different words syntactically connected. Still a sentence has one import. Otherwise it would be wrong to say that a sentence has one import.

Those who are proficient in semantics say that that is the meaning of the word to which the word refers. That is the import of a sentence which by its assertion completes the sentence and for the assertion of which the other meanings of words are accepted. Such a thing is of the nature of Karya the result of Kriti. This is the import of a sentence both in sacred Veda and profane literature. For when we use such unrelated words as cow, horse, man, elephant or 'Devadatta cooks' we do not find sentences reaching satisfactory consummation. But we reach that perfection only in such sentences as 'Devadatta! bring the cow' which expresses as its import the bringing of a cow which is the Karya. Because it is the result of activity of bringing. Hence all sentences have their import of activity only. In secular literature the perport of a sentence is the activity which is the meaning of the root. But in Veda it is the last Apurva born of the root अ॒ meaning to perform sacrifice. This is the only difference between sacred and secular sentences.

The other words in a sentence get related with the Karya in order to reveal it. And therefore they also indirectly connote Karya. Sentences that have other imports than Karya would get themselves associated with sentences conveying Karya and get their fulfilment. Thus all sentences in Veda having the import of Karya have the grandest of the achievements, the Apurva the last and nearest antecedent to Swarga.

Now the root in order that the termination लिङ्, तस्य and others meaning Karya should function, becomes a support to that Karya and meaning the same activity is also referring to Karya. It may refer to Karya that is in the meaning of the root. Or the meaning of the root itself is Karyata. Now bringing of a cow is Karyata. The other words when they are related with the Karyata connote their own meaning.

This is the theory of the Meemamsakas in semantics. In ordinary sentences the import of the sentence is that which is achievable by activity (कृतिसाध्यं कार्यं). Based on this theory the import of the Vedic sentences is the last Apurva which immediately brings about heaven and heavenly pleasures as that Apurva is achievable by activities like yaga. Now Jaya-

teertha shows how such a conclusion is untenable when this Karyata or Apurva is made the import and presents his theory of Istata as the import of a sentence in order to refute the Meemamsaka theory.

The word अविवादम् is explained as विवादाभावः. This is अव्ययीभाव compound according to the rule 'अर्थाभावो यदव्ययम्' and it means 'absence of dispute' or 'undisputedly' and an अव्ययीभाव is in neuter gender.

Now Jayateertha begins his refutation. Formerly in order to justify the position of ओं before the first Sutra it was quoted to the effect that Brahma oozes out if ओं is not repeated with the Sutra. This ओं after derivation is shown to denote Vishnu on the authority of Shruti. And that is the meaning of Vyahriti (मः सुवः स्वः). This Vyahriti is elucidated by Gayatri which then means Vishnu. Purush sukta is the elucidation of Gayatri. Hence Purush sukta also propounds Vishnu. Ultimately the Vedas are said to be the explanations of Purusha Sukta and hence all the Vedas have the import of Brahma or Vishnu.

To this the Meemamsaka has already raised the objection. All sentences or statements have the import of Karyata and they do not have the import of a static Brahma.

To this the rejoinder of Jayateertha is that all Karyata means only 'desired object' or 'means to desired object?' This desired object is some accomplished static being (सिद्ध) and changing activity.

Now this justification of सिद्ध to be the import of a sentence is an addition to the former arguments as interpretations or implications of अतः. Of them the first is, अतः supplies the end as Moksha through god-vision and the second is the establishment of the reality of Bandha or bondage and the third is the present one which proves that the statements in Veda have for their object the full-fledged Being Brahma in order to supply an object for investigation.

Derivatively the word Karya or Kritya ultimately means Ista or Ista sadhana. For the word कार्य is derived from the root कृ and the termination कृत्य which means 'object' that is the object or कर्म which is very much desired by the agent to be achieved through activity. So Karyata is nothing but an object of desire to be achieved by activity. Or it may be means to get an object of desire.

Other interpretations of Karyata are shown to be untenable. And this interpretation alone is shown to hold good. Some interpretations are

rejected while others are shown to be nothing more than Ista or Ista sadhana.

Others object that for the knowledge of Karyata the knowledge of Ista sadhana is essential (knowing that a certain thing fulfils my desire, I think that it must be achieved.) Besides mere state of being desired is not the cause for the impulse to activity. The state of being desired accompanied with the assurance that it is possible to be achieved through activity is the cause for impulse to activity.

If some body asks you why you wish to do it, you reply that it is the means of fulfilling the desire. So you must admit that one is the informant and another is informed. (गम्य and गमक). Therefore this distinction must be recognised.

This is not well argued. For Karya is of two types; one is desired object and another is means of the desired object. Laymen define Karya only as Ista sadhana. First there is the knowledge of the means of desired object; then there is the desire, then effort and then activity—thus all these attributions about a thing rise up in the soul. But the thing remains unaffected even when we know it to be the means of the desired object. If we find Karyata established

in the thing then we could have recognised it as a means of our desire.

Now let the end or consummation of the sentence be Karya or Ista or Istasadhana. Then what? Then Brahma should have been called Ista or Istasadhana and not Bhagavan? The desired deity is Bhagavan Narayana being an object of love and admiration. Shruti declares that Bhagavan is dearer than wife, son, and wealth and every thing.

Though the Bhagawan is Ista and Istasadhana we find that the causes of the knowledge of the meaning of a sentence viz expectancy, compatibility and juxtaposition would all combine to declare the import to be Bhagavan.

Through inferential knowledge is the means to get desired objects still as it is not in the context it is not mentioned. For the context is the knowledge of Brahma which is nothing less than God-Vision to be produced by the verbal knowledge of the Vedas; and hence inferential knowledge is found useless.

The others declare that all Vedas have their import in Karyata; while you declare that the Vedas have their import in the being or *सत्*, how is it that all the Vedas have their import only in Brahma?

This is the intention. Bhagavan is Ista to some while he is Ista Sadhana to others. Jayateerth takes the first alternative into consideration and on that theory he explains the method of syntactical interpretation of a sentence.

A man of pious nature knows in general the maker of this world and of himself through convention and tradition or through inference, feels greater appetite to know more about him, because he has been inspired with his powerful deeds and with his unbounded love. This pious man does not think any thing but Bhagavan. To this man Veda like a faithful friend propounds Brahma as the main import of itself. Understanding this from the knowledge of the meaning of the sentence he desires His visibility. For him a form of worship is enjoined. That worship, to be effective, requires mental catharsis, for which many rituals are ordained. Or taking the next interpretation of कार्यता or इष्टसाधन Bhagavan is इष्टसाधन.

A man desiring to get rid of various trials and tribulations of life and to get the highest pleasure wishes to know the sources of them. To him Veda advises that Great-God highly pleased is the source of desired objects. Then the question arises how is He pleased? God-Vision is the cause and as aids to it rituals start. Thus the chief

import of Veda is in both the ways, God supreme. Because God is subserviant to some purpose to be derived. He should not be considered as secondary because the purpose, God-Vision, is also for the sake of God. This pratipathi or God-Vision is the fruit of the Vedas. The Vedic injunction that one desirous of heaven should perform the Jyotishoma sacrifice treats of the Jyotishomayaga as having the fruit of heaven. So also in the Veda 'Brahma is truth, knowledge, and infinity. Brahma is not known as subordinate to some other thing, hence Brahma is not meant for any thing else.

The main import of Veda is proved to be Brahma and hence Brahma Jijnasa or investigation of Brahma is justified. Now let the Vedas have the import of Karya. Even then in such Shruties as 'one should meditate on Atma' the statement is injunction or action-ridden; still Brahma becomes the object of meditation. Then that Brahma to be meditated upon is described as 'Truth, knowledge, infinity is Brahma'. Thus this Shruti which describes the nature of Brahma attains to the status of validity. Hence Brahma Jijnasa is justified. Thus Acharya proves that even sentences which have not got the form of

injunctions prove the existence of real things by quoting Shruties accepted by others also.

Now he tells the protagonists of activism as import of Shruti, that they cannot neglect the existence of sacrificial implements or utensils like wooden ladle, sacrificial fire and the sacrificial post (other than activity) which are proved to exist in particular form only by Veda. How to prepare yupa is fully described in the Veda. Such statements which prove the form of yupa (not described any where else) must be accepted as valid, though there is no injunction or *विधि*; in the same manner they must also accept the Vedic sources as authentic where the description of sacrificial ladels and other utensils which are to be improvised for the performance of sacrifice though those descriptive passages of Veda cannot have any import of Karyata, as they describe the things required.

The Meemamsakas make a distinction between the perceptual instrument of knowledge and verbal instrument. For they say that perception cognises things and hence are valid conveyers of knowledge of things. But Shastras are valid conveyers of only Karyata and not things.

Madhwa contends that perception and verbal-testimony have no such distinction. If they

insist on this then there would be no source of knowledge to prove the things like sacrificial ladles and others which are described only in the Vedas; and those Vedas carry only the import of Karyata. In the same way the Shruti which describes Atma which is not described else where must be accepted as conveying its import of Atma in order to facilitate the worshipful mediation of Atma.

But the Meemamsaka objects that Shruti only tells us that Shruti has no import in Atma. For Shruti says 'one should worship as इति आत्मा So worship of Atma (with इति) is ordained.

Now this इति when used after a word gives a different meaning to that word from the one which it usually conveys in the context. An instance is quoted: 'नवेति विभाषा' is a rule cited in the Shastra of word. This usually assigns the sign of विभाषा to words 'न and नः'. But followed by इति which changes them to give different meaning विभाषा becomes the sign of their meaning 'negation and disjunction (विकल्प)'. Contrary to this, ours is Shastra of meaning (while the one we just considered was Shastra of words) and इति after Atma does not enjoin worship of Atma in its essence; but divesting its essence only the

word Atma is enjoined for worshipping which means only the repetition of Atma, the word. This is the worship of Atma. Hence Shruti does not prove the existence of Atma.

Raghavendra thrashes out this question of grammar. In grammar in the First Adhyaya and first Pada in the Sutra नवेतिविभाषा. This difference in meaning is brought about by the use of the word इति after the words नवा, This is explained in the words of Mahabhashya. The symbol विभाषा is assigned to words न and वा. But this will not achieve the desired goal in grammatical from. Taking advantage of इति used after those words नवा is interpreted as meanings of न and वा viz nega-tion and disjunction.

Therefore the question remains viz how does Veda import Brahma ? We accept इति here in the sense of 'mode of speciality' (प्रकार) and Raghavendra quotes Amara to substantiate this meaning. (इति हेतु प्रकरण प्रकारादि समाप्तिषु). If different meaning is insisted upon instead of this, then in अग्नौजूहोतीति also instead throwing oblations in fire mere remembrance of Agni would be the meaning.

If it is objected that there is no इति used after अग्नौजूहोति then there are many sentences conveying

the worship of Atma without इति like आत्मानमेवलोकं उपासीत. If it is said that इति is made understood after उपासीत then the same might be said of जुहोति.

Some Mayavadins try to argue with the Mee-mamsakas thus. It is true that some Vedas like Karmakanda have karyata for their import. The Sutras beginning from अथातोऽर्चयन् विज्ञासा considered interpretation of that portion of Veda. But Vedanta (Upanishads) has its import in being an accomplished thing. This Vedanta is considered and discussed for its import in Sutras beginning with अथातोऽर्चयन् विज्ञासा.

Here Jayateertha asks why they have been forced to take recourse to two different imports in Veda, one devoted to Karyata and another devoted to Brahma. Is it because one import is not possible or is it inspite of one import. The first alternative is discarded; for it is easy to establish one import for all Vedas. When it is possible to establish one import for all the Vedas it is also possible to have Brahma as the import of all the Vedas.

Following the canons of interpretation, they say, they arrive at Karyata as the import of the sentence. We may reply that the big sentences are those which have Brahma for their import.

All Vedas get homogeneity of meaning when they first are homogeneous with these big sentences. Still those parts devoted to Brahma treat Karma as subservient to knowledge. Then that Karma-Kanda will be uniform in subject with those big sentences. These subordinate sentences then would have followed the traditional canons of interpretations.

But there is utter heterogeneity prevailing in Karma-kanda and Brahmakanda. For the aspirant student for Karmakanda is one attached to return of fruit and the heaven, the fruit of Karma is not everlasting; while the aspirant of Brahma Kanda is a disinterested person and the fruit Moksha is everlasting. This is the cause of heterogeneity of import between the two.

Now a sect of Meemamsakas represent their side. They agree to the uniformity of import of all the Vedas. Only the knowledge of Atma should be regarded as aid to the fruit of Karma viz heaven and this should be the import of all the Vedas. For unless we realise Atma to be different from the body we are not entitled to any activity conducive to other wordly pleasures.

Or the treatment of Atma will encourage the remembrance of gods as part of the rituals of Karma. If there are any rewards mentioned

there on let them be considered as mere consolatory prizes. For knowledge of Atma is not enjoined for the sake of Moksha. It is used only for actuating one to take up activity.

To this the reply is 'Moksha is the great fruit. Hence it is Brahma that gives that great fruit. And the whole of the Vedas will have relationship with that Brahma. Vedas will have no relationship with Karma which has a little fruit. This truth is illustrated in Prayaja and others'.

For समिदो यजति तत्तृतीयं यजति are the subordinate yagas called Prayajas. These are related to Darsha and Purnamasa as part and whole. Or Prayajas are merely benefactors of great Kritus and cannot become the main purport of the statement. As they are connected with Pradhana Karma yielding great fruit, only Pradhan Karma can be the main purport of the statement.

We do not seek difference of purport between Karma Kanda and Brahma Kanda. But even if we concede that, we still contend that इति is understood after अग्नि and others, which is quite near a sentence in which इति occurs (नगिरागिरेतिब्रूयात्).

In the chapter of Jyotistoma the words इरा इरा should be used in the place of गिरा गिरा. Hence the statement न गिरा गिरा इति ब्रूयात्. Hence the use of इति is just very near (Jyotistoma) अग्नीजूहोति.

Therefore सत्यं ज्ञानं अनंतं ब्रह्म; here the words satya and others have their meaning in Brahma and the import of the Vakya or sentence is the Karyata of Upasana. Thus two imports should be accepted.

If the sentences of the Vedas have their import in Brahma which is the meaning of the words, the words Satya and Brahma would be synonyms. Then Satya and other words have no use. And the attributes of Truth and others (सत्यत्वं) will have no relationship with Brahma. One big sentence consists of many subsentences. सत्यं ब्रह्म ज्ञानं ब्रह्म and others are sub-sentences. In these the attribute सत्यत्वं or Truth is syntactically connected with ब्रह्म.

And again when we want to attribute knowledge to Brahma, Truth will be mere repetition (both being synonymous) and vice versa. But this is not possible; Because Brahma in respect of the same attribute cannot be both a qualified and re-qualified thing.

To avoid this objection we construe both of them separately with Brahman in different sentences. Then break of sentence is a disgrace to singleness of a sentence, only when those broken sentences rise to the status of independent sentences. But in a big sentence you may

have many sub-sentences all merging into that big sentence and this will not amount to break of sentence.

Meemamsaka also has accepted this principle. In a sentence ब्रह्मण्य एरुहायन्या पिगाक्ष्य गवा सोमंकीणाति like 'he buys Soma by bartering a cow that is reddish, one year old, and red eyed'; he breaks it into many sentences. First cow is stated as means of purchase in गवासोमंकीणाति. Then that cow which was stated as means of purchase is repeated as subject and reddishness is predicated. Then the cow is stated (विधानं) as means of purchase and the same cow is repeated (अनुवाद) when predicating reddishness. Thus there is statement or predication and repetition in respect of the same cow simultaneously. Hence these two mutually contradictory attributes cannot be coexistent. This is the sort of opposition which is explained in many more ways. For fear of opposition reddishness and others are construed with cow and others partially through expectancy and juxtaposition. Hence the fault of break of sentence accrues to them also. Then they shall have recourse to the same expedient of merging these subsentences into the big sentence and seeking unity of sentence. *We also*

use the very expedient as it comes very handy to us.

Another objection is raised; Brahma is the soul that is directly experienced by us. It is predicated with blissfulness, uncommonness which belies our experience. But Brahma is Supreme soul other than human soul. If these sentences from Shruti run counter to human experience still they do not forgo their meaning or import. If contradicted by Pratyaksha they end in secondary meaning. Connotatory or primary is not the only meaning. Even Secondary or implied also, when accepted, is not contradicted.

A sort of reconciling is sought in the conflict of these ideologies. All activities like sacrifice and others end in God-vision which assures the grace of God. This God-vision is the result of constant practice of study, thinking and meditating. Hence investigation in the field of Brahma is justified as Brahma is validly conveyed by the Vedas.

Vedas come under the category of verbal testimony. This word or shabda has its claim to valid instrumentality questioned by the Baudhas, who contend that a Pramana is the means of valid knowledge. That by the presence of which

apprehension arises and by the absence of which it does not arise is the cause of valid apprehension.

We have the experience that apprehension does not arise even when there is word. How then can it be called Pramana? Besides a Pramana must have an object. That object may be visible or invisible. Visible object is cognised by perception. Invisible is known by inference. Hence shabda or word has no object of its own; and is no Pramana.

Moreover a Pramana is known to be of the nature of knowledge. For instance the knowledge of smoke creates knowledge of Agni by inference. But Shabda is not of the nature of knowledge. Hence it is no Pramana.

Again word being related to meaning connotes meaning, or unrelated. In the first alternative the relation must be made clear. It is either identity conjunction or inherence. The word and its meaning are not identical. If so at the pronunciation of the word fire the mouth should have been burnt up. A word connected with a past thing would drag it to the present time or the word would be dragged to the lumber of the Past. If it is Samyoga that joins the word with its meaning Samyoga is technically a guna. A

shabda also is guna. You cannot have a Guna in a Guna. Hence Shabda cannot establish its relationship with the object. If shabda is Dravya and it is tangible substance, then by some action Samyoga is established with the object, Shabda might cognise inner objects. If on the other hand Shabda is all pervasive substance it will have contact with all objects and create knowledge of all objects. And as in no way the word can get contacted with the past things; it cannot connote past things. The relation of inherence can only subsist between the ether and the word, by the relationship of inherence. If unrelated words were to connote the meaning, there will be no controlling factor; therefore every word may mean every thing.

Therefore man is actuated to activity not depending upon the validity of the statement or the certainty of the fact mentioned by the words, but depending upon the probability as in the case of cultivation or farming. So word is not a sure vehicle of knowledge much less can Vedas a special group of words be considered as valid source of knowledge. Least is the chance of the Vedas conveying the sense of a finished being. Hence there is no chance of beginning the

investigation of Brahma. Hence all this attempt is a great fuss about nothing.

Now the whole discussion is at stake. Hence a close scrutiny and critical survey should be made. Madhva makes provoking reply. Just as perception and inference are independent means of knowledge so also verbal testimony is an independent and natural source of knowledge.

For experience tells us that a word conveys a meaning. If one says that a word does not convey a meaning, he uses word only to say so. Then he indirectly proves that word conveys some meaning. Hence when word conveys some meaning there is knowledge. Now this knowledge is not doubt because it is not disjunctive in expression; nor is it erroneous; for there is no sublation at the end.

Hence we can infer that shabda or word generates knowledge which is neither doubt nor wrong knowledge. Just as perception is so shabda is pramana or right source of valid knowledge. Word will have the same validity as perception viz correspondence with the external object.

Mere word is not the cause of knowledge but a word well heard and the connotational relationship well remembered. When these essentials

are there the word expresses its meaning and thus there is knowledge.

It cannot be objected that there is no object to the word. Such an objection can be raised even in the case of perception and inference. They have some special purpose to serve. So the word also should be supposed to have some purpose as it produces knowledge.

It was objected that word being not knowledge in essence is not a Pramana. But it is not fair because in the case of perception also the contact of the object and sense, also being non-knowledge in essence should not produce knowledge. But it does.

Besides it is not mere word, but the knowledge of the word that produces knowledge. And knowledge inheres in Atma. Hence the argument that Shabda is not Pramana because it does not inhere in Atma, is not true. Because shabda through knowledge is found in Atma.

It was also asked whether the word was related with the meaning or not. Of these two alternatives we accept the first and say that the word is related. The known contacts, if they fail to serve the purpose, should be rejected and the new one that suits the context should be forged. If the relationship cannot be

explained you cannot reject the result that is visibly seen by us. Work warranted by evidences must be accepted and we must contrive to get new suitable relations to establish the casual fabric.

Some call this contact convention while others call it connotational. We say that it is some natural relationship with which a word conveys its meaning.

Yet the relationship cognised becomes the cause of understanding and not otherwise. Still we admit that some words convey their meaning by the power of natural relationship. Some other words convey their meaning by the force of convention or Sanketa or we may even persist that every where it is the natural relationship that binds the word with the meaning. In some cases where there is some defect the meaning is not conveyed. This cannot deter any one from admitting natural relationship.

The natural relationship on account of the auxiliary aid of cognition results in different meanings yet there is no breach of the natural relationship.

Now begins a long controversy between naturalists and conventionalists regarding the meaning and its conveyance. The conventionalist

argues that naturalist also at some stage will have to accept the theory of convention. But the naturalist argues that at least some words must be agreed to have natural power to convey meaning. For at the beginning of creation there is no convention at all. To this the conventionalist replies that God and his attendant sages and others make the first convention of such and such words carrying such and such meanings. Knowing this convention of meaning we continue the further business of convention. We understand the old conventions through a long process of understanding and inferring. An old man uses words in a certain meaning and a junior to him behaves accordingly. A child observes closely the words of the senior and the behaviour of the junior. By an intelligent method of understanding, the child determines that such and such a word has such and such a meaning. This is the process of learning in the case of children. They also depend upon the theory of convention. Usage settled by convention is good; usage not warranted by convention is bad. Grammar also sees if the usage is warranted by divine convention and serves its purpose.

To this argument of the conventionalists, the naturalists or realists like Madhva and Jayateerth

reply that mere divine convention is not able to convey the meaning. Human convention also is necessary. Besides, convention well understood alone carries the meaning. So teaching and instruction are essential for correction in conveying the sense. So instruction is common to both sides. Let that alone contrive to convey the meaning. Why convention? Instruction or initiation into old conventions or natural senses is quite essential. Communication alone is the fruit of both these theories. Grammar is then useless. For common communication is done by convention. Then Grammar is used for higher religions merit and not for common communication. But this is not a coveted desire. For it reduces us to a position not warranted by evidences.

The conventionalist quotes evidences to prove that Grammar and other aids meant to guide us in good usage of words, will give us religious merit. It is mentioned in Brahmana "one word well understood, correctly used, will yield desired object in Heaven." But the realist contends that this Shruti is indifferent to natural power or convention. If accepting initiation or instruction (through the conversation of the senior man with the junior man) the natural power of the word to convey meaning is rejected it

will lead to absurd position. This will be so absurd as to agree the existence of wheel, pole and other auxiliary aids and then to reject the result of the creation of the pot.

There is much disparity between the subject on hand, the instance quoted, objects the conventionalist. For the result pot and other things are known to exist and hence they cannot be denied. But the natural power of meaning is not known to exist. Hence we can safely deny it; and accept that the meaning is conveyed by the word with the auxiliary aid of convention.

This objection is cleared by the realist saying that the modern people are not making any new conventions. And any evidence cannot be produced to prove that there were extraordinary persons who made these conventions. Therefore it is concluded that natural power alone exists in the word to convey its meaning.

The conventionalist uses an inference to prove divine convention in the use of a word having a particular meaning. The word गे has a convention to mean a cow having a lap and other things because it is used in that sense; like the word गज. This inference is affected with logical fallacy. For the law of concomitance between usage of a word and its conventions in that sense

comes to be true under limited conditions (सोपाधि-
करव). This concomitance comes to be true only in
the bad usage of a word. If this is not agreed to,
then it means that the word गे is used in the
sense of a cow according to our convention.
Hence it only proves human convention and not
the conveted convention made by God.

The contention of the realist is that the word
is the conveyer of the meaning in the same
manner as the senses convey knowledge but
senses in some context convey wrong knowledge
because they are affected with deffects. In the
same manner if the man who uses the word in the
wrong sense, then the meaning will be wrong and
wrong knowledge is conveyed. If this arrangement
of right and wrong knowledge is not agreed to,
then inference also cannot be called an instrument
of knowledge.

Take for instance the syllogistic reasoning
'The word is mutable because it is constructed'.
This is considered to be sound reasoning. But
when we argue with the same reasoning of being
constructed or made that the fire is not hot,
the reasoning is fallacious because it is openly
contradicted the fire being very hot. Here the
necessary prerequisites of reasoning are present
in one case and hence it is good reasoning while

in the case of another they are not found, hence it is bad reasoning. This argument is not correct; because the distinction of good and bad reasoning is mainly made by the reference to the right object and wrong object. Hence it is said that the word carries its meaning just like the senses and also just like the inference.

Still it is contended that Vedas-special form of word-cannot be accepted as a valid instrument of knowledge. Because they are charged with telling lies, self contradiction and tautology. Veda tells brazen lies because though it announces the birth of a son to a person who performs Putrakamesti, still one performing it is found sorely disappointed. There is also self-contradiction in the Vedas. For in Jyotistoma there are seven stages like Agnistoma, Atyagnistoma, Uktha, Shodashee, Atiratra Aptoryama and Vajapeya. Among these in the Atiratra Jyotistoma yaga one is asked to take the Soma Patra called Shodashi in one sentence. In another he is asked not to take it. And many more such statements involving self contradiction are cited. Tautology is found in such instances as "Darsha Purnamasa" in which fifteen Samidhenies are required to be recited. In that context one is required to recite eleven hymns, the first and the last to be recited thrice

in order to make the total fifteen. Hence there is thrice repetition or tautology.

To this the protagonist of the Vedas replies that Vedic source of knowledge cannot be rejected, if some parts of the Vedas are found affected with some defects. For even if some perceptions end in illusions and some inferences are found fallacious still we do not reject all perceptions and inferences as of no use.

Brahmasutras prove that there is no falsehood in the Vedas (In नविलक्षणत्वात् अधिकरण). The same sutrakara shows that there is self contradiction in the Vedas.

Raghavendra throws some light here on the procedure of logical technicalities. Self contradiction, in Veda, if at all it exists, is to be found between two statements. If these two statements contradict each other one of them must be true and the other false. Then true statement is considered valid. Thus other being false there is doubt about the invalidity of the Vedas and this doubt ends in doubtful contradiction or doubtful discrepancy of reason (बाध or व्यभिचार). A natural doubt about the existence of Sadhya in the Paksha does not amount to a logical fallacy. But when the reason loses its strength to prove the existence of Sadhya in

the Paksha, this affected doubt amounts to a serious defect in the process of logical reasoning.

In the case of real contradiction in the Vedas it is not a proved fact as in the case of perception and inference. For suppose there are two perceptive cognitions. One is 'this pot is a substance' and another is 'this is not white'. In the same way suppose there are two inferential cognitions. 'Mountain possesses fire; for it has smoke' and 'It has no trees, for it is merely a huge pile of rocks.' You do not find any contradiction either between the two perceptions or between the two inferences. In the same manner there need not be any real contradiction between the two statements in Veda.

Now Brahma sutrakara with his long experience of vedic interpretation, shows us the method of reconciling the two apparently contradictory statements. There is a seeming contradiction between two statements made about the attribution of divine qualities, once a man is asked to meditate the attribution of divine qualities and at another time he is asked not to do so. Then in the third Sutra the two statements are reconciled and proved to be true in different eligibility. Here no doubt the instances of attribution and non attribution of qualities ought to

have been cited to show contradiction in the Vedic statements. But the instances from Karma-kand are cited because they have been used by men of different schools and also because they are oft cited. Or it may be construed that these statements from Karmakanda also are reconciled by the Sutrakara.

So all sorts of contradictions discrepancies in the case of Veda are to be reconciled as in the case of Pratyaksha and Anumana. The ancient commentators like Jaimini have explained them as rhetorical repetition or philosophical tautology. The modern commentators like Madhva justify these as the source of strengthening the meaning of the statements.

Invalidity of Vedas is waved off; But the validity of the Vedas is not yet proved. It is objected that the absence of invalidity cannot be the presence of validity. To this objection Madhva replies that when invalidity is removed validity comes of its own accord, i.e. by the intrinsic power of producing knowledge only. The Naiyayikas admit self-validity in the case of perception and inference and refuse it in the case of word or Vedas. In reply to these people, Madhva says that Agama also has self validity like perception. Agama from its deri-

vation means the source or instrument of knowledge. Shri Madhva has else where derived it and says that it tells us of Dharm and Adharma. Both mean the same thing.

There are some who do not admit self-validity to any source of knowledge. They shall have to accept self-validity of agama as they are forced to accept the same in the case of perception and inference.

Now Jayateertha explains the self validity of the Pramanas. Perception inference and Verbal Testimony are three Pramanas or sources of knowledge; and knowledge born of these sources is also Pramana. In the case of knowledge, validity means correspondence with the object of knowledge and selfness or intrinsicity in validity of knowledge is being produced by the same sources as will produce knowledge. This is self validity in the production of knowlede. (उत्पत्तिवत्त्वम्) Raghavendra warns us here that this sort of intrinsicity is restricted to only non-eternal or produced knowledge. For eternal knowledge like that of God is essential and unproduced. And hence, it is not produced by any sources of knowledge. Only knowledge born of the external sources of knowledge has its validity being produced by the same sources as have produced knowledge.

Even then it is objected that the definition of self validity in the birth of knowledge is defective. Because the positive rule of concomitance is wherever there is source of knowledge, producing knowledge, there is producing of validity of knowledge. But this rule is violated because in the erroneous knowledge Pratyaksh or perception has produced the knowledge 'This is Silver' seeing the shell. Yet it has not produced validity in it. For 'This is silver' is a piece of invalid knowledge to be sublated by 'this is not silver but this is shell'. Hence it is not correct to say that sources of knowledge produce validity of knowledge.

This objection is cleared by elucidating further 'Validity produced by only producers of knowledge.' It means that validity is capable of being produced by only producers of knowledge. Its capability is proved and is not contradicted. Again you may have the first definition involving the production (not mere capacity); still we may show that there is no harm even if this definition is not found in erroneous knowledge. For 'by only producers of knowledge' is further explained to mean that 'producers un-accompanied with elements contributing to the disproof of validity.'

Even then the definition is not free from defects of half baked or hasty definitions. The

definition with the elucidation amounts to this "self validity in the birth of knowledge is that it is produced by the same producers of knowledge unaccompanied with elements disproving the validity." Let us take a case where the elements of producing knowledge are scanty and they are unaccompanied with elements disproving validity. No validity is produced. Hence the definition is defective. So the definition is further expanded. "The producers of knowledge must have all the elements of producing knowledge unaccompanied with all elements disproving validity of knowledge" Here \forall is taken to mean 'all'.

When this definition is given to Naiyayika, he says that nothing new is given to him by this definition. For this sort of self validity is agreed to by the the Niyayikas. They also say that the elements of producing knowledge without the elements of disproving validity through certain qualities like "corroboration by men of verity and integration" produce validity. Here again 'produced by only the producers of knowledge.' means 'not produced by the non-producers of knowledge.' This is some thing new to the Naiyayikas. For he agrees that validity is produced by some thing other than the producers of kno-

wledge viz 'corroboration by men of verity' which does not produce any knowledge.'

Self validity in respect of its origination was so long considered. Now self validity in respect of its cognition is considered. Knowledge is cognised by the internal evidence or Sakshi and other means as would cognise knowledge. This is self validity in respect of its cognition.

As for the source or means of knowledge, they have no self validity in respect of cognition. For the cognition of the means of knowledge is made by perception and others as is found suitable. That they produce valid knowledge is known to us by inference. Or from another point of view they have self-validity. Those very means by which we know that they produce knowledge, also help us to know that they produce valid knowledge. This is their self-validity in respect of their cognition.

In origination there is self validity because validity does not need any more causal elements than are required for origination of knowledge. In cognition we accept self validity because validity is cognised by those very elements which cognise knowledge. Then follows a long course of inferential argumentation with attacks and counter attacks.

If self validity is not accepted then there will be infinite regress. But invalidity in its origination and cognition depends upon defects which are not elements that constitute the cause of knowledge. So the invalidity of knowledge is dependent, and extrinsic. These means of knowledge are not sure to produce valid knowledge. But naturally they tend to produce valid knowledge; if certain defects crop up they hinder the natural power from being effective and cause invalidity. For defects are universally accepted to hinder the natural process of change and cause deformed perversion. Then it may be said that causal elements include defectlessness, when producing validity.

This will raise an important question. It is believed that generally an effect is produced out of its own inherent potentiality. It is its natural process. In spite of the presence of the potentiality on account of some hindrance the natural process of change is stopped or perverted into deformed effect. Then it is called exceptional process. If on the other hand the absence of hindrance is included in causal elements and the natural process of potentiality turning into actuality is stopped by some hindrance then we may suppose that there are no

potential elements that constitute cause, Or when deformed effects are produced there were deformed elements as cause. Hindrance which really existing will have to go out of causal procedure. Thus the general rule and exception will completely disappear when considering causal relationship.

The internal sense (sakshi) which cognises knowledge, also naturally cognises its validity. But it is generally so. In exceptional cases when there is hindrance affecting the operation of sakshi it may not cognise the validity at all. So naturally or usually validity is intrinsic self proved. Then it naturally follows that knowledge which runs against the vedas originates as invalid only because the knower is deceitful, dull in his senses and labouring under false knowledge.

Here some fundamental objections are raised. Vedas and works of Budha are antitheses of each other. Yet why should not both of them be valid sources of knowledge? or if one of them is to be invalid what special reasons are there to attribute defects to Baudhagamas so that ultimately they would be proved to be invalid?

To all these there is one reply and that is that the Vedas are not composed but self-revealed

and hence eternal. But it may be contended that because the Baudhagamas are not going to be destroyed and hence they are eternal. Besides the order of letters in Baudhagama is fixed by the intelligence of God. Hence the order is indestructible and hence eternal. And these are the sources to settle Dharma and Adharma which is claimed as special privilege by the Vedas. Therefore the Baudhas before they enter into lists of dispute make certain points clear, through friendly enquiry.

What are Vedas? What is their uncomposed nature or authorlessness? A special order of letters is the Veda; Its authorlessness means to be found the same (without any change in order) eternally. Because in ordinary composition the order of letters depends on the pronunciation of the teacher. Letters themselves being eternal and all pervasive cannot have their own natural order. Of the vedic letters there is no anterior intelligence used as in ordinary composition. The modern teacher always repeats Vedic composition dependent on his memory of what he has repeated yesterday, as God also repeats the same Veda as was found in the previous creation. The divine memory of Vedas is an eternal flow in the mind of God. From that eternal flow the

anterior repetition becomes the source for the posterior repetition, in the case of God's repetition of the Vedas. Hence Veda is eternal and authorless.

Now Dharma and Adharma though invisible yet form an essential stuff of our spiritual life are generally accepted by all systems except the atheist's. And it is also agreed that they have certain sources from which they can be ascertained. We must now know Pratyaksha or perception is not the source to know Dharma; For they have no external and visible forms. Nor can internal perception help us. For we never get the experience of having enjoyed happiness.

Nor can you plead that we ordinary people cannot perceive Dharma Adharma and their being the cause of happiness or misery in the other world. But the Yogis with their supernatural power of vision cannot vouch safe any authority for our guidance and behaviour. One man's experience cannot be guidance to another man.

Nor can reason take us a long way. For it cannot settle the special fruit and the method of achieving Dharma and Adharma. Thus by the principle of elimination only the eternal and authorless Vedas can be the guidance in respect of religious life of men and women.

So it is proved that some source of knowledge of Dharma and Adharma must be accepted. And that is the authorless Veda. All other records are known to be attributed to some author. But the Veda is not attributed to any author. Some others do not concern themselves with the establishment of Dharma and Adharma. Veda alone being authorless and eternal takes up the task of establishing Dharma and Adharma

Even when they know what Dharma and Adharma are from the Vedas, yet people, on account of their defective understanding, find particular interpretations in them running contrary even to the main purport of the Vedas. Hence there is keen difference of opinion regarding Dharma and Adharma.

Now some object that there are evidences both verbal and inferential to prove that the Vedas also are written compositions. From the very fact that the vedas are made up of sentences which must have been composed by some body as the sentences of Kalidas are, it is proved that they have authors.

Jayateertha now enters into very subtle syllogism with his keen sense of logical reasoning

The present time is such as would possess authorful composition which is different from the present (secular) composition different from the Vedas. First take the situation where the secular sentence belongs to the present time and is different from the Veda. Now the present time has authorful composition which does not possess the quality of present time that is different from the Veda. No doubt authorful composition different from the present time that is different from Veda is secular composition consisting of words and sentences and Veda to be found in the past and future.

If we try to prove that the present time is such as has authorful composition not belonging to the present time, we commit the fallacy of self contradiction. For at this time there is only authorful composition of the present time and not one not belonging to the present time. Hence the adjective 'different from Veda' is made to qualify 'the present time'. Now the authorful Veda existing at present, though belonging to the present is not different from the Veda and hence Veda is something different from the present which is different from the Veda. Now there is no contradiction. Thus Raghavendra goes on

from intricacy to intricacy involving the ordinary man into confusion.

He also quotes Veda to show that there is an author to the Vedas. Vedas are composed writings. There is onething which comes in the way of this kind of reasoning. We must ascertain the infallibility of the person whom we rely upon, for the validity of the work attributed to him. Hence any work written by an author cannot be the source of the knowledge of Dharma and Adharma. Even God cannot be accepted as author of the Vedas, relying upon the streangth of inference. For the same inference leads us to the idea that he is not a reliable author.

For in some of his incarnations he has behaved like an unreliable person. Hence the Vedas are authorless and Puranas and other works have been written compositions and their authority is borrowed from the Vedas.

Here and there Agni and Varuna are mentioned in Veda as the sources of the Vedas and hence some argue that they are the original composers of Veda. But this is not sound. For Agni and Vayu and other Gods are merely propogaters of Veda. These apostles cannot be raised to the rank of original authors.

Some others contend that when letters themselves are evanescent and not eternal, Vedas cannot be eternal. To this the reply is that Vedas are not unchanging and eternal. But it has one and same and continuons order of letters. Hence no question arises whether letters are eternal or not.

At the beginning while introducing the investigation of Brahma the topic of the validity of Vedas had cropped up. A note of sceptic disappointment had been drawn out. The validity of verbal testimony in general had been questioned. For no reasonable contact could be established between a word and its meaning. Hence no method of deriving the meaning of the sentence could be explained. When thus an ordinary sentence has no validity of conveying the meaning then a particular section of verbal testimony can have much less claim to such validity.

This doubt is dispelled by launching a theory of connotation in the science of semantics. The objector directly attacks the theory of validity of the Vedas so far discussed. His contention is that verbal testimony introduces to us a thing already known to us through other instruments

of knowledge. This sort of redundancy is a weakness or short coming in man. But Veda being authorless is untouched by human hand. Hence this redundancy may not amount to a defect. Yet it pleads for rejection on the ground of uselessness. Therefore we need not make any investigating researches in the Vedas as they are proved to be redundant and useless, when no new thing is to be known from the Vedas. Nor can they produce any useful knowledge regarding the meaning of a statement. For a sentence cannot yield its meaning as letters, words, meaning, memory born of the knowledge of these severally or jointly cannot yield any meaning.

Hence as there are no sound basic grounds for the understanding of the meaning of a sentence, there is no settled meaning of a sentence. The meaning so called is only a kind of doubt in which one alternative is abnormally stressed. Hence there is no validity in the Vedas as they do not convey a settled and sure meaning warranted by sure grounds. To this Shri Madhva rejoins :—

A word has connotational power to express its meaning when it is syntactically related with the meaning of the other proper words.

But some say that there is one word of this type, which conveys its meaning being related with the meaning of other words. That word stands

first or primary in meaning in the sentence. But such a word is arbitrary and very difficult to settle. For any word can stand first in a sentence or primary in meaning is settled when all words aid the meaning of a particular word. This sort of primacy leads to split of sentence (vakya bheda) which is a fault in sentence-construction; and hence all words would be primary and all would convey their meaning after being related with the meaning of the other proper words.

Raghavendra explains this sentential defect by taking an example. Here is a sentence (गं वानय) 'Bring a cow'; Though its meaning is 'Bringing' and the word 'cow' only defines 'Bringing'. In different sentences like 'cow is white' 'cow is having a hump on the back' 'she is a milch cow.' 'A cow' is the meaning and other words qualify that meaning. Hence importance or primacy varies with intention of the speaker and therefore it is unsettled and unascertained.

It is contended that the verbal form is the important word in a sentence. Then in a sentence like दध्ना जुहोति (he sacrifices with curds) the verbal form is subordinate. Now curds is sacrificial oblation and is called Guna. This sentence is quoted in the chapter on Agnihotra or sacrificial Fire. Here with the verbal form जुहोति (sacrifices) the

context of sacrifice is repeated; and it is said in what is called sacrifice, curds is enjoined to be offered. Therefore what is repeated (the verbal form) is subordinate and what is enjoined is curds and that is important. Hence the rule that the verbal form is important in a sentence is violated here.

Verbal form cannot be the principle part of of a sentence round which all the other words hinge and yield the meaning. For sentences without verbal form also convey the import.

Some contend that the word has power to convey meaning only as particularly related to some other word; this contention is baseless and it will be proved so in III Adhyaya Brahma sutra. There it is said that the subject word when used expresses the meaning as related in general. To know the particular relation he asks what. When words expressing attributes and action are used and the word expressive of doer or subject is related with them then expectancy is satisfied. Therefore each word connotes meaning as connected in general with some other word when the particular connection is made explicit when actually related with that word. So words have meaning only as related.

Then the discussion goes on with arguments and counter arguments till at last it is conclusively proved that the word has meaning only as related to some other word in general and the particular relationship is made clear only in the context with other words.

At this stage Raghavendra reconciles apparent contradictions between different works of the same author. In *Pramanapadhati* Jayateerth says that words which convey meaning as related in general when brought in the context with other words, get different power to connote meaning with particularised relationship. In another context in *Nyaya Sudha* it is said the word connotes the meaning as particularised by its special contact with other words. So in the regular context of words one word first being generally related gets a new power to connote the meaning in the particular relationship with the other word. Here in *Sudha* it is only said 'पदंतर सप्तभिर्व्याहारात्' which implies that the word with its intrinsic or or natural power connotes the meaning of that word in particular relationship with the other word. But Madhva does not accept natural power of connotation for the particularly related meaning. He only admits some assumed (आहित) power of the word to convey the particularised

relationship. It is useful only in particularising the general relationship, with the other proper word.

Now in this context Shri Madhva considers the concept of Sphota in the connotation of the meaning of a sentence. Sphota is an all pervasive entity of the kind of Aksha or ether. It is in the form of a sentence. The advocates of Sphota enter into details of definition and division. But here we limit ourselves to vakya sphota which is considered the cause of the conveyance of the meaning of a sentence.

If this partless entity Sphota is the cause of the expression of the meaning of the sentence then you are indulging in unnecessary conceptual prolixity. This Vakyasphota is manifested by the group of words. This manifested sphota reveals the meaning of the sentence. This is a cumbrous process because you are accepting a Vakya of this new type unwarranted by any evidence. And then you attribute power to that Vakya to express the meaning of that sentence. This is conceptual cumbrousness

The protagonist of sphota contends that a sentence consists of words and a word consists of letters. A letter is manifest being born in a place like 'palate'; thus when the word consisting of

letters is fully manifested all the words would reveal the Vakya sphota, which on its part brings to light the import of the sentence. There is first Vakya sphota revealed part by part by each word. Then this Vakya sphota in parts leads to the partless vakya sphota which ultimately ends in the revelation of the import of a sentence. Under these circumstances if a sentence apart from the group of words and a word apart from the group of letters are not accepted, then in both the cases no meaning is conveyed. Now each word cannot convey the meaning of a sentence; each letter cannot convey the meaning of the word. Nor can the group either in the case of words or letters be formed to convey the meaning. For one letter after producing its cognition perishes in the next moment and does not remain to form a group. So is the case with the word.

If the rise of the meaning from the word is traced to the memory of each letter combined with the memory of the last letter, then in that indivisible solid memory there cannot be any order of letters— one following the preceding,— which is the antecedent cause to produce cognition of the word. If letters are eternal and all-pervasive there cannot be any order spatial or temporal. And the order may be found in the concepts fo-

med of different letters after their cognition. But even this conceptual order cannot be found in the solid mental impress of all letters. And without this order there cannot arise any meaning. If order does not constitute the antecedental cause of the rise of the meaning from the word then words like *एरः* and *रः* will have the same meaning. Therefore in order to explain the production of meaning from the word when letters cannot do that, a sphota apart from the letters is forced upon us which becomes the causal link between word and its meaning.

Now Jayateertha refutes this theory of sphota. He wants to know from the apostle of sphota whether this sphota is first cognised and then it conveys the meaning of the word and the import of the sentence; or it does so by its mere presence. For the cognition of sphota there is no other evidence but the pre supposition he put forth before. If so there is mutual dependence. For after cognition of sphota there is cognition of meaning. And after the meaning is apprehended as it cannot be explained in any other way he posits the presence of sphota. This is the fallacy of mutual dependence.

But he contends that sphota is cognised by perception. Seeing a group of words he cognises 'one sentence' and seeing a group of letters he

cognises 'one word' This cognition of unity presupposes the existence of sphota.

This supposition deserves critical scrutiny. For this perception of unity includes diversity of words and letters. It precludes all diversity and difference from its indivisible verbal oneness (of sphota). Now the second alternative runs counter to our experience which comprehends unity in diversity. In the first alternative if unity of sphota with all its diversity alive is comprehended; is it mere manifestation or physical production? In the case of manifestation it cannot be explained as before whether each word or each letter manifests sphota or the whole group. Physical production is out of question in the case of eternal letters.

The sphotavadi contends that the cognition of the last letter with the residue impress of each of the previous letters is the cause of the manifestation of sphota. This contention is met with the rejoinder that mere cognition of the last letter will be enough to produce the manifestation of sphota.

Thus Jayateerth gives sphotavadi a long rope to hang himself by allowing him the choice of many more alternatives. Still he could not give any satisfactory explanation. Then Jayateertha

exposed the hollowness of the contention of spho-tavadi.

Jayateertha critically examines other systems of semantics which determines the connotation and cognition of meaning of these. He scrutinises the school which recognises connotation first and then syntactical relationship of the meaning of one word with that of the other.

They say that connotated meaning with the aids of syntax like Expectancy, compatibility, and Juxtaposition seeks relationship with the meaning of the other word. If we contend against the Bhattas whose system we propounded, that mere meaning without the use of the word establishes syntactical relationship and a complete idea is developed. One man sees a whitish object, hears the neighing and stamping of the horse and gets the idea that 'a white horse runs'. He pleads that it is inference which yields this idea. But this is a lengthy process. Madhva admits only one power of a word which connotes related meaning and not two powers one to connote meaning and another to convey relationship as the Bhattas admit.

Now by retracing our steps to the starting point we say that the import of the sentence is conveyed by the words themselves and hence the

reliability of the Vedas is fully established and hence again the investigation of the Vedas for the knowledge of Brahma is fully justified.

Jayateertha now recapitulates all the five reasons conveyed by the word अतः in the first sutra. Vedas are to be investigated because 1) Investigation leads to knowledge causing divine grace which ultimately results in Mukti, 2) the bondage is real 3) Vedic words have the import of existing beings (and not becomings only). 4) The Vedic words have validity 5) and a word is first related to another word in general and then connotes its meaning.

Therefore this elucidation of the word अतः easily wards off the defect of repetition with the meaning of the word अतः as is found in the exposition of Vritikara. For Vritikara interprets अतः as 'after' which expects to be allied with what has gone before 'eligibility' and ultimately means, 'After eligibility'. Hence it proves eligibility to be the reason for investigation. Then अतः also means 'because there is eligibility'. Therefore there is the logical fallacy of Tautology. Even if it is argued that अतः only gives reasonability as implied meaning while अतः gives it as connotational or primary meaning still the objection of repetition is there. For, whether primary or secondary that

meaning is incorporated in the import of the sentence.

But such repetition or tautology does not occur in our interpretation; for the word *अ* in the first sutra signifies eligibility of an aspirant which will qualify him for investigation of Brahma. But *अः* signifies a collection of reasons which will settle the subject matter and purpose of the investigation. Hence there is no tautology. Now the statement of eligibility removes the doubt that there are no eligible aspirants for Brahma Jijnasa. The phrase Brahma Jijnasa tells us that Brahma with its significance is proved to be some thing quite different from the sentient and the insentient. Such a Brahma is the subject of investigation. Through this knowledge of Brahma one gets Moksha. Hence Moksha is also the purpose of investigation of Brahma. The eligible man for Moksha is one who is desirous of getting Moksha. Thus the words like Brahma and others signify that the present investigation has eligible students for that research. Yet if all desirous of getting Moksha are eligible for this research, then it directly runs against the spirit of the statement "Women, Shudras, and fallen Brahmins are not eligible to study the of Vedas." Therefore according to the statement

that the eligibles are of three kinds, some are the lowest and others are the middle class and still others are highly eligible. Their characteristics also are given as eligibility for Mukti, study, and other qualities as devotion and self restraint.

It must be clearly understood that Brahma Sutras are the sutras and on them depend all other Sutras like Dharma Sutras for their validity.

It must be supposed that Tarka and Meemamsa are separate disciplines. For they are so enumerated in the shruties.

It is stated in the Talavakar Upanishat that Tarka Vidya and Meemamsa Vidya are two different Vidyas. For there while enumerating Vedas and Vedangas, Tarkshastra and Meemamsa are separately mentioned. Tarkashastra is bodily mentioned; while the word 'satya' (because Brahma is discussed) stands for Meemamsa. In the same way in a quotation from Talawakara Bhashay, Meemamsa is bodily mentioned and Tarka is included in the others 'विज्ञानम्'. When these two are different disciplines the subject-matter also of both must be different. So, if the theories of validity of the Vedas which are the subject matter also of the Tarkashastra is treated mainly in Meemamsa then there will be no difference in subject matter. But the subject of Tarka

shastra might be a little touched in Meemamsa to prove its nature of dependency on the Meemamsa. Now this Tarka is not written by Kanada Akshapada or Gautama. But it is Brahma Tarka written by the Sutrakara Vedavyasa himself. Narayan is the original writer of the huge work which extends to millions of verses, but is then abridged into a work of five thousand by Vedavyasa.

Really speaking the Brahma Tarka is written by Vedavyasa separately for some special reason. These two doubts are entertained in this context. First it is said Vishnu composed the huge Brahma Tarka of millions of verses. If Sutrakara has composed one of a few thousand verses it must be different one. The second doubt is Vyasa should have composed another work on the same subject. Then it is waste of time.

Vishnu in the incarnation of Narayana composed this work. Now both these doubts are cleared. The validity of Vedas is taken from Brahma Tarka where it is treated and it is suggested by अतः in Brahma Sutra on which Brahma Tarka depends. Yet both these are different works for their subject matters are different. That which is dilated upon at length in Tarka Shastra is suggested briefly in Meemamsa Shastra by the word अतः. Because the topics like the reality of

bondage are corroborated by experience. And hence they are treated and suggested by अतः.

Madhva adduces another reason also. It is the habit of human beings. Simple topics like instruments of knowledge and their validity are treated in Brahma Tarka; while at the request of Gods Vedavyasa dealt with more difficult topics of the interpretation of Vedas and canons for this interpretation in Brahma Meemamsa or Brahma Sutras. The sparse treatment that is accorded to these topics also suggests scant respect shown to the objections of the opponents as they are very hollow and plausible. For those who are unable to deal squarely with even perceptible things are unqualified to deal with imperceptible and deep things like Moksha and others, as treated in the impenetrable Vedas. Though they are the followers of Veda yet they deserve this scant respect.

Thus interpreting अतः Madva expatiates upon the subject of Brahma. He quotes Bhagavan himself who told that Brahma is no other than Vishnu, at the end of Devi Meemamsa. He now derives the word Narayana to show that etymologically both Brahma and Vishnu mean the same thing viz 'Full of auspicious qualities'. Narayana is the अयन or resort of नार or gunas or qualities.

How does नर mean quality or Guna is the question.

Raghavendra feels a fish in water when he has an opportunity to explain grammatical derivations. The word नर is the combination of न or नञ् (the negative particle) plus the word अर. In Vyakarana there is the Sutra नञ् which authorises the negative particle to be compounded with its next word. So न and अर coalesced by Savarna-deergha Sandhi become नर. Now the negative particle नञ् has three meanings 1) difference 2) Negation 3) opposite or contrary. Of these the third meaning is chosen. अर signifies defects or drawbacks and the opposite of it is good quality. Hence नर: means good quality.

One grammatical difficulty is नञ् should be dropped as in words like असुर (नसुर). But before certain words like नक्त and नाक्त the न is not dropped. The word नारायण is also included in this group, and hence न remains unchanged.

Or सुप्सुपा is a Sutra which forms the compound of न with अर. Hence न is not elided or dropped. But then the meaning नर is not गुण or good quality but only the absence. This is not a great objection, for looking to the context नर may signify गुण though it is there to contradict defects.

Or by secondary meaning it may signify गुण, which is the contrary of defect.

Now the question is the change of न to ण in नारायण. The Sutra by the strength of which न is changed to ण is रषाम्भ्यां नो णः समानपदे. The meaning is न is changed to ण in the same word or Pada if न comes after र or ष. Here र is in नार and न is in अयन and hence they are not to be found in the same Pada. But even then when र or ष is in the first Pada and न in the second still न is changed to ण only when ग does not come between them and when the word is used by strong convention. (पूर्वं पदात् संज्ञायां अगइति)

One more objection is नारायण being formed with the suffix ल्युट् should be neuter in gender. Even this is not so sound. For it is not that all words with the suffix ल्युट् are neuter. Had it been so there was no necessity of ordaining ई (डीप्) after-words in ल्युट् to get their feminine gender. From this we know that there are other genders ordained for such words and hence masculine gender is justified in Narayana. Raghavendra quotes usages from Mahabhashya where a word in ल्युट् is used in masculine gender (कोऽसौ अनुमानो नाम). Here अनुमान is used in masculine gender.

The word ब्रह्म in the Sutra is chiefly used in the sense of Vishnu. Reasons are adduced to

prove this for those who do not admit this. But Brahma connotes other meanings also primarily. You cannot disprove this as Koshas are quoted as authority. Hence it is said Brahma means Vishnu by a chief primary way of connotation. (or the convention of the learned).

In 'तदेव ब्रह्म' Vedic scripture ascertains the meaning of Brahma to be Vishnu only. To prove this another scripture-evidence is adduced 'अमर्यपारे' This quotation does not prove तत् to stand in the place of Vishnu. So it is explained that the commencement of the former passage is the latter quotation whose purport is the same as the meaning of Narayana. Hence तत् recapitulates Narayana and asserts that he is Brahma.

Vishnu is said to be in the midst of ocean. Lakshmi who bestows as gifts the posts of Rudra and Brahma, finds her Lord in the midst of ocean.

A Shruti is quoted to prove that Vishnu has taken resort to the ocean and to prove his greatness par cellence. Raghavendra shows his skill in Vedic interpretation as he has shown his scholarship in grammar and allied subjects. ऋद्धगर्भिः The constituents of Brahmanda which are all pervading are seven viz the five elements in including Mahat and Ahankara; and they have the presiding deities, who are all engaged in their re-

spective duties at the order of Narayana. He is the agent who distributes happiness among mankind.

The experience of the great men of intuition is brought to bear upon the problem. They declare emphetically that Brahma is Vishnu alone.

Here again an objection is raised. Sutrakara himself in the next Sutra (जन्माद्यस्ययतः) specifies the meaning of Brahma as one who is the cause of creation, sustenance destruction and other things of this world. Where is then the necessity for the Bhashyakara to marshall all his scriptural scholarship in adumbration to settle the meaning of Brahma to be exclusively Vishnu.

Because to one who is well versed in the different meanings of words it is but natural that a word when uttered should convey different meanings. Hence it is natural that Bhashyakara should ascertain one exclusive meaning warranted by the context.

It is not a rule in interpretation that we should interpret in the light of expositions that follow and not those that precede. सविष्णुराहुः precedes अथातोब्रह्मजिज्ञासा and in its light a discussion of the meaning of Brahma is instituted and settled. Bhashyakara does not prevent any one from

interpreting Brahma in the light of coming elucidation.

So Brahma is Narayana or Vishnu and not the embodied soul. Sutrakar does not give even an inkling of a hint that Brahma is the human soul. Why should we father upon him an idea which is not his. The subject is sufficiently thrashed and at the end we only reiterate that investigation of Brahma is essential as it is endowed with all the prerequisites of eligibility, subject matter, and purpose—all mutually related which qualifies Brahma Meemamsa for a happy launching.

The end of Jijnasadhikarana.

JANMADHIKARANA

It was stated that the investigation of Brahma must be undertaken in the first Sutra. That investigation begins from the second sutra जन्माद्यस्य यतः and not from ईक्षतेनशब्दम् as others contend. This is made clear in Chandrika.

Here it is explained how naturally the second sutra follows the first sutra. Investigation of Brahma means the investigation of the nature of Brahma along with its means and its ultimate fruit. No doubt the compound ब्रह्म-जिज्ञासा is to be dissolved as ब्रह्मणः जिज्ञासा and the genitive is used in the sense of karma or object of investigation and hence the nature of Brahma is the most important part of investigation; Yet this investigation to be complete includes the research of the means of investigation and the ultimate purpose or fruit of it. Besides the inquisitive nature of an aspirant does enquire how to investigate and why; and the satisfactory explanation of how and why is the exposition of means and purpose of this investigation. Of these two, first Sadhana is taken up for treatment and next Phala. First the nature is expounded. Nature of Brahma is made clear by a definition and evidences.

Definition distinguishes the object defined from similar and dissimilar objects. Then you shall have to adduce evidences to prove what you have stated.

Here Brahma that is defined is not void of attributes as others say but it is one endowed with rich attributes. For that Brahma is one who is the cause of creation sustenance and destruction of this world. And he is also one who is searched in the midst of the ocean, by the men of intuition.

So then the ultimate definition of Brahma is that which is the cause of creation and other seven things of this world. Here the activity of creatorship is in Brahma and the action of creation is in the world. One is the agent of creation प्रयोजक and another is the object of creation प्रयोज्य. The activities of creatorship and others denote by secondary implication creation and other things of the world.

Now all these attributes of creatorship and others are corroborated by statements in Shruti. For all statements referring to the cause of creation, when they are made to refer to Hari, accord harmoniously with the general spirit of Shruties. Or some like Ramanuja object to Brahma being the cause of creation and other things at one and the same time. For when

creation goes on, there cannot be destruction and other things and so on and so forth. Hence Brahma is the cause of creation and other things not at one and the same time but at different times pertaining to different functions. But Madhva wants to assert that Brahma has the potentiality of all these powers at all times. This is elaborately treated in Chandrika when refuting Ramanuja.

‘Brahma is one full of all (auspicious) attributes’ is a good definition. Yet ‘Full of attributes’ though proved in Shruti yet this scriptural evidence has not saved it from the doubt of ‘impossibility’. But the definition of ‘cause of creation and other things’ is proved by Shruti and countenanced by reasoning also. This topic is expostulated in the second Adhya where to prove Brahma to be the cause of creation, reasons like ‘sentience, absolute freedom, omnipotency’ are adduced. But to prove Brahma to be ‘full of attributes’ the only reason that can be adduced is ‘the cause of creation’. Hence in the second Sutra the definition of Brahma is first given as ‘the cause of creation’.

The compound जन्मादि gives room for double dissolution. One is अतद्गुणसंविज्ञानबहुविहिः that is the attribute does not qualify substantive. Hence

(जन्म आदिः यस्य) refers to स्थिति. Brahma is one who is the protector (पालक) of the world but जन्म does not qualify the other, Brahma. Then the second dissolution is तदुणसविज्ञानबहुव्रीहिः in which the attribute qualifies the noun that is different from the members of the compound. So creation sustenance and dissolution are the attributes and Brahman is considered the cause of these things. Hence सृष्टिस्थितिभंगं is a Samaharadwanda (showing single collection of these things).

But all these definitions are defective. For the definition of Brahma is scriptural and it must entirely be vouchsafed by the Shruties. Chandrika mentions all such Sruties which must be consulted before the inception of the definition. Shruti tells us that Brahma is the cause of eight things beginning with 'birth' they are maintenance, death, knowledge, ignorance, control, bondage, release."

The hidden purpose is explained thus:-

If Brahman is the cause of eight things like creation, are these individually each one of them is a definition or all these collectively constitute a definition? If the first alternative is accepted, there is no special use of more than one definition. If the second alternative is accepted then all the eight will be attributes of Brahma. In a

definition if an adjective is to be used attributively then it must fulfil these two conditions.)

1) It must be Samhāvita or really existing in the substantive and 2) it must be useful in removing Vyabhichara (residing in a place which does not come in the orbit of definable things). Now these attributes (like cause of creation and others things) are really existing in Brahma). But each one like 'cause of creation' is adequate enough to distinguish Brahma from non-Brahmas. Hence they do not serve the purpose of removing Vyabhichara or existing in non definable things.

Thus we accept the first alternative of eight individual definitions. Besides these attributes add to the splendid and un limited richness of Brahma.

So the Sutra 'जन्माद्यस्ययत्:' enumerates eight definitions of Brahma as stated in different Shruties. But this is not what a Sutra should do. A Sutra is expected to interpret Vedas and adduce proper reasons for such interpretations. Its function is not over merely by making some meaningful statements. Brahmasutras are aid to the interpretation of Veda offering conclusive and decisive interpretations based on sound reasoning and canons of interpretation. So here the fourth interpretation of the Sutra is given.

Hence a different interpretation is given to the elucidation by Jayateertha 'सृष्टिस्थितिश्चसंहार' on the Sutra जन्माद्यस्ययत्नः. Among these eight definitions one is enough to distinguish Brahma from other things. Brahma is mentioned as the object of investigation and is stated in some Shruti as the cause of creation and in some others as cause of destruction to distinguish Brahma from Jeeva. If from the eight some are not mentioned then they will not be considered as extra-ordinary properties of Brahma to distinguish it from Jeeva. Hence all the eight are mentioned as definitions of Brahma.

Now in Shruti the object of investigation is enjoined as Brahma, who is endowed with innumerable and unlimited attributes and hence is proved to be other than Jeeva or soul. Here a doubt arises. Raghavendra makes clear the form of doubt. The object of doubt is Brahma as used in the Veda. This doubt is to satisfy the objections raised on Jijnasa that is proved in the first Sutra. So the second Sutra develops the subject matter of the first through satisfaction of queries raised on the first. The topic of investigation is not doubted for it is already confirmed. But who that Brahma is, is doubted.

The interpretation of a word depends on etymological derivation and syntactical import. Etymology of Brahma is resort of attributes. A doubt is not entertained in this respect as it is ascertained. But whether the syntactical import favours Vishnu to be the meaning of Brahma is the form of doubt.

Finally it is settled that jeeva cannot be Brahma to be investigated. For that Brahma is the creator. Therefore Brahma is Vishnu only. The meaning of a sentence is ascertained by elucidation. Now if we find the elucidation of a passage in the same work it is more reliable. The Shruti that Vishnu is full of attributes is elucidated by Shruti itself. This self elucidation confirms the existence of meritorious attributes in Hari; and it does not give scope for the existence of defects. Hence the mention of defects here pleads for some other meaning of Vishnu than Brahma. It must be either the master of sacrifice or sacrifice. For in Shruti Vishnu is born of Soma sacrifice. But the real meaning of this Shruti is that Soma is Narayana in the ocean of milk from which as original the form of Vishnu is manifested. This explanation is to be found in Sanyasa Ratnavali.

Another reason is adduced in this context. Shruti cannot expose any defects of Vishnu. For Vedas are the expected sources of knowledge of Vishnu and Jeevas through Vedic knowledge and divine grace get release from bondage. God cannot be pleased with the knowledge of His own defects. Hence Vedas cannot describe the defects of Vishnu. Such Veda which enjoins investigation of Brahma and tells its defects is as invalid as a statement which enjoins a sacrifice to get heaven and at the same time doubts the existence of heaven.

But the validity of a statement is correspondence with the object that is stated, and not its fruitfulness. Hence on the ground of incompatibility with Moksha Vedic statement cannot be declared to be invalid.

We do admit that validity depends upon correspondence; yet reference to fruit is not out of place; for when two meanings are expressed by a sentence naturally we try to settle one of them as its meaning, by reference to the fulfilment of the fruit or purpose. Thus fruitfulness is the criterion to settle which of the imports is warranted by the context.

Thus the validity of a sentence is, in respect of import, which is compatible with the fruit or

purpose of that sentence. But let this be accepted as theory of semantics in the case of human compositions. For man for the purpose of getting the fruit uses a sentence. In authorless composition of Veda how can there be expressed any desire of a person? The reply is that when there is no person involved and the natural power of the word expresses itself into some meaning, then knowledge is obtained and import is the object of knowledge, and that is the purpose, and not one involving desire.

Purpose is not to be studied through, the inference but through Veda itself. The inference is to this effect. Veda has purpose, and fruit and impelling to activity because it is an acceptable sentence. But Veda itself declares that it is started to alleviate the pain of man.

Even then it is objected that the Vedas may have the purpose of securing Swarga or heaven, and not for securing Moksha. Then Validity or invalidity is to be settled by reference to Expectency, compatibility and Juxtaposition, in a sentence. There also if the purpose is fulfilled only then, the sentence is valid in its meaning.

The definition of Brahma as vouchsafed by Shruti is defective because the agency of creation, on the strength of Shruti is to be found in

chaturmukha Brahma and Shiva and some shruti relates Vishnu is said to be born. Hence creatorship is not to be found in Vishnu. So the definition is affected with impossibility (असम्भव).

Thus in Shaiva Purana some other than Vishnu is credited with creatorship and Vishnu is divested of it. They cannot be reconciled with the teachings of Shruti by another interpretation.

When Puranas thus challenge teachings of Shruti, rule of Jaimini restores the situation. If a composition is written by human beings and is suspected to be defective and yet runs counter to authorless compositions of Veda, such composition is declared to be invalid. This applies to all Smrities and Puranas that depend up on the Vedas for their Validity. But human compositions, if they could not be traced to their original Shruties, must be imferred to have their original Shruties though they could not be traced now.

So though Rudra and others are referred to as creators in Smrities and Shivagamas, they are invalid as they are catugorically contradicted by the Vedas. Hence the definition of Brahma or Vishnu being the creator of the world is neither improbable nor is overpervasive. It is not also over-extending. Hence it is finally stated

that Brahma is that which is the cause of creation, sustenance and destruction.

Now Madhva wants to show that the definition of others is not to the point, and is beset with all the defects of definition. First he chooses the definition of Mayavadi for critical survey. The very way in which he introduces the definition is not proper. First he chooses the definition is something not proper. He says that Brahman is the cause of creation and other things is the definition of Brahman not one referring to the nature of Brahman but it is only तदस्य लक्षण or definition which conveys only a temporary mark of the thing defined. Creatorship is not the intrinsic property or essential characteristic of Brahman but it is something extraneous. It is Maya connected with Brahma that proves to be the cause of creation. There are three possibilities. 1) Brahma qualified by Maya is the cause. 2) Brahma is the cause after borrowing the power of Maya. 3) Maya really is the cause of creation; But Brahma is the cause being its support. Thus the cause is extraneous in his system. But this is not reasonable; the cause of creation is the intrinsic nature of Brahman. Hence the definition of Brahma is swarup laxana and not Tatastha Laxana.

To corroborate this truth Bhagavata is quoted. In the tenth skandha it is stated that "Brahma is uncommon, devoid of internal distinctions (homogeneous), without equals and superiors, characterised by its essential nature of being the cause of creation and others." This is the way in which Krishna meditated on Brahma; yet Badarayana called it his own statement. You cannot decry the statement on the ground that it is a repetition. Otherwise the dialogue between Swetaketu and Uddalaka also would be fit to be rejected.

Mayavadi contends that this cause of creation is not the essential nature of Brahma. It is an extraneous character borrowed from Maya which has sought contact with Brahma. Or it is a temporary mark of Brahma like a crow perching on the house. It need not be objected that the definition would have been "that from which the world originates is Maya and Brahma is its support." For 'That is Ganga where there is a cow-pen' where 'Ganga' means by secondary implication 'the bank of the Ganga' And here also by the same method of secondary implication 'From where originates the world' means 'from Maya which has resorted to Brahma.'

Even when, thus Mayavadi takes resort to Tatastha Laksana, he is not out of the wood. For it is objected that the mark of the perching of a crow if included in the definition of the house, 'the house' also means 'the resort of a crow'. So when the crow flies away we must have the idea of the slipping of the part of a house from our consciousness. But Mayavadi contends that the Tatastha Laksana theory of Brahma is not at variance with the theory of oneness of Jeeva with Brahma. For the doership and enjoyership which are conceived by the Jeeva as belonging to him as they are not dissociated from the group of body, senses and mind and from the group of defects of Nescience which are manifested in the form of attachment and hatred, cause vainly trouble and tremour to him. That Jeeva is really distinguished from Brahma having this definition. But what forms his consciousness is really identical with Brahma. Then again the present sutra means (जन्मद्यस्य यत्) That the whole world is superimposed upon Brahma. So this illusory world has for its substratum Brahma. Hence the cause of unreal world, Maya, is also unreal and hence Brahma has no real attributes. Mayavadi adduces inference and Verbal testimony as evidences to his contention.

But all attempt is carrying coals to New castle. Let us keep the theory of world illusion apart. First let us see why we should accept that the definition of Brahma is only his temporary mark and that the definition secondarily by implication should apply to Brahma. Secondary implication always pre supposes the contradiction of the primary meaning. Perception does not offer any objection for Brahma to be the cause of creation. Nor inference offends the nature of Brahma as the cause of creation. Mayavadin pushes forward the argument of presumption (अवगति). The identity of Jeeva and Brahman is presumed. That presumption does not tolerate that Brahman should inhere the nature of being the cause of creation. To save Brahma from this peril Maya would accept that cause of creation as her attribute. Brahma being the support of Maya becomes secondarily the cause of creation.

But the presumption of the identity is unwarranted. For there are no evidences to prove it. Now we must see in whose place तत् in तत्त्वमसि is used. (यतः प्रसूतिः तद्ब्रह्म) In chandogya a statement that precedes तत्त्वमसि runs to this effect: सत्त्वमसाः सोम्येमाः प्रजाः तदैक्षत तत्तेजोसृजत. Then we find तत्त्वमसि does not support identity of Jeeva and Brahma. For there will be no rational cohe-

rence between identity and what precedes तत्त्वमसि. तत् in तत्त्वमसि is used in the place of Paramatma who is the store house of attributes and who is the cause of creation and other things of the world. This great Paramatma is said to be identical with this small soul of limited knowledge. There cannot be any identity between two things of incompatible natures. So these two things shedding their own contradictory natures embrace identity.

In the second alternative (तत्त्वमसि) 'that is you' is like 'Devadatha is a lion.' Here is only an appositional construction where two nouns are used in apposition in conformity with the difference between the two, even when both are used in their primary senses. Where is then the necessity of taking recourse to secondary implication. This appositional construction is considered (गौण) secondary because the apparent identity means only real similarity between the two. In Chandrika this secondary identity is explained thus: In the secondary apposition the 'that' (तत्) is Brahma having doership. In this appositional construction 'that' means secondarily 'a thing similar to that'. In 'That is you' there is identity which is the meaning of apposition. But this identity is not based on the peculiar etymological connota-

tion of the word Brahma, the chief attribute of Brahmahood, which is not found in Jeeva. Yet this similarity cum-identity is to be found between the two, based on some secondary and common attribute of consciousness: Therefore secondary identity is obtained by appositional construction.

Mayavadi accepts secondary implication of a peculiar type which is called जहदजहल्लक्षणा in the case of तत्. Raghavendra explains this as त्यजत् अत्यजत् लक्षणा (ओहाक् त्यागे). The meaning of a word is derived by a secondary way of losing something in its primary sense and retaining some other thing of it. Here तत् according to Mayavadi loses some attributes like doership in Brahma, but retains consciousness in Brahma. Therefore तत् means pure consciousness.

We know that a doubt arises whether this apposition should be primary and the words तत् and त्वं should be used in secondary sense or the apposition to be secondary and the two words to be primary in their senses; and there is sound reason to solve one of either alternatives. When we use the canons of interpretation, they usually end in difference as the result of the investigation.

Now God Hari is eternally endowed with auspicious attributes while Jeeva is eternally

branded with imperfection with, limited attributes. What is the meaning of the deletion of opposite attributes of both of these? It neither means lack of your intention nor their temporary nature. It only means the identity of Jeeva with attributeless Brahma.

Now we must scrutinise 'attributeless Brahma.' He must be either different from or identical with 'Brahma with attributes.' If identical, Nirguna also becomes saguna. If on the other hand Nirguna is different eternally from Saguna then Nerguna is no longer Nirguna.

Again if it is contended that Brahma is naturally attributeless (Nirguna) but becomes one with attributes, only by imposing false attributes on the pure Brahman, it is only layman's point of view. It cannot stand the discipline of a well established system. For the Tarkikas suppose that the five things 'Guna, Karma, Samanya, Vishesha and Samavaya' have no Guna in them (Nirguna). Now the point at issue is not to refute that Nirgunatva of the Tarkikas but only the Nirgunatva of Brahma according to the Advaitic conception. Guna is simple attribute or property (गुण) of Brahma and not any technical Guna of the Vaisheshikas.

Therefore Advaiti cannot present a rational exposition of the Nirgunatva of Brahma. Or false attributes cannot be conceived to be super imposed. For the dictum that Brahma is indescribable is already refuted. Even the Vedic statement that साक्षीचेतः केवलीनिर्गुणश्च describes Brahma and Nirguna here means 'not having physical attributes' that does not deny all attributes. For the statement shows that Brahma is Sakshi, which is explained by Panini as साक्षात् दृष्टरिसंज्ञायाम्. In the sense of seer there is the termination इनि. In साक्षात्, आत् has the sign of टि and according to the rule of grammar भमात्रे टिलोपः आत् is dropped. And to साक्ष् इनि is joined and then it becomes साक्षिन्.

If still it is persisted that Brama is Nirguna on account of lack of attributes in general, it leads to absurdity. Then it is objected that if this definition is essential it goes very hard to relate the definition to the thing defined. For if the relation of definition is different from Brahma, then it necessitates the existence of another relation to relate it to Brahma, that relation again needs another. Thus there is endless regress. If on the other hand there is identity between the relation and the related, then relationship itself is not justified.

Then all the three definitions as sources of creation, sustenance, and dissolution become one. Therefore all the three mean the same thing and there is Tautology. Hence it is necessary to say that that which is the cause of creation is Brahma. Hence causality is false and super imposed.

Now again the identity propounded by Mayavadin is difficult to be explained. It is explained according to him by 'great' sentences like तत्त्वमसि and by subordinate statements like सत्त्वं ज्ञानं अनन्तं ब्रह्म. These two kinds of statements mention some identity which is coloured with some attribute by which it stands divided from itself. For तत्त्वमसि describes identity. But is this identity one with the consciousness the implied secondary meaning of तत् ? or is it different or both one and different? Mayavadi accepts the first alternative viz identity, is one with the consciousness the secondary meaning of तत्.

But if identity is one with consciousness then तत्त्वमसि cannot state it. For consciousness which is identical with identity, is self luminous, and always stands self expressed and hence does not need the help of the shastras to express it.

But Mayavadi contends that according to himself luminousness is not self expressibleness

but it is unknowable and yet fit to be object of perception. yet self perceptibility propounded by the shastras stand self contradicted.

But Mayavadi contends that identity being one with self luminous Chaitanya is self perceptible and needs no shastras to propound it. But a doubt arises of difference and shastra removes that doubt of difference.

This contention is utterly baseless. For, being self-luminous identity ever stands known to all and hence there is no scope for the doubt of difference to rise up. If to give scope for the doubt to rise you allow identity to hide, then Atma shall have to forfeit its claim to self luminosity. If it is Maya or Avidya that hides this self luminosity, then there is no Adhithana or substratum, Atma, for the illusion, and Avidya and its function cannot stand to reason. If Avidya can hide a thing which is consciousness and self luminous then Atma also belonging to the same category will not express himself.

In the case of second alternative of identity being different from self luminous Chaitanya Mayavadi denies his own principle. For he is an advocate of identity and not difference.

Besides identity different from Chaitanya is false according to Mayavadi's presupposition. Then if identity is false, difference will be true. Identity and difference are two contrary things. Of these if one is true another is false: There cannot be any third state between the two. This is the rule.

In the third alternative the identity is both one and different from Chaitanya implied by *तत्* in *तत्त्वमसि*. Then there is the fallacy of infinite Regress.

But infinite Regress, which is able to cut at the root of the first thing from which it started amounts to fallacy. This infinite Regress will not stop the first Bheda either to be produced or to be cognised. Hence this is no fallacy.

Jayateertha says according to the rule that 'there is no cognition of a qualified thing till its attribute is cognised' the cognition of the first Bheda is not possible. For identity is different from cum identical with Chaitanya is qualified cognition. The adjective is Bheda bheda (difference cum identity). Unless this is known the qualified knowledge is not possible. Now again Bhedabheda is an adjective and identity is the substantive qualified by it. Hence we must

first have the Cognition of Bhedabheda. Thus for the cognition of the latter Bhedabheda the cognition of the former Bheda bheda is essential. So this regress hinders the cognition of the first Bhedabheda. Therefore this Regress amounts to a fallacy.

Mayavadin again rallies his borken strength and puts forth an argument. Identity though identical with chaitanya still maintains itself on its own merit. Hence it does not express itself by the self illumination of Atma; and hence again it needs the aid of Shastra to expose itself. Or identity is different cum identical with Chaitanya and it does not need another difference cum identity; for it can maintain itself on its own strength and get through verbal intercourse.

In this context Raghavendra discusses the genuineness of the reading of निर्वह्यति. This form should be निर्वह्यति and the insertion of the suffix इद् before the termination is the scribe's devil (mistake) or निर्वह्यति means 'expresses itself'. But here it should not have this meaning; it should mean 'maintains itself'. Perhaps to show this distinction, here the reading of निर्वह्यति has been accepted as the correct form

Even this argument of the Mayavadi is not sound. For in order to endow identity with the

power of self maintenance he must also give it the gift of self distinguishing characteristic or vishesha. But Mayavadi never accepts a vishesha.

It is proved now that non acceptance of vishesha hinders 'great statements' like सर्वमसि from expressing a coherent meaning. And the same difficulty is shown in the case of subordinate statements like सत्यज्ञान अनंतं ब्रह्म. Showing that the same alternatives of relationship like difference, identity, difference cum identity, they should be exposed as untenable in this statement also.

Mayavadi obdurately sticks to the relationship of identity between Brahma and his attributes like सत्य, ज्ञान, and अनंत yet they need not be synonyms. Because they have different connotational meanings. Of these some have more extensive connotations and others have less extensive connotations. The Mayavadins (व्यवहारे जादृनयः) accept the theory of Bhatta in all secular speculations. The Bhatta's theory is that a word expresses class notion. घट expresses घटत्व potness. Here सत्य expresses सत्यत्व or सत्ता existence which is more extensive generality. While ज्ञान expresses ज्ञानत्व which is less extensive. These are called पर and अपर जातिs, or according to Naiyayikas they express some attribute and Brahma with

these attributes is a coloured Brahma. In these two cases these words (सत्यज्ञानमनंतब्रह्म) imply secondarily the absolute Brahman.

Now the discussion runs into very fine philosophical subtleties. The first attribute सत्य by implication defines Brahma. If the other attribute ज्ञान also implies Brahma with no additional significance, then it is redundant. If on the other hand it adds to the first meaning then Brahma would lose his homogeneous unity.

Mayavadin persists in his contention and continues that though there is no difference between the two implied meanings of सत्य and ज्ञान yet they are used to refute negations of these attributes (असत्यत्व, अज्ञानत्व) falsely imposed on Brahma. Therefore there is no redundancy.

Now this contention is squarely opposed. This refutation of the negation of सत्य and others is done as an attribute of Brahma or independently. Refutation of the negation as an attribute of Brahma cannot be the import of the words सत्यज्ञान. Here Madhva says न व्यावृत्त्याप्रयोजनम्. व्यावृत्ति is used in the instrumental case. Panini says 'इत्थंभूतलक्षणे तृतीया'. Raghavendra explains this as follows :- इत्थंभूत (thus become) is 'one that has attained some mode'. Instrumental case is used when signifying

this. For example छात्रेण उपाध्यायमद्राक्षीत् (He recognized the teacher by the presence of the student). Here the word student signifies a person who has attained the mode of teachership. Therefore Panini enjoins instrumental case after the word छात्र or student. Here also Madhva uses व्यवृत्त्या in the instrumental case with this very significance. यद्वृत्ति is 'difference' (भेद). Madhav means to say that Mayavadin cannot show the negation of असत्य and others as attributes of Brahma and this cannot be pretended to be the purpose of the use of सत्यज्ञानमनन्त. Here the compound may be dissolved as इत्थंभूतस्य लक्षणं. This means instrumental is used to show that it is the attribute of something. Or it may be dissolved as इत्थंभूतं च तल्लक्षणं. It is used to express that it is the sign of an attribute of something. Hence truth is different from untruth. This difference from untruth is an attribute of Brahma because in the import Brahma is known as having the attribute of difference from untruth (सत्यं). And the instrumental case is used just to show that difference is the attribute. But Mayavadi cannot reasonably argue that difference is the attribute. And this 'difference' also cannot be the purpose. For Brahma which seemed to be different from 'untruth' does not contain 'truth' then he cannot say that 'Truth' can distinguish Brahma from 'Untruth'.

Now this *व्यवृत्ति* or difference cannot be the essence of Brahma for Brahma is positive in nature and is free from any kind of condition and is one and indivisible. If this difference is not the nature of Brahma what is the use of attempting to know it.

Thus if you do not admit any attributes it goes very hard to get any meaning out of the great and subordinate statements. To say that Brahma is 'one devoid of attributes' is as self contradictory as 'I am dumb'. For 'one devoid of attribute' is an attribute itself.

Now to come to the point on hand, Brahma is one and indivisible. Even the attributes of *सत्यम्* and others inhere in the Brahma. This will not affect its homogeneity. For Brahma has a natural power which allows expression of diversity without affecting its oneness. This power is called *Vishesha* which allows the expression of difference where there is actually oneness, without affecting it.

This *Vishesha* is defined as one existing in all things. It is the cause of the use of words, not synonyms, in respect of a thing which has no difference at all. Take for instance the two words 'Pot' and 'Cloth'. These are not synonyms.

There is difference between pot and cloth. Because there is really difference between the two. Vishesha only characterises difference in the case of that where there is no difference.

The expression of pot depends upon 'potness'. But Vishesha is not 'potness' because it is not the cause of expression of difference. It is only the cause of expression of Pot. In 'the head of Rahu, Rahu and head are one and yet they are expressed as different; and here Vishesha can be the cause of expression of difference. Yet here there is no Vishesha used to differentiate them. For the difference between Rahu and head is only formed and not real. The expression must be real difference.

Thus Adwaitavadi was forced to accept Vishesha to get cogent meaning out of Mahavakya and Avantaravakya. In the same manner it is not only in respect of Brahma but in respect of all real things every systematist requires a vishesha to manage the expression of difference where there is real identity. For instance cloth and whiteness though cannot be shown seperately and hence one and yet they are expressed as different on the strength of the natural power of vishesha.

These Visheshas are infinite in number as the things are infinite. And in each they are to be

found infinite in number, as infinite number of qualities in each thing are to be shown as different from the thing. And there is difference between one vishesha and another vishesha. But then no new vishesha need be recognised as vishesha is autonomous in nature. The rule to make this theory is no other than consistency in presentation; and the system adopted goes on changing so as to suit the new facts found out. Hence visheshas are considered as autonomous and independent.

Therefore Brahma possessing innumerable attributes is said to be one and homogeneous. It is all on the strength of the native power called Vishesha. Shruti also enjoins us that Brahma is one with its attributes and hence admits of Visheshas.

Hence the two definitions of Brahma comprising causality of creation and abundance of attributes are meaningful and consistent. That Brahma is Narayana to be investigated and meditated upon by the aspirant, ambitious of Mukti.

End of Janmadhikarana